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Evolution of Tail risk during the Global Financial Crisis (2008) 
 
Diya Lulla  




The primary objective of this thesis is to understand the behaviour of extreme 
events taking place in the foreign exchange (FX) and stock exchange (SX) markets 
around the Global Financial Crisis using parametric and non-parametric methods. 
Specifically, it models the evolution of the extreme values and Black Swans 
measures of daily stock returns and volatility proxies from a set of more than thirty 
SX and FX markets and compares their statistical properties in the pre- and post-
crisis periods. 
My findings suggest that irrespective of the modelling approach followed, there are 
substantial differences in the tail-behaviour of the two periods that cannot be 
accounted for by the mainstream mean-variance model although the identification 
of latent Non-linearities in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamics does 
indeed lead to a significant reduction in tail asymmetry and kurtosis. Moreover, 
the mainstream parametric models prove insufficient in encompassing the 
volatility tails. Consequently, this study demonstrates that during times of extreme 
financial turbulence in financial markets the existing financial risk models are 
inadequate to provide guidance for the probability of extreme events taking place 
and subsequently underlines the need for additional research on parsimonious 
models and for the use of encyclopaedic exercise of judgment in the real-world 
risk management. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The behaviour of financial markets when undergoing extreme duress or expecting 
a crisis has gained much popularity in recent financial, economic and risk literature. 
Much of this is due to the recent tidal waves of financial and economic crises 
affecting developing and emerging economies alike.  
 
It is well known that daily returns of financial assets display stylized properties 
such as volatility clustering, excess kurtosis, significant negative asymmetry and 
long memory; the effects of these are ostensibly heightened in times of a crisis 
thereby augmenting tail risk. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 popularized the idea of classifying highly 
extreme events as Black Swans which in this context are defined as events that 
are outliers and hence lay beyond the realm of normal probability (Taleb, 2007b). 
Quite a few studies have focused on the so-called de-blackening of such Black 
Swans by proposing that uncertainty comes in several forms but the most popular 
versions are: known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The former stands for 
knowledge that we know we don’t know and the latter for knowledge that we do 
not know we do not know.  
 
Generally, there is a plethora of research that emphasizes the multiple causes of 
a Black Swan such as the bursting of the housing bubble, abrupt effects of 
deregulation of the financial services sector, incongruous subprime mortgage 
derivatives, and so on. However, schematically there appears to be two strands 
that emerge: management-inspired that concentrate on transparency in 
communication, and adaptive governance, and finance-inspired which deliberates 
over the adequacy of financial models to incorporate extreme values. 
 
On the one hand, the management-inspired strand of literature highlights various 
methods by which Black Swans can become prospectively more detectable and/or 
moderated. For example: if they emerge from the lack of knowledge (an known 
unknown), an increase in knowledge of various possibilities would decrease their 
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blackness (Aven, 2015)1, and if they emerge from unknown unknowns then 
predictability can be achieved through joint cognitive processes that turn the 
implicit knowledge into collective practices (Lindaas and Pettersen, 2016).  Other 
studies focus on adapting a holistic communication technique focused on adaptive 
governance techniques that allow firms to dynamically expand their scope when 
faced with extreme uncertainly (Wardman and Mythen, 2016).  
 
On the other hand, the finance-inspired strand of literature focused more on 
studying the causes of such extreme volatility such as: the inappropriate use of 
derivatives in asset securitization transactions and deregulation of financial 
services (Catanach Jr and Ragatz, 2010, Chi, 2008, Crotty, 2009), the exclusion 
of dynamic conditional forecasts of risks that allow for rapidly changing “bursts” in 
the economy (Marsh and Pfleiderer, 2012), financial models that do not include 
modelling joint marginal tail behaviour, conditional heteroscedasticity and the 
extremal dependence structure (Hyung and De Vries, 2007, Beine et al., 2010, 
Hilal et al., 2011) and the omission of stress testing by assigning probabilities to 
extreme events and including them into formal risk models (Aragonés and Blanco, 
2008). 
 
While the empirical work on the causes of the Global Financial Crisis grows 
considerably, an emergent topic of interest in the area of tail risk is the presence 
of structural breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamic of asset 
returns and the effect it has on the tail risk. 
 
The study of structural breaks is essential to accurately modelling tail risks because 
it can lead to an misestimating of kurtosis, if neglected, thereby leading to a 
specious probability of the occurrence of an extreme event (Marsh and Pfleiderer, 
2012, Skinner, 2010, Vodra, 2009, Cowen and Abuaf, 2010, Seaberg, 2009), 
skewness (Harvey and Siddique, 1999, León et al., 2005, Jondeau and Rockinger, 
2003a) and spurious detection of long memory in asset returns (Charfeddine and 
                                                             
1 Typically the author recommends an extension of the conceptualization of the domains of probability of 
extreme events, the development of risk assessment models that incorporate this extreme risk and finally 
resilience engineering in the decision making process of the management. 
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Guégan, 2012, Chen and Tiao, 1990, Diebold and Inoue, 2001, Granger and 
Hyung, 2004, Gourieroux and Jasiak, 2001, Liu, 2000).  
 
Additionally, there are a multitude of papers that provide ample empirical evidence 
regarding the inadequacy of parametric risk assessments tools such as GARCH 
type processes in measuring tail risk (McNeil and Frey, 2000). With respect to the 
limited literature that covers tail risk during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, a 
plethora of papers exist that find evidence regarding the superiority of using 
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) to model tail risk see for example Totić and Božović, 
2016 for six stock markets from Eastern Europe; (Straetmans and Chaudhry, 
2015) for evolution of tail and systematic risk for banks in US and the Eurozone; 
(Allen et al., 2013a) for application to the benchmark indices of US, UK along with 
their VIX indexes;  Billio et al., 2016 for a Markov-regime switching approach2 for 
hedge funds because it can adequately capture time and space dependent risk 
exposures.  
 
However, these models assumed that the parameters of volatility such as the 
variance remained stable and linear. Furthermore, these papers failed to explicitly 
capture the evolution of tail risk in the presence of latent Non-linearities in the 
underlying mean and/or variance structure of the asset returns.  
 
A study that focused on studying structural breaks during the Global Financial 
Crisis found that the inclusion of breaks in the mean and conditional variance 
reduced although did not fully eliminate long memory properties in the time series 
for the GCC countries (Aloui and Hamida, 2014).  
 
The following thesis uses structural breaks combined with the EVT-GARCH 
methodology to capture the evolution of tail risk during the Global Financial Crisis 
because an essential assumption of the traditional regime switching models is that 
the number of states is finite and the causes are endogenous and recurrent while 
                                                             
2 A popular nonlinear time series model that assumes that changes are frequency and random. These are 




structural breaks impose no such restrictions allowing for the exogenous 
estimation of infinite states.  
 
The findings of this thesis will contribute to the literature of Extreme Value theory 
as its ability to capture the evolution of tail risk with the inclusion of structural 
breaks has not been considered in the literature thus far. Consequently, the 
following thesis aims to build on this work by exploring the effect of the inclusion 
of structural breaks have on tail risk termed as Black Swans in recent literature, 
specifically the change in kurtosis, and tail asymmetry of returns. The thesis 
focuses on black swans instead of extreme values because extreme values will 
exist in every data set irrespective of a crisis (returns above/below 1 percentile on 
both tails) however, black swans are highly improbable and tend to appear during 
a crisis (returns that are three standard deviations away from the mean). 
Therefore, in order to study extreme tail risk during a crisis, black swans are the 
more appropriate measure. 
 
Therefore, the estimation of tail risk and inclusion of latent Non-linearities in the 
mean and/or variance of underlying asset return process has important 
implications for asset pricing models, option pricing as well as portfolio 
diversification and hedging strategies. 
 
Specifically, the first two empirical chapters (chapter 3 and 4) will focus on the 
effect of structural breaks on tail risk arising from the mean dynamics of the 
returns process in the equity and forex market. The next two chapters (chapter 5 
and 6) will study tail risk arising from the variance dynamics by looking at the 
change in the frequency of extreme values in volatility proxies such as absolute 
returns, squared returns, log-squared returns and log range in the equity and forex 
markets. 
 
Moreover, all four chapters briefly focus on the effect of the inclusion of breaks on 
the contagion effects/volatility spill-overs building on the work of Jung and 
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Maderitsch (2014)3. This was tested by implementing a model that combined 
extreme value theory with GARCH models on daily log returns (chapters 3 and 4) 
and first-order differenced volatility proxies (chapters 5 and 6) with and without 
the provision of breaks which were identified using the break-testing procedure of 
Karoglou (2010a). The results were then contextualized using the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008 (identified as a major Black Swan (Taleb, 2007a) since the effect of 
time-varying conditional third and fourth moment of asset returns are heightened 
during a crisis).  
 
The research philosophy of this thesis is primarily positivist in its ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. It will, therefore, be using a deductive approach of 
reasoning starting with Extreme value theory to rationalise the importance of 
information that sits in the tails of an assets return distribution. The thesis will 
then build a set of hypotheses in each chapter regarding the evolution of this tail 
risk during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 i.e. is tail risk in equity and forex 
markets influenced by structural breaks in the mean and/or variance structure 
(chapters three and four) and if it is then is there a difference in tail risk from 
mean dynamics versus volatility dynamics (chapters five and six). In order to do 
this, I use a quantitative research design strategy which applies superior 
econometric modelling methods to cross-sequential data that combines cross-
section and longitudinal financial time series data to test the hypothesis (I test for 
structural breaks in multiple countries over multiple time periods with possible 
structural breaks within the data set). 
 
The empirical findings of chapters three and four are three-fold. First, that 
provision for breaks leads to fewer extreme events being identified. Second, the 
frequency of the resulting clusters of extreme events changes from one segment 
to the next in the majority of the cases in the data set thereby providing evidence 
that extreme events clusters are not homogenous in nature. Finally accounting for 
breaks reduces tail asymmetry and kurtosis overall making the asset returns 
distribution appear more normal. 
                                                             
3 Having studied volatility spill over between the equity markets of Hong Kong, Europe and the United States 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, provided evidence that structural breaks were the main cause of 




The empirical finding of chapters five and six is that black swans that arise from 
the returns processes are different to the ones that arise from the volatility 
processes. While there is a significant degree of overlap, disregarding extreme 
volatility arising from the innovations in variance could lead to a potential 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The foundational financial theory measures risk in financial markets by the 
variability of returns around the mean (often with variants of the standard 
deviation or sigma i.e. σ) or by relative volatility (often with variants of the CAPM 
model beta i.e. β). However, their hard-wired assumption, that returns follows a 
normal distribution, has long been proved invalid. Several modelling methods have 
been devised to bridge the gap between theory and empirics but so far 
unsuccessfully at least in providing with a widely accepted mainstream answer. 
 
The primary problem of the stylised non-normality is not around the mean of the 
distribution where the theory is actually quite successful in modelling the market 
returns but in the tails, when extreme events take place. This has paved the way 
for a supplementary view of risk measurement in financial returns: one that 
focuses primarily on the tails of the distribution where catastrophic events lie.  The 
Extreme Value Theory (henceforth EVT) introduced by (Mandelbrot, 1963) has 
provided now a well-established strand of literature in finance. Interestingly, 
market practitioners are more familiar with a related notion borrowed from 
manufacturing processes: the notion of Black Swans as, typically three, standard 
deviations away from the mean. This explains the confusion surrounding the term 
Black Swan since some researchers use the same term to refer to any outstanding 
phenomenon and not something that can be quantified as strictly as that. In this 
thesis I use the concept of Black Swan for both these notions and clarify whenever 
it is important, whether I am referring to the quantitative and/or qualitative term. 
At this stage it should also be noted that the main difference between the notions 
of extreme values and Black Swans is that the former stems from the EVT theory 
and refers to a pre-specified number of observations that are characterised as 
extreme values, while the latter stems from the practitioners’ approach and refers 
to a pre-specified interval outside which observations are characterised as Black 
Swans. However, both of these approaches capture the same thing i.e. extreme 
events. 
 
The remainder of this section is organised in two parts. The first part overviews 
the theoretical framework of EVT and focuses on describing each of the two 
methods for identifying extreme values. The second part provides a flavour of the 
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voluminous empirical finance literature that is tangent to the notion of Black 
Swans.  
 
Theoretical Framework of EVT 
In order to efficiently realize extreme financial risk which requires focus on the 
tails of a financial distribution, the EVT branch of statistics has provided two 
popular techniques: one is the Block Maxima method and the other is Peak Over 
Threshold.  
Block Maxima (BM) 
Being the more traditional of the two methods, BM fits a generalized extreme value 
distribution (GEV) to the maximum values within certain blocks of time derived 
from a set of identical and independently distributed returns. The GEV distribution 
can take three specific forms: Gumbel, Fréchet or Weibull (see (Embrechts et al., 
1997);  Kellezi & Gilli, 2000; McNeil, 1998 for detailed theoretical evidence).  
Starting with the daily returns of the chosen index, Ri, assumed to be identically 
and independently distributed with an unknown underlying cumulative distribution 
function, FR, the chosen time period for analysis is then broken into non-
overlapping blocks of length n, from which the maximas in each consecutive block 
are chosen, Xi. These maximas Mn where Mn=max(X1,X2,…,Xn) are then normalized 
and their cumulative distribution function can be given as:  





Theorem: Fisher and Tippett, 1928; Gnedenko, 1943 
In order to achieve a non-degenerate distribution function Yi, maximas, Mn, have 
to be standardized to achieve a non-degenerate behavior limit when 𝑛 →  ∞ using: 
𝑌𝑖 =
(𝑋𝑖 −  𝛽)
𝛼
         𝛼 > 0 
Where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are location and scale parameters respectively. 
The Fisher –Tippet theorem states if 𝑌𝑖  converges to some nondegenerate 
distribution function, this must be a generalized extreme value (GEV) whose 










𝑖𝑓 𝜉 ≠ 0
𝑖𝑓 𝜉 = 0
 
Where ξ is known as the shape parameter of the GEV distribution which determines 
the tail behaviour and Yξ gives the type of distribution. GEV is a generalized 
representation which can take one of the following three forms: 
ξ > 0 for Fréchet distribution in which the tail of Fr declines by a power function. 
The result will be fat tailed distributions like pareto, gauchy or student’s t. it can 
be represented as:  
Φ𝛼(𝑥) = {
0,                   𝑥 ≤ 0
𝑒−𝑥
−𝛼
, 𝑥 > 0
 
ξ < 0 for the Weibull distribution in which the tail is finite which will result in 
distributions with bounded support like uniform or beta which can be represented 
as:  
Ψ𝛼(𝑥) =  {
𝑒−(−𝑥)
𝛼
, 𝑥 ≤ 0
1,                     𝑥 > 0
 
 ξ = 0 for the Gumbel distribution in which the tail of Fr declines exponentially. The 
result will be a thin tailed distribution like normal, log-normal, exponential or 
gamma which can be represented as:  




It is important to remember that all three limiting distributions of the GEV are of 
normalized maxima’s, however, in reality, the underlying distribution of the sample 
extremals are unknown. Therefore, it is important to calculate the parameters for 
the GEV distribution (the tail index,𝜉, and constants 𝛼 and 𝛽) using various 
statistical techniques, the most common one being the maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE) using a three parameter specification. 
 
Peak over Threshold (POT) 
Peak over threshold approach is an alternative approach that fits the generalized 
pareto distribution (GPD) to independent data which exceed a given high 
threshold, 𝜇. Unlike the block maxima method, POT is considered more efficient 
since time series data often exhibit volatility clustering and where BM method 







values above a predefined high threshold to be taken into consideration. The 
conditional excess distribution function for this method was introduced by Pickands 
(1975), Balkema and de Haan (1974) motivated by Fisher and Tippett (1928) who 
provided the types of limiting distribution that sample maxima can converge to 
given it has specific mathematical properties. 
 
Theorem: Pickands (1975), Balkema and de Haan (1974) 
Using the i.i.d. daily returns 𝑟𝑖 in the financial time series arising from an underlying 
distribution 𝐹𝑟 the returns that are above the threshold 𝑢 follow a conditional excess 
distribution function 𝐹𝑢 (𝑦) where, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑢. The behaviour of these exceedances 
𝑦𝑖 can be approximated by the following cdf:  
𝐹𝑢(𝑦) = 𝑃(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑢 ≤ 𝑦 | 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑢) = 
𝐹𝑟 (𝑦 − 𝑢) − 𝐹𝑟 (𝑢)
1 − 𝐹𝑟(𝑢)
, 0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑅𝐹 − 𝑢  
Pickands (1975), Balkema and de Haan (1974) provided evidence that when the 
predefined threshold is high enough, i.e. that the Fisher-Tippet theorem is 
satisfied, the excess distribution, 𝐹𝑢(𝑦) of most distributions, 𝐹𝑟, can be 













1 − exp (−
𝑦
𝛽(𝑢)
) 𝜉 = 0 
 
When the shape parameter, 𝜉 > 0 then 𝑦 ≥ 0 and 𝛽(𝑢) is a positive function where 
𝐹 belongs to the Fréchet family and 𝐻𝜉,𝛽(𝑢)(𝑦) is a Pareto Distribution. When the 
shape parameter, 𝜉 = 0, 𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽(𝑢) remain positive but F is in the Gumbell family 
and 𝐻𝜉,𝛽(𝑢)(𝑦) is an exponential distribution. When the shape parameter, 𝜉 < 0 then 
y lies between 0 and 
−𝛽(𝑢)
𝜉⁄  and 𝐹 is in the Weibull family and 𝐻𝜉,𝛽(𝑢)(𝑦) is a Pareto-
type II distribution.  
 
In order to estimate the tails of the distribution, Pickands-Blkema-de Haan 
theorem states that the following approximations can be used given that a 
sufficiently high threshold,𝑢, is selected:  






For 𝑥 − 𝑢 ≥ 0, the excess distribution function can be written as:  
𝐹(𝑥) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑢)) 𝐻𝜉,𝛽(𝑢)(𝑦) + 𝐹(𝑢) 
The function 𝐹(𝑢) is estimated using historical simulation using the empirical 
cumulative distribution function:  




Where n represents the total number of observations in the sample and k 
represents the number of exceedances over the threshold, 𝑢. 
Using the method of maximum likelihood, the tail estimator can be obtained using: 










Where, 𝜉 and ?̂? are estimates of 𝜉 and 𝛽 , respectively.  
 
Choosing the right threshold remains of key importance to the efficiency of the 
model, if the threshold is too low then it will violate the asymptotic property of the 
model and lead to higher bias; if the threshold selected is too high then the number 
of exceedances will reduce reducing the sample size for model estimation, this can 
lead to high variance. Therefore, selection of the threshold remains an issue to 
balancing bias and variance which will be looked into more detail in the 
Methodology section of this report. 
Empirical Literature 
While the Extreme Value theory was originally applied extensively to the fields of 
hydrology and engineering, by the late 1900’s there was an increased interest in 
its applicability to financial markets and insurance (see (Embrechts et al., 1997, 
Leadbetter et al., Diebold et al., 2000, Danielsson and De Vries, 2000, Thomas 
and Reiss, 1997). 
 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: the first part covers the 
empirical literature of Extreme Value theory i.e. in equity markets, the various EVT 
models (conditional, unconditional and hybrid), the second section provides 
empirical work on tail asymmetry and the final section focuses on research done 






EVT and Equity Markets 
The introduction of EVT and its validation in estimating a superior VaR at higher 
quantiles exists in abundance within the finance literature. For example: Bekiros 
and Georgoutsos (2005) applied EVT to the financial data from Dow Jones Index 
as well as the Cyprus stock exchange and found EVT based VaR to be more 
accurate when compared to conventional methods (see Gilli (2006) and more 
recently  (Allen et al., 2013b) with respect to US, UK, German, French and the 
Australian Stock exchanges as well as volatility indices, (Daníelsson and Morimoto, 
2000), for application to Japanese Stock Markets, (Wagner, 2003) for application 
to the German stock market, (Kabundi and Muteba, 2011) for application to the 
left tail of the US, UK, Japanese, South African, German and French equity 
markets, (Vilasuso and Katz, 2000) for application to seventeen developed 
markets, namely Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US). 
 
Although empirical evidence supporting fatter tails of financial distributions as 
opposed to the previously assumed normal distribution of stock returns emerged 
relatively early (see (Mandelbrot, 1963, Fama, 1965) and more recently works by 
(Embrechts et al., 1999, Longin, 2000, Danielsson and De Vries, 2000)) yet 
research focusing on the application of EVT to emerging markets became more 
significant after studies by Harvey (1995) and Claessens et al. (1995) revealed 
that the deviation from normality was significant in emerging markets in 
comparison to developed markets (see (LeBaron and Samanta, 2005) for 
additional evidence). Empirical evidence has shown emerging markets to be 
characterized by size constraints, limited liquidity and higher volatility caused by 
lack of information transparency, added trading expenses and other market 
inefficiencies among others in comparison to industrialized economies (Domowitz 
et al., 1998). All these contribute to the significant difference in the performance 
of asset returns from emerging markets and therefore require differential 
treatment as well as testing of the applicability of EVT. Research focusing and 
validating the efficiency of EVT based VaR estimates in being able to capture tail 
risk in comparison to conventional risk measurement techniques such as variance-
covariance method, HS method and ARCH type processes in emerging markets is 
adequate in literature (see (Assaf, 2009, Maghyereh and Al-Zoubi, 2006) for 
application to Middle Eastern and North African equity markets, (Gencay and 
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Selcuk, 2004) for application in Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey, (Jondeau and Rockinger, 2003b), for 
application to twenty countries covering industrialized markets, Asian markets, 
Eastern European and Latin American markets, (Ergen, 2014), (Cotter, 2004) for 
application to six Asian and Five European markets, (De Jesús and Ortiz, 2011), 
for application to the Brazilian and Mexican stock exchange, (Cerović and Karadžić, 
2015, Cerović et al., 2015) for application to the Montenegro stock market; (Da 
Silva and de Melo Mendes, 2003) for ten Asian emerging markets).  
 
Although evidence exists that Asian markets are more prone to experiencing 
market crashes and other extreme events as opposed to the American and 
European markets (Cotter, 2006, Cotter and Dowd, 2011) yet a study by Bao et 
al. (2006)studying five Asian stock markets found inconclusive evidence of the 
efficiency of unconditional EVT as opposed to conventional methods because 
neither method provided a superior VaR forecast. The same conclusion was also 
drawn by another study (Kittiakarasakun and Tse, 2011) which tested the 
performance of EVT-based VaR as opposed to ARCH-based VaR and tested it on 
developed Asian markets (Japan), advanced Asian markets (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea), developing Asian markets (Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia) and compared it to the US S&P stock market. They found evidence 
that although there was a substantial difference in the development between the 
Asian and American stock markets yet the stock markets behaved quite similarly. 
Their conclusion, based on the similarity in the shape parameter of the returns 
distributions, was that the difference was only a matter to scale and although the 
Asian markets were more volatile, both Asian and American stock markets shared 
the same probability when it came to the occurrence of extreme events. Another 
study (Dimitrakopoulos et al., 2010) focusing on a wider sample consisting of 
sixteen emerging and four developed markets across America, Asia, and Europe 
found similar evidence that the classification of the country had no significant 
difference in the performance of volatility models. In fact, they claim that majority 
of the previous research disregarded the importance of conditional efficiency of 




Hybrid EVT models 
The conflicting results provided by literature thus far led to the development to 
hybrid EVT models because unconditional EVT model did not consider certain 
essential characteristics of the financial time series data such as time varying 
volatility and clustering. Some examples of hybrid models designed to capture 
these are the Hawkes-POT method proposed by Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005), 
the Autoregressive conditional intensity POT, ACD-POT model suggested by 
Herrera and Schipp (2013) the duration-POT, D-POT model introduced by Araújo 
Santos and Fraga Alves (2013) and self-exciting marked point processes combined 
with POT, SEMPP-POT model, presented by Herrera and Schipp (2014) which 
theorized and proved that the intervals between extreme events are an essential 
consideration in forecasting the magnitude and intensity of extreme events in stock 
markets.  
 
The most popular however remains the conditional EVT model which is a two-step 
process introduced by McNeil and Frey (2000) whereby a GARCH filter is used on 
the returns to obtain independent and identically distributed residuals to which the 
chosen EVT distribution is then fitted. The most significant contribution of this 
improvement is that this model captures the conditional heteroscedasticity that 
exists in financial time series via GARCH filtering along with the ability to model 
the tails of the distribution via EVT. Although Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) 
alleged that the two step procedure meant that the efficiency of the final results 
of the conditional EVT model would be based on the accuracy of the GARCH model 
fitting, this allegation was refuted by Furió and Climent (2013) who found their 
empirical results to be robust under multiple GARCH models in the US, UK, and 
Japanese markets.  
 
Conditional EVT has been applied to international markets (see (Fernandez, 2005) 
for application in United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America, (Cotter, 2007, 
Ghorbel and Trabelsi, 2008) for application to the Tunisian stock exchange, (Furió 
and Climent, 2013), for application to both tails of the S&P 500, FTSE 100 and 
NIKKEI 225 index returns distribution), emerging markets (see (Ozun et al., 2010) 
for application to the Turkish stock market, (Vee et al., 2014), for application to 
the stock markets of Mauritius, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Croatia and 
Kazakhstan, (Totić and Božović, 2015) for application to the left hand tail of the 
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returns distribution of six emerging markets of the Southeastern Europe, namely 
Serbia, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Slovenia) and to a combination 
of both industrialized and frontier stock markets (see (Chen et al., 2012), for 
application to Chinese, Hong King, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, India, Singapore, US, 
Canda, Mexico, France, Germany and UK stock markets, (Karmakar and Shukla, 
2015) for application to three developing and three developed markets across US, 
Europe and Asia) and found to provide more accurate VAR estimates.  
 
An exceptional benefit of a dynamic VAR estimate resulting from a conditional EVT 
model that adjusts to the current volatility in the market also leads to a robust 
margin system in the Indian stock market compared to the current ad hoc margins 
being imposed by the National Stock Exchange during periods of higher volatility 
(Bhattacharyya and Ritolia, 2008).  
 
Studies have also focused on extending the conditional EVT model which was 
originally proposed to be applied to GPD distributions to GEV distributions as well 
(see (Byström, 2004) for its application to the Swedish and the US indices). 
Samuel (2007) proposed the improvement of the conditional EVT model by 
combining it with the Markov switching process in order to capture excess volatility 
being caused by the structural changes in the financial return series. The SWARCH-
EVT model was then applied to three stock indices - S&P 500 Index (S&P), Hang 
Seng and Hang Seng China Enterprise Index (CEI). Their proposed model 
outperformed the GARCH-EVT model at 99.5% confidence levels in both in-sample 
and out-of-sample tests, however when yearly back-testing was done GARCH-EVT 
model produced the most accurate VaR estimates. 
 
Research that focused on the comparison of conditional and unconditional EVT 
model during tranquil and volatile market conditions found the conditional model 
to be superior although both models performed well at confidence intervals of 
99%. However, conditional EVT model was deemed to be superior at higher 
confidence intervals capturing time-varying volatility more efficiently (see 
(Byström, 2004) for application in Swedish and US stock markets,(Zikovic and 
Aktan, 2009) for application to the Turkish and Croatian stock markets before, 
during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, (Seymour and Polakow, 2003) 
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for application to nine stocks from the South African stock market). Another recent 
study by Hoque et al. (2013) which found empirical evidence of the superior 
performance of the conditional EVT model during the Global Financial Crisis by 
applying it to five emerging (Brazil, China, Mexico, South Africa and India) and five 
developed markets (France, Germany, Japan, UK, and US). However, they also 
found that the tail parameter of the GPD was quite different in pre-crisis and during 
crisis periods implying that extreme loss estimated of one period needed to be 
tested for another and might not be an automatic fit.  
 
It is important to note that even though conditional EVT is highly superior to the 
unconditional EVT model the choice between selecting between the two models 
still exists. A distinctive study by Danielsson and De Vries (2000) provided 
evidence that for longer time horizons where a continuously modernizing VaR was 
not required, that an unconditional model was still the optimal choice as it provided 
optimal asymptotic results (this was also supported by (Christoffersen and Diebold, 
2000), whose study found that volatility forecasting display a higher speed of 
decay as there is a shift from shorter to longer time horizons. More specifically if 
the time period of interest is more than ten or twenty days, given a specific asset 
class that volatility forecasts are less relevant). So a conditional EVT model would 
be most suitable for a risk manager understanding the financial losses that could 
arise for events in the next ten to fifteen days or daily risk factors. Therefore, the 
final decision of model choice depends largely on the time horizon of interest and 
if continual updating of parameters is essential. 
Another facet of sound financial risk management is international diversification 
but due to the contagion effect and volatility spillovers, it became important to 
extend the understanding of financial risk caused by extreme events to a 
multivariate setting i.e. there has been an increasing focus on modeling extreme 
value dependencies between markets using EVT. This focus is necessary as the 
assumption of multivariate normality, which gives equal weight to all the values in 
the distribution, leads to a gross underestimation of the risks caused by co-crashes 
especially since evidence exists that joint extremal dependence increases during 
financial distress. For example, a study by Galbraith and Zernov (2009) studying 
extremal dependence between the NASDAQ and S&P found that although GARCH-
type models produced similar second-moment dependence between the two 
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markets, GEV combined with a extremal index revealed significantly highly 
extremal dependence in the NASDAQ returns.  
 
Asymptotic dependence and independence are the two types of cross-section 
dependence which determine if the relatively large values from each variable can 
transpire collectively or not, respectively (see (Ledford and Tawn, 1996, Ledford 
and Tawn, 1997, Ledford and Tawn, 1998, Coles et al., 1999, Poon et al., 2003). 
Poon et al. (2003) studied five international markets, namely US, UK, Germany, 
France, and Japan and find evidence of stronger left tail dependence due to 
correlated conditional volatilities (a study (Bhatti and Nguyen, 2012), found similar 
empirical evidence between the Australian and US stock markets). Also, markets 
within Europe displayed increasing asymptotic dependence whereas extremal 
dependence between Europe, North America, and Asia was asymptotically 
independent. Another significant outcome of the same study was that where 
asymptotic dependence exists filtering conditional heteroscedasticity using GARCH 
models can reduce tail dependence substantially (see (Fernandez, 2005) for a 
more recent study validating this conclusion for US stock markets i.e. extremal 
dependence reduces drastically when controlling for conditional heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. See (Chen et al., 2012) whose study followed similar 
methodology testing for extremal dependence between the Chinese stock market 
with thirteen international and emerging stock markets from Asia, North America 
and Europe finding that although there exists a positive correlation between the 
movements of the Chinese and other stock markets yet they are asymptotically 
independent when compared pairwise).  
 
Research has also focused on combining the conditional EVT model with 
multidimensional marginal distributions also known as Multivariate Extreme Value 
Theory (MEVT) to estimate linear and non-linear dependencies and found it to be 
an efficient parameter during periods of calm as well as crisis especially because 
they integrated dynamic conditional correlations (conditional EVT-Copula model) 
of the selected asset classes (see (Berger and Missong, 2014) application to 
German national stock exchange and foreign exchange market, see (de Melo 
Mendes and de Souza, 2004), for evidence on modelling of the joint dependence 
structure of bivariate financial distributions from the Brazilian and American stock 
market, (Bradley and Taqqu, 2004) for international markets, (Bhatti and Nguyen, 
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2012) for modelling tail dependence using time varying copulas along with 
conditional EVT between the Australian financial market and the US, UK, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Japanese stock markets, (Schich, 2004), for application to the 
European stock markets, namely Germany, UK, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
finding that dependencies during periods of extreme negative returns are higher 
than compared to extreme positive returns as well as that conditional probabilities 
between the markets are symmetric).  
 
A study on fifteen emerging markets (Ergen, 2014) provided evidence of an 
inverse relationship between diversification benefits and extremal tail dependence 
in emerging markets. They also found that although pairs of emerging markets are 
asymptotically independent yet their dependence at even finite levels of extremes 
is underestimated by simple correlation measures (see, (Turgutlu and Ucer, 2010, 
Chollete et al., 2012) for joint extremal dependence of international and emerging 
markets leading to similar results). For deeper understanding of diversification 
benefits that can be gained with a global portfolio, (Bekiros and Georgoutsos, 
2008a) found slightly contradictory results when they studied extremal 
dependence between stock indices of seven Asia-Pacific stock markets and the US 
using MEVT. For example, their first substantial conclusion was that extreme 
correlations were not statistically different from correlations achieved through 
multivariate GARCH models or unconditional models which means that amplified 
correlations during crisis periods are not prevalent. Their second key finding was 
that in order to achieve diversification benefits Asia Pacific markets would have to 
be identified as high correlation clusters to attract investors from the other two 
markets: US and Europe. However this was not the case between all the seven 
indices, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand show a highly integrated 
capital market, whereas Taiwan and Indonesian stock markets depict lower 
systematic correlation. Japan, on the other hand, exhibited fluctuating degrees of 





Chapter 3: Influence of Latent Non-linearities in Mean 
and/or Variance dynamics of Equity returns and their 
effect on the tail risk 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The use of methods based on econometric analysis has been the backbone of 
financial models – the success of which depends mostly on their ability to prepare 
their users for any foreseeable risks in the market. The Global Financial Crisis of 
2008 followed by the European Debt crisis highlighted the importance of paying 
special importance to tail risks or extreme volatility of asset returns during times 
of heightened financial distress. The presence and scope of these tail risks have a 
significant impact on the continuance and perseverance of a crisis, making it 
harder to predict their severity and therefore incorporating the amplified risk into 
asset prices.  
 
Neoclassical finance theories such as the modern portfolio theory, derivative 
pricing and financial forecasting models include financial models such as Capital 
Asset Pricing model, Modigliani-Miller Theorem of capital structure and the Black–
Scholes–Merton approach to option pricing rely heavily on the Efficient Market 
hypothesis and therefore typically assume that market participants are rational, 
well-informed and asset prices in the market are informationally efficient. 
However, empirically it has long been shown that asset returns display properties 
of persistence, volatility clustering, asymmetry, and kurtosis and yet there exist 
few parametric financial and econometric models that can comprehensively allow 
for each property to be included in the modelling of asset returns (see for example 
(Harvey and Siddique, 1999, León et al., 2005, Jondeau and Rockinger, 2003a)4 
for the implications of higher moment time-varying dynamics on asset pricing and 
allocation). 
 
While important, the literature that exists on the importance of encompassing 
time-varying conditional higher-moments remains emergent and the evidence 
                                                             
4 These studies provide strong evidence that the presence of conditional skewness and kurtosis affects the 
persistence of conditional variance of asset returns, i.e. the inclusion of conditional third and fourth moment 
led to a significant decrease in asymmetric variance thereby improving model estimates and performance. 
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limited (see for example (Clark and Baccar, 2018, Gong et al., 2010, Appadoo et 
al., 2012, Flynn et al., 2005). The predominant paradigm is still based on the 
adoption of a mean-variance model such as GARCH or Stochastic Volatility model 
at best with some realised volatility measures. 
 
A second strand of literature that has emerged in the past decade, states extreme 
risks specifically that arising from leptokurtosis have been synonymized with Black 
Swan events (Marsh and Pfleiderer, 2012, Skinner, 2010, Vodra, 2009, Cowen and 
Abuaf, 2010, Seaberg, 2009). Black Swans here are defined as events that are 
effectively treated as outliers and hence lay beyond the realm of normal probability 
(Taleb, 2007b). Quite a few studies have focused on the de-blackening of Black 
Swans by proposing that uncertainty comes in several forms but the most popular 
versions are: known unknowns and unknown unknowns. The former stands for 
knowledge that we know we don’t know and the latter for knowledge that we do 
not know we do not know. The literature highlights various methods by which Black 
Swans become prospectively more detectable. For example: if Black Swans 
emerge from the lack of knowledge (an unknown unknown), an increase in 
knowledge of various possibilities would decrease the blackness of a Black Swan 
(Aven, 2015) 5, and if Black Swans emerge from known unknowns then 
predictability can be achieved through joint cognitive processes that turn the 
implicit knowledge into collective practices (Lindaas and Pettersen, 2016).  Other 
studies focus on adapting a holistic communication technique focused on adaptive 
governance techniques that allow firms to dynamically expand their scope when 
faced with extreme uncertainly (Wardman and Mythen, 2016). This chapter 
effectively contributes to this literature by focusing on the de-blacking of Black 
Swans through the testing and, in anticipation of the results, proposal of adopting 
a simple form of time-variation in the fourth moment of asset returns. 
 
A final strand of literature on volatility that is tangent to the research objectives 
of this chapter involves the evidence on the presence of structural breaks in the 
mean and/or variance dynamics of asset returns which can lead to higher 
estimates of kurtosis leading to an upward bias in the estimates of long memory 
in the variance of stock returns (Starica and Granger, 2005, Hillebrand, 2005, 
                                                             
5 Typically the author recommends an extension of the conceptualization of the domains of probability of 
extreme events, the development of risk assessment models that incorporate this extreme risk and finally 
resilience engineering in the decision making process of the management. 
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Karoglou, 2010a, Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990). Studies show that 
incorporating structural breaks in the volatility along with time-varying volatility of 
returns leads to better estimates of Value At Risk using conditional and 
unconditional tests (Hood and Malik, 2018). However, these studies focus primarily 
on structural breaks and excess time-varying kurtosis generically and do not study 
its effect on tail risk. This chapter can be seen as a natural extension of this work 
but with an explicit focus on the evolution of tail risk, i.e. identification of extreme 
values and Black Swan clusters due to time-varying kurtosis.  
 
Combining the three stands of literature reveals an essential gap and in turn my 
research question: could unaccounted for structural breaks in the mean and/or 
variance dynamic of asset returns be a cause of excess kurtosis and if so, how is 
this effect played out when markets undergo extreme distress namely the Global 
Financial Crisis? Consequently, this chapter endeavours to examine from an 
empirical point of view, the extreme variability of equity markets of 35 countries, 
with respect to the existence of Black Swan clusters. Specifically, it tests whether 
the weak existing empirical evidence of time-varying kurtosis and skewness could 
be viewed as the manifestation of structural breaks in the underlying asset return 
distribution that are not taken into account. Such breaks would effectively segment 
the returns into subsamples, and by extension lead to the clustering of Black 
Swans.  
 
Additionally, by examining the homogeneity or heterogeneity of these clusters we 
would have effectively been informed as to whether time-varying kurtosis, as 
captured by the changing frequency of Black Swans and the threshold values of 
the extreme values, could provide a simple albeit overarching explanation for the 
tail risk behaviour of asset returns. Therefore, a comparison of how the statistical 
properties of these clusters differ before and after the Global Financial Crisis would 
inform us as to how the stock markets respond in this respect during extreme 
financial distress. In effect, the contribution of this chapter lies in recognizing the 
effect that latent Non-linearities can have on the variabilities in equity returns, the 
ignorance of which can lead to the misestimating risk during a crisis. It is not hard 
to infer that this would have a significant impact on a variety of financial tools, 
such as those dealing with risk measurement, efficient asset pricing, optimal 




The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II sets the context for the 
research with a literature review; Section III provides the specific research 
questions this paper seeks to answer; Section IV describes the data; Section V 
presents my research methodology. The final segments of the chapter are section 
VI, which presents the empirical results on the frequency of Black Swan clusters 
and extreme returns that exist in the stock market, and section VII, which 
discusses the implications for key market participants. Section VIII concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
While extreme value theory has remained highly popular in the literature (as 
evidenced by the plethora of studies summarized in chapter 2) for its ability to 
capture tail risk in equity markets thereby provide superior estimates in 
comparison to parametric models yet there is a component of tail risk that requires 
further study. This section will focus on important studies that are directly related 
to the research questions of this chapter: tail asymmetry, black swans and 
structural breaks. Tail risk is synonymized with excess kurtosis in the distribution 
of asset returns. Another term for tail risk coined by Taleb (2007b) are Black 
Swans. 
Tail Asymmetry 
There are multiple studies that have focused on the implications of time-varying 
skewness and kurtosis on the asset returns (see (Harvey and Siddique, 1999, León 
et al., 2005, Jondeau and Rockinger, 2003a). Therefore,  tail asymmetry is known 
to have a direct and significant effect on asset allocation and portfolio management 
(see (Chunhachinda et al., 1997, Guidolin and Timmermann, 2008), as well as risk 
management (So and Wong, 2012)). 
 
This has resulted in the formation of various models that have the ability to capture 
tail asymmetry considered to be superior in comparison to models that hold the 
third and fourth moment as constant because of their inability to explain ex-ante 
market risk premiums and cross-section variation in asset returns (see (Grigoletto 




However, the main challenge of modeling tail asymmetry is fitting a suitable 
distribution since traditional parametric distributions were not appropriate. This is 
resolved by Extreme value theory (EVT) that specifies the distribution of extreme 
values as Generalized Extreme Distributions (GED). McNeil and Frey (2000) then 
improved the existing EVT model by first filtering the returns using GARCH models 
and then fitting the GED distribution to the tails of the distribution. While this 
method implicitly allowed for the incorporation of tail asymmetry in asset returns 
by modeling the left and right tails separately, its efficiency was never tested 
explicitly.  
 
So and Chan (2014) investigated the significance of tail asymmetry by proposing 
a threshold extreme value distribution combined with GARCH to calculate Value at 
Risk over multiple periods. Their VaR estimates outperformed most benchmark 
financial models of extreme quantiles. While the study conclusive confirmed the 
efficiency of using EVT with GARCH to study tail asymmetry and the significant 
effect it has on risk management in equity markets, it also found finding further 
evidence regarding the degree of tail asymmetry which increases significantly 
when markets are in turmoil. 
 
Black Swan clusters 
The term Black Swan was formally coined with respect to risk and financial markets 
by Taleb (2007a) who defines it from the viewpoint of its attributes: Black Swan 
clusters are rare, have extreme impact and are essentially unpredictable 
prospectively (Taleb, 2007a). Although this research accepts the first two factual 
attributes about the extreme nature of Black Swan clusters, it integrally stunts the 
third as it deals more with human psychology as a coping mechanism after 
extreme events rather than the capability of statistical models to capture them. 
There exist other definitions in the literature with regards to Black Swans: Aven 
(2013) describes Black Swan as extreme events that are surprising given the 
context of present knowledge; Aven and Krohn (2014) identify three types of Black 
Swans, namely: 1. as an unknown unknown (a completely unknown event beyond 
the realm of the scientific, professional and academic knowledge), 2. Unknown 
knowns (events who occurrence was known to some and unknown to others) and 





There has been a growing strand of literature that focuses on the identification of 
Black Swans in the financial markets during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. A 
few focus specifically on the changes in the interest rates spreads between the 
overnight federal funds (OIS) and the interbank offer rate (LIBOR) since it is widely 
accepted as one of the key measures of financial stress (Brunnermeier, 2009, 
Mizen, 2008, Taylor and Williams, 2009, Ji and In, 2010). While Taylor and 
Williams (2009) identified August 2007 as the occurrence of an extraordinary Black 
Swan using visual observation of the trend line exhibiting an exceptionally high 
and volatile spread between OIS and LIBOR, the Ji and In (2010) used impulse 
response analysis in a multivariate setting in conjunction with bias-corrected 
bootstrapping to discuss the impact of the crisis on cross currency linkage of the 
OIS-LIBOR spread. Both studies found in part that markets were depicting stress 
signals before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 as markets started 
demanded excess liquidity. 
 
However, none of these studies account for structural breaks.  
 
Structural breaks 
Recent research has found the existence of structural breaks in financial time 
series (see (Koedijk et al., 1990, Werner and Upper, 2004, Lin and Kao, 2008, 
Quintos et al., 2001) and confirmed that tail behaviour does not remain stable 
over time. Liu (2013) tested for structural breaks using a transformed Generalized 
Pareto Distribution in the foreign exchange market, specifically UK Pound, 
Japanese Yen, and New Taiwan Dollar, all versus US Dollar. Their study provided 
evidence that there are multiple structural breaks in the tail index at quantiles 
lower than 1% and 5% with a 95% confidence interval. 
 
A recent paper by Olson et al. (2012) used the Bai and Perron (1998) technique 
to identify structural breaks and therefore possible Black Swan clusters with 95% 
confidence intervals for eight international LIBOR-OIS spreads and the global 
credit default swap index. Their findings remain similar to those previously 
mentioned, in the essence that during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 global 
markets (mainly emerging economies) were sending financial stress signals well 
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before September of 2008. Another interesting finding of their study was that the 
statistical significance of shocks to the spread became statistically insignificant 
after a 30-day time period for all countries except the US. 
 
Marsh and Pfleiderer (2012) find that the frequency and intensity of Black Swan 
reduces dramatically when existing models efficiently include predictable shifts 
(structural breaks) in the markets by using stochastic volatility models. For 
example: using S&P returns over a 20-year period, the paper provided empirical 
evidence that when returns were scaled by the prior day VIX –typically including 
the EGARCH effect, the returns were less extreme and closer to a Gaussian 
Distribution. Another interesting finding of the paper is that most asset prices 
specifically the yield premiums on corporate bonds were already inclusive of the 
time-varying risk premium which becomes heightened during crisis periods (Bao 
et al., 2011, Lin et al., 2011). 
 
All the definitions assume the nature of Black Swan clusters lies essentially in its 
immense impact (Bogle, 2008).  
 
3.3 Research Question 
Evidence exists that by identifying structural breaks in the mean/volatility 
dynamics, the assumption of normality becomes more plausible in comparison to 
conditional volatility models. However, a very limited literature exists that 
endeavours to use EVT methods to measure financial risk arising from the 
probability of an extreme returns/outlier events after incorporating conditional 
volatility models and the use of non-parametric approaches to identify multiple 
breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamics. This chapter aspires to contribute 
to this literature. 
 
Specifically, by allowing EVT to set a threshold of identification of these outliers 
combined with a break detection procedure it becomes possible to identify, test 
the homogeneity of, and estimate the frequency of Black Swan clusters and in turn 
test the hypothesis that excess kurtosis in the extreme tails of the asset 
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distribution could be a result of unaccounted latent non-linearity in the mean 
and/or variance structure of the asset returns. More tangibly, it seeks to answer:  
- Could unaccounted structural breaks in the underlying conditional mean 
and/or conditional variance dynamics be responsible for tail 
asymmetry/excess kurtosis in the distribution of asset returns? 
- Are clusters of Black Swans homogenous in terms of their frequency? 
- How does this variability of Black Swans change ex-ante and ex-post the 
Global Financial Crisis? 
 
The impact of these critical questions can be calibrated with the appropriate pricing 
of financial investments as well as the investment horizon when there exists a 
probability of occurrence of an extreme event. For example, to underestimate the 
frequency of Black Swan clusters before the occurrence of a crisis would mean that 
the asset is under-priced and not taking into account the higher risk. Therefore, 
the risk-adjusted returns are not reflecting the plausible variability around the 
mean of the stock market returns. 
 
 The use of traditional financial models used to make standardized investment 
decisions that average out the risk (assuming homogeneity in the mean and/or 
variance dynamic of asset returns i.e. constant change in conditional kurtosis and 
skewness) of those assets could be disastrous because financial markets are inter-
linked and pro-cyclical (Commission, 2009). Consequently, the collective 
behaviour of underestimating the probability of a (negative) Black Swan and 
investing in assets that do not reflect it, would lead to a far greater crisis than 
otherwise. In other words, by categorising the frequency of Black Swan clusters 
using structural breaks, my research will contribute to the current literature by 
making it possible to ascertain the exogenous risks of financial assets which could 






I use daily closing prices of the benchmark stock indices of 34 countries extracted 
from the OECD6 database accessed through the Thomson Reuters DataStream 
which is a comprehensive financial and economic information platform covering 
the equity, bond, forex, commodities and derivatives markets for several 
countries. The primary reason for choosing the OECD countries was that this 
basket of data is varied and inclusive, allowing for the demonstration of market 
risk in stock markets that  according to the FTSE Russell’s unique 4-tiered country 
classification structure ranges from most advanced (Japan, U.S., U.K., Germany 
and Switzerland among others) to advanced emerging (Brazil, Mexico and Turkey 
among others) to secondary emerging (China, Pakistan and India among others) 
and finally frontier economies (Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia) (Russell, 2016). 
 
The sample period runs from as January of 1965 to May of 2016 overall; however, 
the time period varies for some countries depending on when their benchmark 
index was introduced. Table 1 contains this information. 
  
                                                             
6 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was founded in 1960 and consists of 35 




Market Full Name Symbol Start Date Source 
Greece Athex Composite GRAGENL 30/09/1988 
Athens Stock 
Exchange 
Austria ATX - Austrian Traded Index ATXINDX 07/01/1986 Wiener Boerse 
Belgium Belgium 20 BGBEL20 02/01/1990 BEL Group 









Germany DAX 30 Performance DAXINDX 31/12/1964 Deutsche Boerse 
France France CAC 40 FRCAC40 09/07/1987 Euronext Paris 
Ireland Ireland Stock Exchange Overall (Iseq) ISEQUIT 05/01/1983 Irish Stock Exchange 
Israel Israel Ta 125 ISTA100 23/04/1987 Israel Stock Market 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Stock Exchange General LUXGENI 04/01/1999 
Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange 
Mexico Mexico IPC (Bolsa) MXIPC35 04/01/1988 
Mexican Stock 
Exchange 
Japan Nikkei 225 Stock Average JAPDOWA 03/04/1950 NIKKEI 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen (OMXC20) DKKFXIN 04/12/1989 Nasdaq OMX 
Finland OMX Helsinki (OMXH) HEXINDX 02/01/1987 Nasdaq OMX 
Czech 
Republic 




Standard and Poor's / Australian Stock 
Exchange 200 
ASX200I 29/05/1992 S&P/ASX 
Canada 
Standard and Poor's / Toronto Stock 
Exchange Composite Index 
TTOCOMP 31/01/1950 S&P/TSX 
Netherlands AEX Index (AEX) AMSTEOE 03/01/1983 Euronext Amsterdam 
Turkey Bist National 100 TRKISTB 04/01/1988 - 
Italy FTSE MIB Index FTSEMIB 31/12/1997 FTSE 









United States NASDAQ Composite NASCOMP 05/02/1971 
NASDAQ Stock 
Market 
Norway Oslo Exchange All Share OSLOASH 03/01/1983 Oslo Bors 
Portugal Portugal PSI-20 POPSI20 31/12/1992 Euronext Lisbon 
New Zealand Standard and Poor's / NZX 50 NZ50CAP 29/12/2000 
New Zealand 
Exchange (NZX) 
Slovakia Slovakia SAX 16 SXSAX16 14/09/1993 
Bratislava Stock 
Exchange 
Slovenia Slovenian Blue Chip (SBI Top) SLOETOP 31/03/2006 
Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange 
Switzerland Swiss Market (SMI) SWISSMI 30/06/1988 SWX Swiss Exchange 
Poland Warsaw General Index POLWIGI 16/04/1991 
Warsaw Stock 
Exchange 
Sweden OMX Stockholm (OMXS) SWSEALI 28/12/1979 Nasdaq OMX 
United 
Kingdom 
FTSE All Share FTALLSH 10/04/1962 FTSE 
Table 1: Countries along with the full name of their benchmark stock index, code, 




The values of the aforementioned stock market indices are first converted into log 
returns by taking the natural log-differences using the following equation: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑖+1
𝑃𝑖
] = log(𝑃𝑖+1) − log (𝑃𝑖) 
Appendix 1 presents the time-series graph of each series and Table 1 below 
provides a brief overview of their statistical properties. 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics for Equity Market Daily Returns 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
No. of Observations 6255 7923 9493 8950 6883 
Mean 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.06% 
Standard Deviation 0.95% 1.33% 0.98% 1.04% 1.12% 
Skewness -0.44 -0.32 -0.22 -0.74 0.21 
Kurtosis 5.66 7.57 10.38 12.68 6.75 
 Finland France Germany Greece Hungary 
No. of Observations 7665 7531 13406 7210 6622 
Mean 0.03% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 
Standard Deviation 1.61% 1.38% 1.22% 1.86% 1.61% 
Skewness -0.38 -0.14 -0.25 -0.1 -0.51 
Kurtosis 9 5.31 7.49 5.93 11.75 
 Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico 
No. of Observations 4797 13406 10798 4534 7404 
Mean -0.01% 0.02% 0.03% -0.01% 0.08% 
Standard Deviation 1.56% 1.24% 1.50% 1.68% 1.52% 
Skewness -0.09 -0.42 -0.31 0.22 0.07 
Kurtosis 3.79 10.28 8.27 59.32 7.49 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain 
No. of Observations 5764 6101 5918 2383 7402 
Mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% 0.02% 
Standard Deviation 1.80% 1.16% 1.44% 1.66% 1.38% 
Skewness -0.16 -0.37 1.49 -0.1 -0.1 
Kurtosis 5.4 7.16 41.8 291.74 5.83 
 UK USA Estonia Turkey Norway 
No. of Observations 9731 13406 5209 7142 7665 
Mean 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.13% 0.03% 
Standard Deviation 1.09% 1.01% 1.51% 2.60% 1.50% 
Skewness -0.53 -1.04 -1.01 -0.04 -0.97 
Kurtosis 21.79 28.42 24.71 4.45 15.6 
 Switzerland New Zealand Ireland Denmark Czech 
No. of Observations 7014 4015 8707 6904 5772 
Mean 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% 
Standard Deviation 1.14% 0.69% 1.22% 1.17% 1.33% 
Skewness -0.39 -0.49 -0.6 -0.27 -0.44 




 Israel Sweden Netherlands Iceland  
No. of Observations 7586 7664 8709 6101  
Mean 0.05% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02%  
Standard Deviation 1.45% 1.43% 1.32% 1.71%  
Skewness -0.42 0.01 -0.27 -45.27  
Kurtosis 6.24 4.59 8.27 2822.65  
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for daily log returns of stock markets of OECD countries 
It is evident from the descriptive statistics that the empirical distribution of stock 
returns deviates from normal where third and fourth moments are concerned, 
characterized by high kurtosis and some degree of negative asymmetry.  
 
A visual test of normality is conducted using Q-Q plots (presented in Appendix 2) 
which provides evidence that the data is characterized by heavy tails indicating a 
higher probability of extreme returns than a normal distribution.  
 
3.5 Methodology  
 
The research question primarily revolves around three aspects: tail risk, breaks 
that may be the manifestation of structural changes or caused by latent Non-
linearities in the mean and/or variance dynamic of equity returns, and possible 
volatility dynamics. The chapter will use Extreme value theory to identify the 
threshold for tail risk (log returns above a 1% threshold on the left and right tails), 
the Karoglou (2010a) break-test procedure to identify potential structural breaks 
in the data and finally a best fit ARMA-APARCH model to account for the effects of 
volatility clustering and leverage effects. 
 
The first model will include daily log returns from the entire sample as well as 
segments of daily log returns sliced according to break dates identified by the 
break-test procedure. Once the two groups of returns have been recognised, tail 
risk will be measured using extreme values identified by taking returns that lie 
above the 1% threshold on the left and right rails of the respective asset 
distributions and Black swans which are returns that are three standard deviations 
from the mean. The focus, however, will remain on black swans as they measure 
tail risk during a crisis where as extreme values will exist in every segment 
irrespective of the existence of extreme volatility. 
40 
 
Finally, α Black Swan cluster is established when there is a change in the frequency 
of Black Swans from one segment to the next. By comparing these Black Swan 
clusters in segment to those of the full sample, a consensus can be ascertained 
regarding the nature of extreme tail risk. Specifically, if the frequencies are the 
same, then structural breaks do not account for excess kurtosis; however if there 
is a significant difference in the number of Black Swan clusters, then two inferences 
can be drawn: first, that Black Swans clusters are not homogenous in nature and 
second that excess kurtosis can be a result of unaccounted structural breaks in the 
underlying stochastic process of stock returns or latent Non-linearities in the mean 
and/or variance dynamics. Based on these, I can then extrapolate the impact of 
the Global Financial Crisis simply by comparing the respective measures in the 
before and after the crisis periods. 
 
To ensure that the analysis is comprehensive, I also look at a second model namely 
one that aims to tests the same hypothesis but with standardized residuals from 
the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model to account for stylized properties of equity 
returns such as volatility clustering, leverage effects and excess kurtosis. 
 
The following section starts with detailing the method of identifying structural 
breaks in the daily returns, trailed by two models listing their respective 
hypotheses for the testing of homogeneity of Black Swan clusters in the returns 
and residuals respectively. In both models, the extant underlying theme is related 
to extreme values, Black Swan clusters, and structural breaks. 
 
Identification of Structural Breaks 
By definition structural breaks in a time series indicate unforeseen swings in the 
series which have the potential of rescinding the results of financial econometric 
techniques such as: imprecise parameter estimates resulting from incorrect model 
specification, prejudiced forecasts, and unreliable interpretations drawn from 
econometric tests (Pesaran and Timmermann, 2004). Financial time series are 
characterized by significant leptokurtosis but it is routinely assumed that the tail 
behaviour remains constant over time. However, when structural breaks exist in 
the tail index it can pose a fundamental challenge in the implementation of 
econometric models and extrapolation of its conclusions especially when applying 
EVT that studies returns in extreme quantiles. 
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The structural breaks in this research have been recognized using the two stages 
of the Nominating-Awarding procedure of Karoglou (2010a). The reason this 
approach has been chosen is because it acknowledges different strains of break-
tests that can be combined to identify structural changes in the mean/variance 
dynamics as well as latent non-linearity’s in the data that might add bias to the 
model. Therefore, it fortitudes the selection of a particular break date.  
 
The first stage of Nominating-Awarding procedure is the Nominating stage which 
identifies break dates involves using break tests such as:  
1. The Inclan-Tiao test – which uses simple binary-division algorithm like the 
iterated Cumulative Sum of Squares (ICSS) algorithm to retrospectively 
detect changes in the unconditional variance of a stochastic process (Inclan 
and Tiao, 1994). 
2. Sansό Aragό and Carrion test1 which takes into account kurtosis properties 
of financial data and allows for conditional heteroscedasticity (Sansó et al., 
2004) 
3. Sansό Aragό and Carrion test2 (Sansó et al., 2004) with the Bartlett kernel 
and the Quadratic Spectral kernel, implemented using the automatic 
procedure for bandwidth selection (Newey and West, 1994) as well as the 
Vector Autoregressive Heteroscedasticity and Auto-Correlation consistent 
(VARHAC) kernel (Den Haan and Levin, 1998) to bypass the bandwidth 
selection issues. 
4. Kokoszaka and Leipus test (Kokoszka and Leipus, 2000) refined by Andreou 
and Ghysels (2002) including the Bartlett, Quadratic spectral and VARHAC 
kernel correspondingly.  
 
While these test detect structural breaks in mean and/or volatility dynamics, they 
do not differentiate between the two (Karoglou, 2006b). Their efficiency, however, 
remains unchallenged in the literature (Andreou and Ghysels, 2002, Sansó et al., 
2004, Karoglou, 2006b) which confirms that even for strongly dependent time 
series with the existence of outliers, the segments do not exhibit size distortions. 
This ingenious evidence is opportune to this analysis of Black Swan clusters and 
extreme outliers as distributional properties of the returns remain unscathed. This 
procedure also allows for segments differentiated by structural changes in the 
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mean/variance dynamic to be identified while respecting their occurrence in the 
time series.  
 
The second stage of the Nominating-Awarding procedure is that of eliminating 
breaks identified in the first stage and uniting continuous segments with 
homogenous first and second order moments. This process continues until one of 
the two below mentioned conditions are satisfied till there are no segments that 
can be united: 
1. If the t-test (when variance of continuous segments are similar) and the 
Satterthwaite-Welch t-test (when variance of continuous segments are 
disparate) confirm that the means of neighbouring segments are statistically 
diverse; 
2. If the standard F-test, the Siegel-Tukey test with continuity correction 
(Siegel and Tukey, 1960, Sheskin, 2003), the adjusted Bartlett test (Sokal 
and Rohlf, 1995, Judge et al., 1982), the Levene test (Levene, 1960) and 
the Brown-Forsythe test (Brown and Forsythe, 1974) confirm the 
homogeneity of variances of neighbouring segments. 
The final outcome of this awarding break dates procedure are multiple segments 
that are homogenous in their mean and/or variance dynamics.  
Model Specification  
The model empirically tests the effect of unaccounted structural breaks on extreme 
volatility, i.e. could latent non-linearity in the underlying mean and/or variance 
dynamic of the asset return distribution be a potential cause of tail asymmetry? 
This is tested by looking at the homogeneity of Black Swan clusters in the financial 
series with and without a provision for structural breaks i.e. does allowing a 
provision for incorporating structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamics 
lead to a significant difference in the frequency of Black Swan clusters, thereby 
approving the claim that these breaks could be a potential cause of tail asymmetry 
in financial returns. For robustness, the hypothesis will be tested first on returns 
and then on residuals of returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
in order to include the effect of volatility clustering, leverage and negative 




The results of both models will be contextualized using the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008, which effectively provides the underlying research question of this 
chapter, namely, how does the frequency of Black Swans change due to the Global 
Financial Crisis.  
 
Schematically, structural breaks in the underlying asset return distribution can be 
presented as follows: 
𝑟𝑡 = (
𝜇0 + 𝜎0 ∙  𝑢𝑜,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏1 ,
𝜇1 + 𝜎1  ∙  𝑢1,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏1  ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝜏2 ,
𝜇𝑛 + 𝜎𝑛  ∙  𝑢𝑛,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏𝑛  ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝑇  
 
Where 𝑟𝑡 stands for the daily log returns of the equity market, 𝑇 is the sample size, 
𝑛 denotes the number of structural breaks which occur at dates point 𝜏1, 𝜏2, … , 𝜏𝑛 
when there is a change in the unconditional mean 𝜇 and or variance 𝜎2 of the 
underlying non-parametric process of equity returns. The standardized unexpected 
return is signified by 𝑢𝑡 which have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. It is also 
important to note that minimalistic assumptions have been made regarding the 
underlying dynamics of the model. 
 
In order to capture the heteroskedastic properties of the returns process as well 
as the leverage effects, the conditional variance of the returns process can be 
defined by the APARCH (m, n):  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡𝜎𝑡;         𝑧𝑡~𝑁(0,1) 
𝜎𝑡










Section 3.6.1 empirically test the homogeneity of Black Swan clusters in the full 
sample and then compare it to the frequency of Black Swan clusters when there is 
a provision that recognizes structural breaks in the underlying data in daily returns. 
The overarching objective will be observing any reduction in tail asymmetry in 
segmented returns. Sections 3.6.2 will investigate the equivalent outcome in 
residuals of returns, thereby controlling for the effect of stylized properties of 






model is critical from a robustness perspective to control the effect of conditional 
heteroscedasticity in the data which is known to be heightened during a crisis. 
 
Both sections will also examine the change in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values during the Global Financial Crisis to contextualize the outcomes. 
 
3.6 Empirical Results 
Using the Nominating-Awarding procedure has identified two to eight structural 
breaks in each data set. The empirical results in the following section summarizes 
the findings of the study with respect to the above-mentioned research questions. 
3.6.1 Model 1 Outcomes 
Summary of the frequency of the Black Swan clusters in the full sample 
and segments (with breaks) of daily stock market returns  
 
The results in table 2 depict the ratio of Black Swan clusters in daily log returns 
segments with and without the provision of structural breaks. The full segment 
assumes homogeneity in first and second order moments and does not allow for a 
provision of structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamics. The 
segmented sample addresses these issues. The nominating-awarding procedure 
typically finds four to eight structural breaks in the daily log equity returns of these 
OECD countries during the data timeline which spans over two decades. More 
detailed results can be found in Appendix 5. 
Table 2 - Differences in the frequency of Black Swan clusters between the full sample and the segmented sample 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  78.85% 3.92% 6.45% 22.74% 20.29% 
Left tail  36.55% 14.84% 28.00% 26.73% 20.29% 
 Czech Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  -6.90% 38.78% 8.92% 15.23% 55.96% 
Left tail  7.85% 48.29% 19.11% 26.75% 37.04% 
 
Mexico Netherlands Denmark Estonia Finland 
Right tail  13.58% 47.96% 18.72% 14.17% 49.11% 
Left tail  12.41% 23.18% 3.85% 13.06% 42.05% 
 




Right tail  7.41% 16.25% 3.64% 28.77% 9.53% 
Left tail  20.25% 36.77% 21.22% 37.16% 5.26% 
 
Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Ireland 
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Right tail  51.88% -7.41% -14.17% 0.00% 19.91% 
Left tail  15.76% 25.59% -25.78% 0.00% 18.03% 
 
Israel Switzerland Hungary Iceland Spain 
Right tail  11.51% 19.11% -8.34% -378% 18.66% 
Left tail  -3.39% 7.52% 13.88% -186% 0.00% 
 Sweden Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  22.31% 46.36% 7.90% 16.13%   
Left tail  33.95% 20.63% 10.23% 13.04%   
Table 2 summarizes the difference in the frequency of Black Swan Clusters in the full sample versus the segmented sample in 
the equity markets of the OECD countries of the data set. By differentiating the black swan clusters on each tail, the result 
represents the skewness of the data. 
The above table 2 presents the results that test the hypothesis of the homogeneity 
of Black Swan clusters when changes in mean and/variance volatility are 
accounted for as opposed to not. The evidence allows for the rejection of the null 
hypothesis as clearly accounting for structural breaks reduces the frequency of 
Black Swans by approximately 20% (with the exception of Iceland and Slovakia). 
Therefore, by incorporating structural breaks, the probability of unusual events 
reduces substantially along with reducing tail asymmetry in equity market returns. 
The countries with the highest reduction in total Black Swans are Australia 
(51.49%), Finland (45.52%) and Italy (44.63%).  
 
The case of Iceland is extremely unusual as the table shows that full segments 
have eight Black Swan clusters whereas taking the change in mean and/or 
variance dynamics finds 89 Black Swan clusters within the segments. This can be 
attributed in part to the latent non-linearity’s of a crisis (like the banking collapse 
of 2008) which can prejudice interpretations.  
 
A closer look at table 2 in terms of a horizontal country comparison with respect 
to overall Black Swan clusters depicts that the countries with the highest 
frequency/percentage of trading days of Black Swans in the full sample and 
segmented samples are: USA (184/2.32%), Japan (197/2.49%) and Germany 
(184/2.32%); and Japan (170/2.15%), UK (159/2.01%) and Korea (154/1.94%). 
Not surprisingly, these are also the countries with the highest 
frequency/percentage of trading days that account for Black Swans in the full 
segment sample on the left tail and right tail respectively: Japan (115/1.45%), 
Germany (104/1.31%) and Korea (98/1.24%); and Japan (82/1.03%), Korea 




In terms of the frequency of Black Swans in the left and right tail, the evidence 
suggests that given the total number of Black Swans in the full sample, on average, 
56% are negative and 44% are positive. This can be translated as: a) there is 
always a slightly higher probability of events occurring that will affect stock returns 
negatively and/or b) markets overreact to negative news leading to a higher 
probability and emanation of bearish markets as compared to reactions to positive 
news leading to softer impact and culmination of bullish markets. The above trend 
is consistent across 31 of the 35 countries with the exception of UK, USA, Estonia, 
and Mexico where the proportion of Black Swans in the right tail exceeded those 
in the left tail by an average of 7%. For example, the countries with the highest 
Black Swans within the segmented samples of the left tail were: Japan 
(95/1.20%), Korea (75/0.95%), Ireland (81/1.02%) and USA (79/1.00%) and 
those with the highest Black Swan clusters in the segmented samples of the right 
tail were: Japan (75/0.95%), Korea (79/1.00%) and USA (80/1.01%). 
 
A final observation is that in terms of frequency of Black Swans on the left and tail 
right, the segmented sample follow the orientation of full samples but with a much 
lower frequency, i.e. allowing for structural breaks reduces the frequency of Black 
Swan in both tails thereby reducing the skewness of the distribution. This result is 
consistent with the empirical results in the equity market returns as well discussed 
in chapter 4. 
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the full sample 
and segments (with breaks) of daily stock market returns pre and post the 
Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008) 
The following section examines the variations to volatility in daily log returns using 
the ratio of Black Swans (as three standard deviations away from the mean) to 
extreme values. Given that the former measure of tail risk pre-specifies the 
interval of values that is considered ‘abnormal’ and the latter the number of 
observations that are considered ‘abnormal’, which should be the same for two 
different samples with exactly the same number of observations, changes in the 
ratio of the two would effectively indicate that the intervals of ‘abnormal’ 




As before, I use two lenses: first, a preliminary analysis is done on how the ratio 
of Black Swans to extreme values vicissitudes when there exists a provision for 
structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic as opposed to not. This 
contributes to the literature on the impact of structural change onto the tail risk. 
Second, I focus on how the ratio changes when the study epicentres on the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, and seek to answer how the tail risk in equity 
markets evolve with respect to the occurrence of a crisis. 
 
The threshold for extreme values has been set to the 1st and 99th percentile of the 
returns distribution and the table 3 illustrates the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values overall as well as in the left and right tails of the full sample and segmented 
samples of the daily log returns of the equity market (See Appendix 6 for more 
detailed results). 
Table 3 - Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values between full sample and segmented samples 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  83.50% 6.39% 10.58% 27.09% 24.55% 
Left tail  41.20% 17.31% 32.12% 31.08% 24.55% 
 Czech Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  -5.19% 44.84% 10.39% 18.87% 62.28% 
Left tail  9.56% 54.35% 20.58% 30.38% 43.36% 
 Mexico Netherlands Denmark Estonia Finland 
Right tail  20.03% 52.40% 18.72% 16.03% 52.93% 
Left tail  18.86% 27.63% 3.85% 14.93% 45.87% 
 




Right tail  12.54% 17.72% 5.00% 35.83% 13.35% 
Left tail  23.38% 38.24% 22.58% 44.22% 9.09% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Ireland 
Right tail  55.27% -4.18% -10.89% 8.00% 22.16% 
Left tail  19.15% 28.82% -22.50% 8.00% 20.27% 
 Israel Switzerland Hungary Iceland Spain 
Right tail  15.38% 23.24% -6.86% -374% 21.29% 
Left tail  1.81% 11.66% 15.37% -181% 2.63% 
 Sweden Turkey UK USA  
Right tail  27.38% 47.74% 11.90% 17.60%  
Left tail  39.02% 22.01% 14.23% 14.51%  
Left tail  -3.39% 7.52% 13.88% -186% 0.00% 
 Sweden Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  22.31% 46.36% 7.90% 16.13%   
Left tail  33.95% 20.63% 10.23% 13.04%   
Table 3 summarizes the difference in the ratio of Black Swan Clusters to extreme values in the full sample versus the segmented 
sample in the equity markets of the OECD countries of the data set. By differentiating the black swan clusters on each tail, the 
result represents the skewness of the data. 
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There are two key observations about the trends in the ratio of Black Swans to 
extreme values that provide support to previously drawn conclusions based upon 
the frequency of Black Swans when a provision for structural breaks exists as 
opposed to not. 
 
First, when provision of mean and/or variance breaks are accounted for the ratio 
of Black Swan clusters to extreme values declines considerably i.e. in the full 
segment of daily log returns which do have a provision of structural breaks, the 
model identifies 3 blacks swans for every 4 extreme values (approximately 76%) 
and this ratio falls to 2 Black Swans for every 4 extreme value when structural 
breaks are provided for (approximately 60%) for every country except Iceland and 
Slovakia.  
 
The second observation is that in terms of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values in the left tail and right tail, the former is heavier (83% of extreme values 
were Black Swans) than the latter (66% of extreme values were Black Swans). 
This trend fundamentally endures even when there is a provision for breaks but 
the ratio decreases substantially as was evidenced in section 1.6.1 as well i.e. in 
the left tail, of all the extreme values, 68% are classified as Black Swans and in 
the right tail 53% of extreme values are Black Swans.  
 
In order to analyse the transformation in the frequency of Black Swans to extreme 
values before, during, and post the Global Financial Crisis, I have selected the 
segments defined by the three breaks that were closest to the collapse of the 
Lehman Brothers (15.09.2008). Table 4 reports the breaks and demonstrates that 
apart from a few cases there was typically a break detected close to the 
15.09.2008.  
 
Table 4 – Structural breaks identified for the Global Financial Crisis, ex-post and ex-ante segments 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada 
Pre-Crisis 29/10/2001 08/10/1992 26/07/2007 29/10/1997 
Crisis 27/07/2007 30/07/2007 17/01/2008 21/08/2009 
Post-Crisis 21/07/2009 09/11/2009 26/05/2009 06/01/2012 
Country Chile Czech Denmark Estonia 
Pre-Crisis 12/06/1998 07/04/1994 14/07/1997 04/06/1996 
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Crisis 18/05/2007 24/06/2006 10/08/2007 22/10/2008 
Post-Crisis 05/12/2011 15/06/2010 02/07/2009 05/12/2011 
Country France Germany Greece Hungary 
Pre-Crisis 15/04/2003 19/06/2003 27/09/2001 09/07/1993 
Crisis 17/01/2008 17/01/2008 25/06/2008 06/04/2005 
Post-Crisis 18/05/2009 20/07/2009 16/10/2014 25/01/2012 
Country Iceland Ireland Israel Italy 
Pre-Crisis 26/08/2004 11/02/1988 05/04/1995 10/04/2003 
Crisis 12/12/2008 26/07/2007 23/04/2005 08/09/2008 
Post-Crisis 08/03/2011 13/07/2010 21/09/2009 26/05/2009 
Country Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 
Pre-Crisis 14/03/1986 28/03/2003 09/01/2001 10/07/2003 
Crisis 02/05/2006 11/05/2007 19/10/2007 17/01/2008 
Post-Crisis 23/07/2009 05/08/2010 28/07/2009 20/07/2009 
Country New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal 
Pre-Crisis 01/01/2001 17/12/1992 08/06/1995 28/02/2003 
Crisis 09/01/2008 16/05/2006 08/02/2005 11/01/2008 
Post-Crisis 27/08/2009 06/08/2009 31/05/2010 11/12/2008 
Country Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Pre-Crisis 04/04/2007 08/01/1988 13/04/2004 28/06/2004 
Crisis 20/11/2012 12/04/2006 28/07/2008 29/07/2008 
Post-Crisis 20/06/2014 19/01/2009 08/07/2010 09/04/2010 
Country Turkey UK USA Finland 
Pre-Crisis 30/10/1998 13/02/1989 31/03/1998 22/07/2003 
Crisis 19/04/2006 19/07/2005 21/10/2006 27/07/2007 
Post-Crisis 26/05/2010 21/07/2010 21/07/2010 21/07/2009 
Country Japan Slovakia   
Pre-Crisis 23/02/1990 12/02/2003   
Crisis 08/01/2008 11/09/2008   
Post-Crisis 22/05/2009 01/07/2010   
 
It is important to note in table 4 that while most of the break dates regarding the 
advent of the Global Financial Crisis are similar for the countries in the dataset yet 
there are a few that experienced the decline much later. A plausible explanation 
for this could be the lead-lag effect caused by the delay in information diffusion 
across global equity markets.  
Table 5 builds on the above results to report the difference in the ratio of Black 
Swans to extreme value before and after the Global Financial Crisis.  
Table 5 – Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme value ex-post and ex-ante the GFC of 2008 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Pre-Crisis 56.67% 70.51% 70.37% 77.42% 50.00% 
Crisis 41.67% 100.00% 0.00% 57.14% 56.45% 
Difference -30.75% 34.94% N/A -30.37% 12.14% 
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Post-Crisis 35.71% 56.25% 75.00% 31.25% 25.00% 
Difference -15.42% -57.54% N/A -60.35% -81.45% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland Germany 
Pre-Crisis 95.45% 55.56% 84.29% 68.18% 37.50% 
Crisis 65.63% 80.00% 50.00% 58.33% 100.00% 
Difference -37.47% 36.46% -52.22% -15.60% 98.08% 
Post-Crisis 80.00% 53.33% 81.25% 43.75% 75.00% 
Difference 19.81% -40.55% 48.55% -28.77% -28.77% 
  Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel 
Pre-Crisis 55.56% 106.67% 12.50% 80.39% 62.50% 
Crisis 52.94% 58.82% 75.00% 68.75% 72.73% 
Difference -4.82% -59.52% 179.18% -15.64% 15.15% 
Post-Crisis 66.67% 45.83% 45.00% 50.00% 57.14% 
Difference 23.05% -24.95% -51.08% -31.85% -24.12% 
  Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands 
Pre-Crisis 56.67% 60.64% 84.44% 44.44% 45.83% 
Crisis 50.00% 75.00% 64.71% 66.67% 125.00% 
Difference -12.52% 21.26% -26.62% 40.55% 100.33% 
Post-Crisis 38.89% 35.29% 66.67% 97.62% 57.14% 
Difference -25.13% -75.38% 2.99% 38.14% -78.28% 
  New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovakia 
Pre-Crisis 50.00% 81.43% 61.11% 42.31% 113.33% 
Crisis 30.00% 88.89% 59.09% 66.67% 100.00% 
Difference -51.08% 8.77% -3.36% 45.47% -12.52% 
Post-Crisis 45.45% 50.00% 58.33% 47.50% 94.44% 
Difference 41.55% -57.54% -1.29% -33.90% -5.72% 
  Slovenia Spain Turkey UK Switzerland 
Pre-Crisis 40.00% 74.42% 66.67% 44.64% 68.18% 
Crisis 20.00% 53.85% 53.13% 82.76% 80.00% 
Difference -69.31% -32.36% -22.71% 61.72% 15.98% 
Post-Crisis 33.33% 61.54% 65.63% 42.86% 78.57% 
Difference 51.08% 13.35% 21.13% -65.81% -1.80% 
 USA France Luxembourg Sweden  
Pre-Crisis 25.00% 53.85% 18.18% 58.33%  
Crisis 79.03% 87.50% 38.89% 41.67%  
Difference 115.10% 48.55% 76.03% -33.65%  
Post-Crisis 71.43% 72.22% 58.33% 68.75%  
Difference -10.12% -19.19% 40.55% 50.08%  
Table 5 summarizes the difference in the frequency in the ratio of Black Swan Clusters to extreme values in segments identified 
using the break-testing procedure as mentioned in the methodology to show the evolution of black swan cluster before the crisis 
in comparison to after the crisis. 
 
The dominant trend that is apparent in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values 
in terms of pre and post-crisis periods is that the ratio seems to peak before a 
crisis and then continues to decline steadily suggesting that as the crisis becomes 
more apparent and economic measures are taken to stabilize the economy in the 
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majority of the data set the probability of extreme events becomes more 
moderate.  
 
A plausible assumption here is that stock markets were already exhibiting financial 
distress which culminated into a global crisis in the next period by which time 
investors had already become wary of the warning signals and were taking a more 
cautious investment position. However, when averages are taken there are 13% 
more Black Swans to extreme values during the segment identified as the Global 
Financial Crisis as opposed to the segment before and 20% less Black Swan 
clusters to extreme values in the segment after (identified during the Nominating-
Awarding Procedure).  
 
The countries with the highest ratio of Black Swan clusters to extreme values 
during the crisis period are: USA, Iceland, Germany and the Netherlands. 
3.6.2 Model 2 Outcomes 
Summary of the frequency of Black Swans in the residuals of the daily 
equity returns using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
With regard to robustness, model 2 removes the effect of volatility clustering in 
the series by using the residuals of the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. The tail risk 
of these residuals is then studied closely for the effect of structural breaks on tail 
risk presented in table 6 (See Appendix 7 for detailed results).  
Table 6 – Difference in the frequency of Black Swan clusters in residuals of the full sample versus the segmented sample 
(Equity Markets) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  51.08% 0.00% 11.78% 104.98% 8.00% 
Left tail  24.69% -1.98% 7.52% 37.04% -13.40% 
 Czech Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  17.19% 35.67% -8.89% 4.88% 28.77% 
Left tail  -5.88% 19.11% 16.30% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Mexico Netherlands Denmark Estonia Finland 
Right tail  8.00% 18.23% 0.00% -19.57% -57.54% 
Left tail  0.00% 6.74% -3.28% 0.00% 2.15% 
 




Right tail  -7.41% -10.01% -5.00% 0.00% 4.88% 
Left tail  -9.24% -7.28% -19.57% 23.64% 5.56% 
 
Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Ireland 
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Right tail  14.31% 12.78% -25.13% -150.41% 10.54% 
Left tail  29.85% -8.00% -3.08% -36.77% -14.66% 
 
Israel Switzerland Hungary Iceland Spain 
Right tail  7.15% 19.42% 6.90% -297.04% 26.83% 
Left tail  14.76% -2.82% -2.35% -184.58% -15.82% 
 
Sweden Turkey UK USA  
Right tail  -20.48% 0.00% -42.61% 0.00%  
Left tail  -25.49% 4.65% -63.13 0.00%  
Table 6 summarizes the frequency of black swan clusters in the residuals of daily log returns of the equity markets in the data 
set (full samples versus the segmented samples). The frequency of clusters on the left and right tail are representative of the 
skewness of the data. 
The above table 6 suggests that when autoregressive and generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models (in this case the best fit 
ARMA-APARCH model was applied) are used to sieve volatility clustering in the 
daily log returns to achieve standardized residuals, the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity of the frequency of Black Swan clusters is still rejected. By taking 
into account the structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamics, the 
frequency of Black Swans is reduced by 12% in segmented samples as compared 
to full samples for more than half of the countries in the sample. 
 
However, it is important to note that the other half of the data set, depict a 
reversed trend in terms of the frequency of Black Swans in segmented samples 
vis-à-vis the full sample i.e. Black Swans in segmented samples exceed those in 
full samples by approximately 30% (including Iceland where the frequency of Black 
Swans in segmented samples are 226% more than those in the full sample). A 
possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that the presence of conditional 
heteroscedasticity exaggerated the tail risk. However, swarms of Black Swans 
reduced drastically once ARMA-APARCH residuals were extracted thereby 
removing any autocorrelation or dependency in the daily log returns distribution. 
This assumption is further validated by the fact that after these models are 
implemented the percentage of Black Swans in full samples constitute on average 
1.49% of the trading days drops to 0.87%; and in segments with a provision for 
breaks the percentage of Black Swans that constitute on average 13.31%  of the 
trading days shrinks to 0.90%. 
 
A final development in residuals that is contrasting to earlier outcomes observed 
in returns is that the percentage of Black Swans in left tail (61%) is higher than 
the percentage of Black Swans in the right tail (39%) irrespective of the provision 
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of breaks. This proves that while accounting for structural breaks reduces tail 
asymmetry overall, equity markets continue to display negative skewness.   
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swan clusters to extreme values in the 
residuals of daily equity returns using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
For appropriateness and robustness of the model results, this section of the results 
examines the fluctuations in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the 
residuals of the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model. Again, the study is two-fold: it 
begins by examining the change in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in 
residuals when compared to returns i.e. whether the Black Swans identified in 
section 3.6.1 are reduced when non-parametric models are fitted to the series. 
The second fragment of the model centres specifically on the Global Financial Crisis 
to study the evolution of the ratio when heteroscedasticity and structural breaks 
are accounted for. In particular, it seeks to answer the questions such as: how do 
equity markets behave before, during and after the Global Financial Crisis when 
volatility clusters are removed in samples that also exhibit the same non-
parametric behaviour in terms of the first and second central moments. 
Table 7 provides evidence to the first section of the model testing the change in 
the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values when a provision is incorporated for 
changes in the mean and/or variance dynamics. It also emphases on the left and 
right tail of the distribution to highlight any underlying skewness (see Appendix 8 
for more detailed results).  
Table 7 – Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of the full sample versus the segmented 
sample (Equity Markets) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  55.73% 2.47% 15.90% 109.33% 12.26% 
Left tail  29.34% 0.49% 11.65% 41.39% -9.10% 
  Czech Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  18.89% 41.73% -7.42% 8.52% 35.09% 
Left tail  -4.17% 25.17% 17.72% 3.64% 6.32% 
  Mexico Netherlands Denmark Estonia Finland 
Right tail  14.46% 22.68% 0.00% -17.71% -53.71% 
Left tail  6.45% 11.19% -3.28% 1.87% 5.97% 




Right tail  -2.28% -8.54% -3.64% 7.06% 8.70% 
Left tail  -4.11% -5.81% -18.21% 30.70% 9.38% 
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  Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Ireland 
Right tail  -27.98% 16.01% -21.85% -142.40% 12.78% 
Left tail  -12.44% -4.78% 0.20% -28.77% -12.41% 
  Israel Switzerland Hungary Iceland Spain 
Right tail  11.02% 23.55% 8.38% -292.24% 29.46% 
Left tail  18.64% 1.32% -0.87% -179.78% -13.19% 
  Sweden Turkey UK USA  
Right tail  -15.42% 1.38% -38.61% 1.47%  
Left tail  -20.42% 6.03% -59.13% 1.47%  
Table 7 summarizes the difference in the ratio of Black Swan Clusters to extreme values in the full sample versus the segmented 
sample of the residuals of log returns in the equity markets of the OECD countries of the data set. By differentiating the black 
swan clusters on each tail, the result represents the skewness of the data. 
 
Table 7 presents twofold evidence regarding the variation in the ratio of Black 
Swan clusters to extreme values in residuals. First, the ratio is reduced in residuals 
when compared to returns and second the trend of skewness towards the left is 
persistent in residuals as is in returns albeit at a smaller scale.  
 
With regards to the first observation, preliminary comparisons indicate that there 
are fewer Black Swans to extreme values overall within residuals as opposed to 
returns, i.e. in full segments, 74% of extreme values are Black Swans whereas in 
residuals this ratio declines to 43%. In other words, there is a higher probability 
of an extreme value being a Black Swan in returns as opposed to residuals. This 
can be explained by the implementation of autoregressive heteroskedastic models 
that eliminate in-sample volatility clustering in the data, a piece of information that 
would not impossible to be known out-of-sample i.e. in real conditions. 
 
In the second segment of the model, despite using the best fit ARMA-APARCH 
model, skewness towards the left persists even though it is at a modest degree. 
In the full segment of the residuals, there are 2 negative Black Swans for every 4 
negative extreme values (53%) and on the right tail, there is only 1 Black Swan 
for every 4 positive extreme value (33%) as compared to returns where the ratio 
is 0.83 and 0.65 respectively. When there is a provision for breaks in the residuals, 
the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the left tail is 0.53 as opposed to 





To further investigate if the modification of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values emerges from a single swarm or a cluster, the model uses the structural 
segments of the residuals from the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model identified in 
section 3.6.2. The results revealed in table 8 illustrate that the increasing ratio of 
Black Swans to extreme values experienced from pre-crisis to during crisis periods 
in the returns were in fact clusters of Black Swans instead of a single occurrence.  
Table 8: Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme value ex-post and ex-ante the GFC (2008) 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Pre-Crisis 30.00% 51.28% 37.04% 43.55% 33.33% 
Crisis 8.33% 25.00% 0.00% 28.57% 38.71% 
Difference -128.1% -71.85% N/A -42.15% 14.95% 
Post-Crisis 7.14% 18.75% 25.00% 37.50% N/A 
Difference -15.42% -28.77% N/A 27.19% N/A 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland Germany 
Pre-Crisis 63.64% 40.63% N/A N/A 33.33% 
Crisis 40.63% 40.00% 62.50% N/A 25.00% 
Difference -44.88% -1.55% N/A N/A -28.77% 
Post-Crisis 63.64% 43.33% 68.75% 18.75% N/A 
Difference 44.88% 8.00% 9.53% N/A N/A 
  Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel 
Pre-Crisis 33.33% 90.00% N/A 59.80% 56.25% 
Crisis 35.29% 39.71% N/A 31.25% 40.91% 
Difference 5.72% -81.83% N/A -64.91% -31.85% 
Post-Crisis 33.33% 29.17% 55.00% 40.00% 14.29% 
Difference -5.72% -30.85% N/A 24.69% -105.21% 
  Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands 
Pre-Crisis 40.00% 44.68% 36.67% 50.00% 25.00% 
Crisis 25.00% 25.00% 32.35% 40.48% 25.00% 
Difference -47.00% -58.07% -12.52% -21.13% 0.00% 
Post-Crisis 16.67% 26.47% 27.78% N/A 14.29% 
Difference -40.55% 5.72% -15.25% N/A -55.96% 
 New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovakia 
Pre-Crisis 39.47% 40.00% N/A 38.46% 93.33% 
Crisis 0.00% 5.56% 40.91% 16.67% 90.00% 
Difference N/A -197.41% N/A -83.62% -3.64% 
Post-Crisis 22.73% 12.50% N/A 27.50% 83.33% 
Difference N/A 81.09% N/A 50.08% -7.70% 
  Slovenia Spain Turkey UK Switzerland 
Pre-Crisis N/A 29.07% N/A 44.64% 22.73% 
Crisis 20.00% 50.00% N/A 25.86% 50.00% 
Difference N/A 54.23% N/A -54.59% 78.85% 
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Post-Crisis 50.00% 30.77% 40.63% 14.29% 28.57% 
Difference 91.63% -48.55% N/A -59.35% -55.96% 
 
USA France Luxembourg Sweden 
 
Pre-Crisis 0.00% 30.77% 50.00% 23.33%  
Crisis 30.65% 37.50% 16.67% 41.67%  
Difference N/A 19.78% -109.86% 57.98%  
Post-Crisis 28.57% 16.67% 25.00% 16.67%  
Difference -7.01% -81.09% 40.55% -91.63%  
N/A’s represent the zero Black Swan clusters being identified in the respective series. 
With respect to variations in the ratio of Black Swan clusters to extreme values 
pre- and post-2007/2007 crisis, the residuals show a remarkable trend which 
challenges the trend in the ratio when returns were analysed i.e. on average, there 
is a significant reduction of 32% in the ratio of Black Swan clusters to extreme 
values from pre-crisis periods to the crisis period and a further 10% reduction from 
the crisis period to the post-crisis period. This is an important finding as it confirm 
two assumptions: a) markets were showing sign of distress before the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, and b) recognition and inclusion of structural breaks 
along with ARMA-APARCH models reduces the deceivability of greater risk during 
crisis periods i.e. the potential upward bias of excess kurtosis. The countries with 
the highest reduction in the ratio of Black Swan clusters to extreme values during 
the crisis period as compared to the previous segment were Australia and Norway.  
 
To add context to this circumstance,  
- Australia had braced itself for a crisis from an economic point of view before 
the fall of the Lehman brothers (its markets had been experiencing a mining 
boom before the crisis hit), from the banking perspective (its banks were 
ranked in the top three according to the World Economic Forum in 2008; 
sub-prime loans account for only 1% of the outstanding housing loans in 
Australia); and from a macro-economic standpoint (the government budget 
released in May 2008 included measures that recognized the warning signs 
and incorporated guards to cushion against an emerging Global Financial 
Crisis; the government had built a $21.7 billion budget surplus; and the 
balance sheet was in a net asset position). The ratio of Black Swan clusters 
to extreme values continue to decline post-crisis periods because of the 
government’s speedy and bold responses to stabilize the economy and 
reduce the impact of global financial contagion (the Reserve bank of 
Australia cut interest rates by 100 basis points and the Australian 
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government announced that it would guarantee all bank deposits along with 
wholesale funding of national banks along with a $10.4 billion stimulus 
package in October of 2008) (Kennedy, 2009).  
 
- In the case of Norway, a similar status quo existed where: a) the country 
built its wealth from being the world’s third-largest gas exporter leading to 
a strong economic performance before the crisis hit, b) it had cushioned 
itself with the sovereign wealth fund called the Government Pension fund 
valued at $326billion at the time of the Lehman Brothers fall (the largest 
pension fund in Europe and the second-largest in the world, c) the 
government has a budget surplus of 11% of its GDP, and d) the housing 
market had nominal lending excesses (Economist, 2013, Thomas, 2009). 
 
Overall, this analysis highlights that unaccounted structural breaks in the 
underlying mean and/or variance dynamic of asset returns could be a probable 
source of excess kurtosis in returns of equity markets which is heightened during 
crisis periods results. Extreme tail risk is also intensified due to 
persistence/volatility clustering and leverage effects in the returns which can be 
decreased with the application of the best fit ARMA-APARCH model.  
 
It is the primary reason there is a contrasting trend in the movement of the Black 
Swan to extreme value ratio when comparing returns and residuals indicating that 
markets are much closer to a normal distribution than predicted when volatility 
clustering is accounted for.  
 
The model was unable to recognize Black Swan clusters in some of the series and 
extreme values remained constant since they accounted for 1% of the distribution. 
This indicates that while there are extreme values within the distribution, there 






3.7 Discussion and Implications 
 
In this chapter, the aim was to understand the effect of unaccounted structural 
breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic of asset returns on the evolution of 
extreme tail risk i.e. tail asymmetry and excess kurtosis and use it to examine how 
the tail behaviour has changed around the Global Financial Crisis. This was tested 
by implementing a model that combined extreme value theory with GARCH models 
on daily log returns with and without the provision of breaks. 
 
The empirical findings are three-fold. First, the inclusion of a provision for breaks 
leads to fewer Black Swans. Second, their frequency changes from one segment 
to the next in majority of the cases in the data set thereby providing evidence that 
Black Swans clusters are not homogenous in nature and therefore there is some 
form of time-varying behaviour of tails that needs to be encompassed in existing 
models. Finally, accounting for breaks reduces tail asymmetry overall making the 
equity returns distribution more normal. 
 
With regards to the first result and research question, the acknowledgment of 
structural breaks, on average, reduces the frequency of Black Swans; there was a 
20% reduction in the frequency of Black Swans in returns and a 12% reduction in 
standardized residuals from the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model. In other words, 
accounting for potential breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic of asset 
returns dramatically reduces the probability of extreme events thereby reducing 
the possibility of an incorrect upward bias of excess kurtosis estimates in the tails. 
 
The second major finding, which is the focus of the second research question and 
builds on the first finding, is that Black Swans are not homogenous in nature and 
their frequency changes from one segment to the next. This implies that the 
frequency of Black Swans is reflective of the events that are causing changes in 
an economy whether gradual or dramatic and assigns credibility to the use of 
break-testing procedures in financial modelling. Hence, structural breaks in the 
mean and/or variance dynamic of asset returns can be used as a reliable proxy to 
capture the evolution of risk in the market. This becomes even more essential in 
times of extreme financial tension as markets would display distress signals that 
59 
 
can be projected by the break-testing procedure. Therefore, it is wise to 
incorporate a provision for changes in the mean and/or variance dynamics in 
financial models in order to efficiently assess the risk from extreme events.  
 
The third and final major finding from the data, related to the third research 
hypothesis, is that when volatility clustering and leverage effects are removed 
using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model along with a provision of structural breaks, 
the equity markets exhibit less negative skewness i.e. the distribution becomes 
more normal when breaks are accounted for. Therefore while equity markets still 
remain highly reactive to the possibility of the occurrence of rare negative events 
in comparison to positive ones (Pagan and Schwert, 1990, Engle and Ng, 1993), 
this intensity is reduced by recognizing potential latent Non-linearities in the 
underlying asset dynamic i.e. the reduction in the frequency of negative Black 
Swans is higher than those in the right tail. Therefore, the contribution of my 
findings further the current literature by supporting the incorporation of structural 
breaks and conditional volatility models would significantly reduce the overall 
asymmetry in the tails as well the excess kurtosis. 
 
From the perspective of risk premiums being inclusive of the underlying possibility 
of the negative or positive shocks, it is important to consider provisions that 
incorporate changes in the mean/variance dynamic of asset returns along with 
removing any effects of autocorrelation or long memory between the log returns 
to truly reflect the risk-adjusted returns on investments along with deciding their 
investment horizon. For the former support exists from existing research that 
shows optimal portfolio allocation is significantly different when the existence and 
identification of time-varying conditional kurtosis and skewness are considered 
(Chunhachinda et al., 1997, Jondeau and Rockinger, 2004). Furthermore, portfolio 
selection based on Betas that allow for the inclusion of systematic risks like Black 
Swans outperforms passive investment strategies (Estrada and Vargas, 2015) 
when studied over four decades for 47 countries including 57 industries. 
 
For the latter there exists similar evidence (Bogle, 2008, Olson et al., 2012, 
Estrada, 2008) that there are extreme but infrequent changes that can influence 
daily returns, however, they become less significant with time. Therefore, the crisis 
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becomes amplified when investors panic as it expounds augmented volatility 
clustering emerging from the behavior of the investors rather than the investments 
themselves. This crucial distinction between the influence of behavior of market 
participants and asset returns was identified as early as 1936 by the John Maynard 
Keynes (1883-1946) in his revolutionary book titled The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money. Using the example of the Great Depression of 
1987, the drop in corporate earnings was a mere 2-sigma event within the 95 
percent probability range as compared to a 20-sigma event in the market overall 
attributable to dominant ownership by individual investors lacking market 
knowledge leaving markets fuelling the domino effect of the crisis (Keynes, 2016).  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The identification of structural breaks in the underlying stochastic process of equity 
returns could lead to better inferences about the performance and change in the 
market with respect to extreme tail risk. My findings show that the inclusion of a 
provision of structural breaks can reduce tail asymmetry as well as moderate the 
upward bias of excess kurtosis in markets overall and more so during a crisis.  
 
Using extreme value theory to examine the evolution of extreme tail with and 
without a provision for breaks allows for a better understanding of the nature of 
Black Swans as well i.e. they exhibit clusters which are not homogenous in nature 
changing from one segment to the next and seem they are reflective of the 
modifications in the market.  
 
In this chapter, using daily returns of stock indices from 35 countries, which can 
be considered as a dynamic portfolio proxy, it has been successfully recognized 
that Black Swans are not homogenous when breaks in the mean and/or variance 
dynamic are considered and can lead to a significant reduction in tail asymmetry. 
Within the returns and residuals, it is revealed that the frequency of Black Swans 
varies from one segment to the next and reduces dramatically when ARMA-
APARCH volatility models are used to remove time-dependence structures in the 
underlying distribution. Therefore, the provision of structural breaks can possibly 
increase the efficiency of financial models as it reduces the inference bias that can 
result from the existence of latent nonlinearities in the daily returns. In other 
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words, recognizing these structural breaks can lead to a significant decrease in the 
tail asymmetry of the asset return distribution. 
 
Another important finding, with regards to the research questions, is that the ratio 
of Black Swans to extreme values depict reverse trends in returns and residuals 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 i.e. the tail variability in the market that 
can be captured by identified clusters of Black Swans shows that although the 
probability of extreme events taking place during a financial turmoil increases, it 
is not long before it returns back to its normal level and in fact even lower probably 
to the enhanced regulation and market practices that are implemented exactly due 





Chapter 4: Influence of Latent Non-linearities in Mean 
and/or Variance of asset returns and their effect on the 
tail risk in Foreign Exchange Markets 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding the behaviour of equity markets during extreme financial distress 
is an essential aspect of broadly understanding asset pricing and hedging 
strategies, however, the global financial system continues to become more 
integrated and therefore there are now varied asset classes with different volatility 
classes that are available for trading globally. In order to add depth to the current 
evidence of this thesis that structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic 
of asset returns can have an effect on extreme tail risk, this chapter will focus on 
Foreign Exchange rates (henceforth forex) returns. 
 
While the equity markets have received considerable scholarly attention with 
regards to tail risk and managing volatility during the recent financial crisis, there 
has been growing interest in literature towards the behaviour of foreign exchange 
markets as well. There is a growing recognition of the vital link7 between these 
markets that become more responsive to each other during a crisis and therefore 
potentially increasing the magnitude of a crisis.  This also has important 
implications for risk management via portfolio diversification.  
 
There have been various empirical studies looking at each of the markets during a 
crisis and its subsequent effect on the other. Some researchers argue that change 
in exchange rates lead to changes in the stock market (see (Mun, 2008, Aquino, 
2005, Chung, 2005, Yau and Nieh, 2006)) while others claim that stock returns 
influence foreign exchange markets (see (Kanas, 2000, Yang and Doong, 2004, 
Choi et al., 2010, Aloui, 2007). There is a notable paucity of empirical research 
                                                             
7 The extreme domino effect between the two markets is explained by macro-economic flow-oriented models 
DORNBUSCH, R. & FISCHER, S. 1980. Exchange rates and the current account. The American Economic Review, 
70, 960-971. and the portfolio balance theories FRANKEL, J. 1983. Monetary and portfolio-balance models of 




that have focused on this relationship during a crisis while testing the presence of 
structural breaks (see (Kallberg et al., 2005) with respect to volatility in Indonesia, 
Malaysia,  Philippines, ,South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand during the recent Asian 
crisis found evidence of higher responsiveness of stock markets to volatility in 
corresponding domestic exchange rate ex-post a crisis). 
 
Lahmiri et al. (2017) studied the short and long term dynamic development of the 
co-movement between the equity and forex market specifically during the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 finding evidence of hierarchical clustering, the presence of 
which could lead to higher contagion effects and global instability (for similar 
results see (Abid and Kaffel, 2018) for analysis on the co-movement between the 
different asset classes such as gold, oil, equity and forex in US markets with the 
implied volatility index during a crisis with regards to the time and frequency 
domain using wavelet analysis; (Inci and Lee, 2014) for US markets along with 
five European markets, Japan and Canada). This chapter aims to build on this work 
by considering the unique behaviour of foreign exchange rate returns during, ex-
ante and ex-post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 with a provision for latent non-
linearity in the mean and/or variance with an added consideration for time-varying 
third and fourth order moments.  
 
Therefore, while this chapter will focus mainly on the evolution of tail risk in the 
forex markets during the financial crisis, a complemental area of the discussion 
section of this chapter will be dedicated to the degree of co-movement between 
the equity and forex markets. In other words, the primary objective of this chapter 
is to understand the behaviour of extreme tail risk during a crisis in returns and 
residuals of the foreign exchange market of 35 countries with respect to the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 when there is a provision for structural breaks as opposed 
to without. Additionally, it provides a brief glimpse on the evolution of tail risk in 
forex markets in comparison to equity markets i.e. it will not study the co-
movement or volatility spill over formally. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II sets the context for the 
research followed by theoretical underpinnings and a literature review, section III 
provides the specific research questions the chapter seeks to answer, Section IV 
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make available the description of the data and section V presents the research 
methodology used to obtain results. The final segments of the papers are section 
VI which presents the empirical results on the frequency of Black Swans and 
extreme returns that exist in the stock market, and section VII discusses the 
implications for key market participants. Section VIII concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Foreign exchange markets are more concentrated than equity markets and have 
a significant effect on equity returns. There have been several studies covering 
various time periods and geographical areas providing evidence of its significance. 
For example: studies have focused on developed countries and found vigorous ties 
between stock market returns and exchange rates (see (Ajayi and Mougoue, 
1996), who studied eight industrialized economies using co-integration analysis) 
as well as developing economies (see (Harvey, 1995) who provided evidence that 
conditional variation in the stock market returns of 16 OECD countries were 
typically explained by foreign exchange risk and expected returns on the global 
market portfolio). 
 
The following section will start with the definition of a currency crisis, followed by 
the models used for empirical research on understanding extreme events in forex 
markets. The final section will summarize the literature on the co-movement of 
extreme volatility between the equity and forex market.  
 
Definition of a Currency Crisis 
 
An extreme event in a foreign exchange market would be defined as a currency 
crisis which would occur when there is a large movement in the nominal exchange 
rates of a country. For example, Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis 
as an event when the exchange rate of a country depreciates by 25% or more in 
the last fiscal year. A currency crisis is a financial crisis that could have a 
distressing effect on the economy and therefore research has focused on 
identifying the factors can cause this currency crisis. One of the common possible 
triggers of a currency attack is when a local currency is under selling pressure in 
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the forex market and this is called a speculative attack. However not all speculative 
attacks turn into a currency crisis as relevant authorities intervene into the market 
by changing interest rates, using their foreign reserves and/or imposing capital 
control measures. 
 
In order to deal with an extreme event like that it is important to distinguish 
successful, speculative attacks from a currency crisis. There is growing literature 
that focuses on differentiating these by looking at changes in other variables such 
as exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves. Consequently, this 
led to the development of the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI). Some of 
the prominent contributors to the EMPI were Wyplosz (1996) and Kaminsky and 




A recent study (Iglesias, 2012) which focused on The Majors EUR/ USD (Euro/US 
dollar), the USD/JPY (US Dollar/ Japanese Yen), the GBP/USD (British Pound/US 
dollar) and the USD/CHF (US Dollar/Swiss Franc and The Commodity Forex pairs 
(AUD/USD (Australian Dollar/Us Dollar) and NZD/USD (New Zealand Dollar/US 
Dollar) associated with gold commodities and the USD/CAD (US Dollar/Canadian 
Dollar) associated with oil commodities) to study the VAR using a hybrid 
conditional EVT model. They found that the Japanese Yen had the highest VAR 
followed by the Swiss Franc with the UK pound being the safest during times of 
extreme turmoil. 
 
However, the competence of using EVT to measure the risk originating in the 
foreign exchange market remains questionable. For example, Bekiros and 
Georgoutsos (2008b) provide evidence with respect to the daily returns of the US 
Dollar/Cyprus Pound exchange rate. They found that for foreign exchange returns 
EVT provided efficient estimates only at significance levels higher than 98% (this 
conclusion is confirmed by Wang et al. (2010), who applied EVT to study the 
exchange rate risk of the Chinese Yuan with the US Dollar, British Pound, Japanese 
Yen, and Hong Kong Dollar). In all studies, EVT provided results similar to other 
conventional methods such as Historical Simulation and GARCH models and 
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therefore was not proven to be more efficient overall. This was due to the absence 
of strong leptokurtosis in the foreign exchange returns even though the null 
hypothesis of normality was rejected. Another study that recommended using EVT 
to study currency crisis was by Karimi and Voia (2014) who provided evidence that 
EVT is only appropriate when using high-frequency data using daily returns from 
20 OECD members and South Africa over a period of 28 years from 1970-1998. 
 
4.3 Research Questions 
 
The aims of this chapter are threefold: to understand the effect that latent non-
linearity, in the mean and/variance dynamic of the returns distribution, have on 
the frequency of Black Swans in global currency markets; to empirically examine 
the evolution of tail risk ex-ante and ex-post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
and finally, to examine the variation in tail asymmetry and kurtosis when structural 
breaks have been accounted for. Specifically, it is seeking to answer the following 
questions: 
- Does the frequency of Black Swans in forex markets change once there is a 
provision that recognizes structural breaks in the mean and/or variance 
dynamic of the underlying distribution?  
- Could tail asymmetry in returns be caused by unaccounted structural 
breaks? 
- What was the impact of the Global Financial Crisis onto the frequency of 
Black Swans? 
 
All of these objectives will be tested on two levels: that of log returns and that of 
the residuals from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model so to capture the possible 
effect of volatility clustering on the frequency of Black Swans.  
4.4 Data 
To understand the dynamic probability of extreme events aka Black Swans 
occurring in the foreign exchange market, 31 currencies were used. Daily 




The countries chosen for extreme risk analysis in the foreign exchange market are 
varied and inclusive of various level of financial and economic development i.e. 
developed economies, developing economies and economies in transition. While 
the FTSE global equity indexes were used for country classifications when 
analyzing extreme risk in equity markets, the basis for forex market country 
classifications is the World Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) annex which 
is published by the Development Policy and Analysis division of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Consequently, the 
current basket includes Developed countries (such as Australia, Canada, UK, 
Germany, and USA) as well as Emerging countries, (such as Brazil, China, India, 
Chile, and Turkey) and transition economies (such as Russia). 
Table 9 below summarizes the basket of countries and their respective currency 
along with the symbols and fractional units as well as the ISO code. 











1 Argentina Argentine peso $ ARS Centavo 
2 Australia Australian dollar $ AUD Cent 
3 Brazil Brazilian real R$ BRL Centavo 
4 Canada Canadian dollar $ CAD Cent 
5 Chile Chilean peso $ CLP Centavo 
6 China Chinese yuan ¥ or 元 CNY Fen 
7 Denmark Danish krone kr DKK Øre 
8 Fiji Fijian dollar $ FJD Cent 
9 Germany Euro € EUR Cent 
10 Hong Kong Hong Kong dollar $ HKD Cent 
11 Iceland Icelandic króna kr ISK Eyrir 
12 India Indian rupee ₹ INR Paisa 
13 Indonesia Indonesian rupiah Rp IDR Sen 
14 Kenya Kenyan shilling Sh KES Cent 
15 Korea, South South Korean won ₩ KRW Jeon 
16 Malaysia Malaysian ringgit RM MYR Sen 
17 Mexico Mexican peso $ MXN Centavo 
18 New Zealand New Zealand dollar $ NZD Cent 
19 Norway Norwegian krone kr NOK Øre 
20 Pakistan Pakistani rupee ₨ PKR Paisa 
21 Poland Polish złoty zł PLN Grosz 
22 Russia Russian ruble ₽ RUB Kopek 
23 Singapore Singapore dollar $ SGD Cent 
24 South Africa South African Rand R ZAR Cent 
25 Sweden Swedish krona kr SEK Öre 
26 Turkey Turkish lira ₺ TRY Kuruş 
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27 United Kingdom British pound £ GBP Penny 
28 Taiwan New Taiwan dollar $ TWD Cent 
29 Solomon Islands Solomon Islands dollar $ SBD Cent 




Papua New Guinean kina K PGK Toea 
Table 9 – Introduction to foreign exchange markets chosen as well as currency symbols, 





Initial analysis was conducted for every data set with respect to the four moments 
of the return’s distribution, namely: mean, standard deviation, skewness, and 
kurtosis, finding a significant deviation from normality. The descriptive statistics 
of each forex market substantiating this are summarized in table 10 below. 
 
Table 10 – Summary Statistics of Daily Forex returns 
  Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 5840 5840 5711 5840 
Mean 0.05% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.92% 0.77% 0.97% 0.53% 
Skewness 20.40 0.69 0.37 -0.13 
Kurtosis 719.36 12.51 17.70 6.52 
  Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5840 2829 5840 5840 
Mean 0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.58% 0.12% 0.61% 0.60% 
Skewness 0.51 -0.59 -0.20 -0.19 
Kurtosis 7.08 60.15 2.44 2.47 
  Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4558 5840 4954 5840 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Standard Dev. 0.59% 0.03% 0.85% 0.36% 
Skewness 13.06 -2.49 -0.41 0.46 
Kurtosis 502.02 62.54 57.31 10.86 
  Indonesian 
Rupiah 
Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 
No. of obs. 5840 4954 5840 5840 
Mean 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 
Standard Dev. 1.35% 0.51% 0.73% 0.90% 
Skewness 2.06 0.48 17.31 2.71 
Kurtosis 84.01 23.87 1000.10 91.71 
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  New Guinea 
Kina 
New Turkish Lira New Zealand 
Dollar 
Nigerian Naira 
No. of obs. 5612 5840 5840 5455 
Mean 0.02% 0.09% 0.00% 0.02% 
Standard Dev. 0.68% 1.18% 0.79% 0.60% 
Skewness -3.89 6.86 0.33 1.78 
Kurtosis 100.31 212.96 5.70 62.10 
  Norwegian 
Krone 
Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
No. of obs. 5840 4743 5578 5272 
Mean 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 
Standard Dev. 0.72% 0.30% 0.80% 1.60% 
Skewness -0.04 0.92 0.17 5.33 
Kurtosis 4.92 37.20 5.52 322.67 
  Singapore 
Dollar 




No. of obs. 5840 2587 5840 5840 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% 
Standard Dev. 0.36% 0.76% 0.96% 0.86% 
Skewness -0.46 -0.13 0.27 -0.76 
Kurtosis 10.38 15.54 6.97 106.18 
  Swedish Krona Taiwan New Dollar UK Sterling  
No. of obs. 5840 5840 5840  
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
Standard Dev. 0.71% 0.27% 0.54%  
Skewness -0.18 1.08 0.01  
Kurtosis 3.50 26.80 4.22  
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for the daily log returns of the forex market 
 
While the daily mean is not significantly different from 0, the third and fourth 
moment show signs of substantial non-normality. For example, the data generally 
seems to be more positively skewed which is a contrast to the trend observed in 
equity markets. The currencies with the highest positive skewness are the 
Argentine Peso (20.4), Fijian Dollar (13.1) and Malaysian Ringgit (17.3) indicating 
a much longer right tail of the returns distribution. In terms of the Kurtosis, four 
out of every 5 countries displays significantly heavier tails i.e. leptokurtic 
properties than a normal distribution which translates as a higher probability of 
the occurrence of Black Swans in comparison to traditional financial models. 
 
The data can also be visually inspected for non-normality and heavy tails using the 
Q-Q plots presented in Appendix 3. The plots for each currency display significant 
deviations in the tails in comparison to a Gaussian distribution thereby providing 
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strong support for the rejection of the Null hypothesis of normality in forex returns 
and providing greater justification towards understanding the complexity of Black 
Swans, their nature and corresponding probabilities for efficient risk management 
during crisis periods. 
 
 
4.5 Methodology  
 
The research question primarily revolves around three aspects: tail risk, structural 
breaks caused by latent Non-linearities in the mean and/or volatility dynamic of 
forex returns and excess kurtosis. The chapter will use Extreme value theory to 
identify the threshold for tail risk (log returns above a 5% threshold on the left 
and right tails), the Karoglou (2010a) break-test procedure to identify potential 
structural breaks in the data and finally a best fit ARMA-APARCH model to account 
for the effects of volatility clustering and leverage effects. 
 
The following section details the three hypotheses that are being empirically tested 
with respect to measuring volatilities in the daily foreign exchange market by 
taking into account the frequency of Black Swans and the ratio of Black Swans to 
extreme values in the full and segmented samples. The following section is divided 
into three segments: Black Swans, Structural breaks and finally model 
specification. Each segment begins with a brief literature review of seminal studies 
thereby providing a structural base and scaffold to the overarching research 
objectives of this chapter. The segments then detail the empirical methods used 
in the model to measure them. 
 
Black Swans 
Although extensive research has been carried out on the recognition and resolution 
of extreme events in equity markets, with a significant focus on Black Swans since 
the Global Financial Crisis, no single study exists within the current literature 
review that adequately focuses on the identification and decryption of Black Swans 





A single study by Lleo and Ziemba (2015) focused on a single Black Swan i.e. the 
abandonment of the Euro peg of Swiss Franc by the Swiss national banks on 15th 
January 2015 and the effect it had on the economy, financial markets of 
Switzerland. However, the study is limited in that it failed to recognize the effect 
of volatility clustering as well as the effect of structural changes in the underlying 
distribution on the occurrence of Black Swans.  
 
In this chapter, the threshold for the identification of Black Swans is set according 
to the routine practice of three standard deviations above or below the mean rule. 
This rule has been applied to full samples as well as segments. 
 
Structural Breaks 
The issue of recognizing structural breaks in order to draw accurate inferences 
regarding the persistence of the realized volatility has received considerable critical 
attention in the literature (Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990, Dieobold, 1986, Rydén 
et al., 1998, Mikosch and Starica, 1998, Liu, 2000, Zikovic and Aktan, 2009). The 
common conclusion drawn by this overwhelming number of seminal studies is that 
accounting for structural breaks dramatically reduces the degree of persistence in 
long memory volatility processes. For example, Han (2016) used the Adaptive-
FIGARCH model to identify the effect of recognizing structural breaks on the long 
memory volatility property in the daily USD-GBP returns. The paper found evidence 
that long memory volatility property in exchange rates is greater due to the 
presence of frequent structural breaks.  
 
Therefore, not accounting for them could lead to an upward bias and overstating 
of long memory persistence of the conditional variance (see (Granger and Hyung, 
2004) for application to the S&P returns and long memory persistence; (Morana 
and Beltratti, 2004) studies the Deutsche mark/US dollar and Japanese yen/US 
dollar exchange rates finding evidence that inclusion of structural breaks lead to 
superior forecasts at longer horizons; (Martens et al., 2004) studied three 
exchange rates, namely DM/$, ¥/$ and ¥/DM to find that even though the leverage 
effect is less important in foreign exchange returns in comparison to equity 
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markets, yet integrating latent nonlinearity's still produced more efficient in-
sample fit and out-of-sample forecasts).  
 
However, most of these studies modeled the structural breaks without identifying 
the actual location of breakpoints. Another stream on literature that focuses on 
the importance of incorporating structural breaks in variance includes pivotal 
papers by Javed (2011), van Dijk et al. (2005), Rodrigues and Rubia (2007), 
Koseoglu and Cevik (2013) which provide empirical evidence that undetected 
structural breaks can lead to biased and overestimated GARCH parameters leading 
to causality-in-variance test results that are inefficient due to severe size 
distortions. The most recent paper (Koseoglu and Cevik, 2013) found the existence 
of several structural breaks when testing for latent non-linearities in the variance 
in the foreign exchange returns series in the Czech Republic, the Hungarian and 
Turkish foreign exchange market, against the backdrop of the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008 ( see (Kočenda, 2005) for application to the foreign exchange 
markets of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from January 1991 to December 
2003).  
 
A paper that tested both i.e. the long term persistence and distortion of the GARCH 
parameters due to structural breaks with respect to the currencies of Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia namely koruna, forint, zloty and ruble found 
inconclusive evidence for the former but strong evidence of the latter (Zivkov et 
al., 2015). However, these papers focused on eliminating the effect of structural 
breaks instead of studying them and this current chapter aims to fill that gap in 
the literature by studying its influence on the behavior of extreme variability in the 
foreign exchange returns of 35 countries. 
 
The structural breaks in this research have been recognized using the two stages 
of the Nominating-Awarding procedure of Karoglou (2010a). The reason this 
approach has been chosen is, that, it acknowledges different strains of break-tests 
that can be combined to identify structural changes in the mean/variance dynamics 
as well as latent non-linearities in the data that might add bias to the model. 
Therefore, it fortitudes the selection of a particular break date. Detailed 
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information is included in section 3.5 of chapter 3. The final outcome of this 
awarding-break dates procedure are multiple segments that are homogenous in 
their mean and/or variance dynamics.  
 
Model Specification 
Similar to the previous chapter, there are two focal notions underlying this work: 
The first notion is the identification of Black Swans with respect to non-parametric 
detection of structural changes in the underlying process. The second notion is 
their evolution in times of the Global Crisis. In order to test the research questions 
mentioned in section 3 of this chapter, two models have been designed to test the 
following hypothesis:  
Model 1: There is a reduction in tail risk of financial returns in forex markets when 
structural breaks in the mean/variance properties are taken into account i.e. Black 
Swans clusters are not homogenous in returns and segmented returns. 
Model 2: There is a reduction in the tail asymmetry of residuals of financial returns 
of forex markets obtained using the best-fit ARMA-APARCH models when there is 
a provision, accounting for latent non-linearities in the underlying distribution. 
Schematically, and using the same notation as in the previous chapter, structural 
breaks in the underlying asset return distribution can be presented as follows:  
𝑟𝑡 = (
𝜇0 + 𝜎0 ∙  𝜇𝑜,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏1 ,
𝜇1 + 𝜎1  ∙  𝜇1,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏1  ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝜏2 ,
𝑢𝑛 + 𝜎𝑛  ∙  𝜇𝑛,𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝜏𝑛  ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝑇  
 
where, 𝑟𝑡 stands now for the daily log returns of the forex market. And as before, 
in order to capture the heteroskedastic properties of the returns process as well 
as the leverage effects, the conditional variance of the returns process can be 
defined by the APARCH (m, n):  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡𝜎𝑡;         𝑧𝑡~𝑁(0,1)               
𝜎𝑡









4.6 Empirical Results 
The Nominating-Awarding procedure has identified two to seven structural breaks 






findings of the study with respect to the research questions mentioned in section 
3. 
4.6.1 Model 1 Outcomes 
Summary of the frequency of the Black Swan clusters in the full sample 
and segments (with breaks) of daily forex returns  
 
The table 11 below illustrates the number of Black Swans in foreign exchange 
returns when there is no provision for structural breaks in the mean and/or 
variance dynamic of the series and then compares it to the frequency of Black 
Swans when these latent non-linearities are accounted for to test the hypothesis 
of homogeneity of Black Swans. Furthermore, both tails of the distribution are also 
examined closely to test this hypothesis and to study the skewness of the 
distribution i.e. the frequency of negative Black Swans versus the frequency of 
positive Black Swans (See Appendix 9 for more detailed results).  
 











Right tail  13.35% 0% 23.26% 44.47% 2.35% 









Right tail  40.55% 60.61% 49.64% 33.65% 28.09% 











Right tail  29.73% 12.90% -21.87% 1.71% -63.10% 
Left tail  7.41% -15% 26.24% 5.94% -62.20% 











Right tail  0% 4.17% -1.98% 4.45% -8.70% 











Right tail  49.47% 3.85% 18.23% -80.70% 11.78% 












Right tail  -8.00% 24.89% -27.63% 42.12% 14.46% 
Left tail  -35.70% 32.16% 15.42% 6.45% 16.51% 
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  UK Sterling     
Right tail  29.73%     
Left tail  7.15%     
Table 11 - Summary of the frequency of the Black Swans in the full sample and segments (with breaks) of daily 
forex market returns. The black swan clusters on the left and right tail are representative of the skewness of 
the data. 
 
An inspection of the results reveals two interesting results: the first being that 
Black Swans are not homogenous when structural breaks in the series are 
accounted for, i.e. on average there is slight decrease in the probability of a Black 
Swans occurring with breaks; and second that data is more symmetric when the 
existence of a provision for breaks  are taken into account indicating that, in forex 
markets, which implies that latent Non-linearities may well be a factor causing at 
least partially the observed asymmetry in the tails. 
 
 
For the first result, the table shows that the frequency of total Black Swans is not 
the same in full samples and segments for 29 of the 31 foreign exchange returns 
series. With the exception of Chilean Peso and Fijian Dollar, all currencies show a 
change in the frequency of Black Swans when there exists a provision for structural 
breaks in the series thus rejecting the null hypothesis of homogeneity in different 
clusters of Black Swans when deviations in the mean and/or variance dynamic are 
accounted for. However, looking further into the results, a counterintuitive trend 
emerges. Although on average, there is a 5% decrease in the number of total Black 
Swans (from representing 1.41% of the trading days to 1.36%) when latent 
nonlinearities are taken into consideration, some countries depict a reverse trend 
when taken individually. For example, 11 out of the 31 countries display a higher 
number of Black Swans in segments (20.69%) as opposed to the full sample, 
however because of a slightly high proportion of decline (20.90%) in the remaining 
20 countries, the resulting average shows a negative trend. The highest increase 
in overall Black Swans is in the Russian Rouble (86.22%) and the highest decline 
in total Black Swans is for the Norwegian Krone (44.03%). Therefore, on average, 
the probability of extreme events is overstated in the daily returns of foreign 
exchange markets if a provision for structural breaks is not provided which is 
analogous to daily returns in the equity market which overstate this probability by 





One notable difference between the equity markets, examined in the previous 
chapter, and the foreign exchange markets is the skewness of the distribution is 
reduced in the tails specifically when there exists a provision of breaks. While in 
equity market returns, 56% of overall Black Swans in full segments were negative 
and 46% were positive, the trend is reversed in foreign exchange market returns 
where on average 46% of the Black Swans occur in the left tail and 54% in the 
right. When there exists a provision for structural breaks the skewness remains 
but more moderate (52% positive Black Swans and 48% negative Black Swans). 
This can be translated as the possibility of unaccounted structural breaks causing 
partially tail asymmetry in the forex markets thereby reducing the probability to 
extremely extreme returns. 
 
 
When it comes to comparing the pre- and post- crisis period, I first focus examining 
the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in full sample where no provision for 
structural breaks exist and compare it to the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values in segments which have a provision for breaks; and then I examine the 
evolution of this ratio when the crisis occurs i.e. the pattern that emerges ex-ante 
and ex-post the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
 
Summary of the ratio of the Black Swan clusters to extreme values in the 
full sample and segments (with breaks) of daily forex returns  
 
The following table 12 summarizes the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values 
overall in the full sample as well as in the left and right tails and compares it to 
segments (See Appendix 10 for detailed results). 












Right tail  11.64% 4.96% 28.31% 47.80% 7.31% 












Right tail  40.55% 63.95% 52.98% 37.90% 33.05% 














Right tail  33.65% 16.25% -18.54% 5.63% -59.79% 
Left tail  11.33% -13.33% 29.57% 9.86% -58.84% 













Right tail  4.96% 4.17% -0.03% 11% -5.13% 












Right tail  56.03% 9.91% 60.84% -76.94% 16.74% 















Right tail  -0.59% 29.85% -21.07% 43.80% 17.79% 




   
 
Right tail  33.06%     
Left tail  10.48%     
Table 12 - Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the full sample and segments (with 
breaks) of daily forex returns. The black swan clusters in the left and right tail are representative of the 
skewness of the data. 
 
The results in table 12 above display two interesting findings: one, that is similar 
to equity markets, is that providing for structural breaks decreases the average 
ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in segments when compared to the full 
sample irrespective of their nature and two, that is contrary to the trend in equity 
markets, is that the decrease in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the 
left tail is much smaller than the decrease in the ratio on the right tail indicating a 
higher probability of market variability when forex markets are bullish as opposed 
to bearish. 
 
With respect to the first outcome, there is on average a 8% decrease in the ratio 
of Black Swans to extreme values when there is a provision for structural breaks 
which translates that the probability of an extreme event being a Black Swan is 
lower when latent non-linearity in the mean and/or variance of the underlying 
distribution are taken into account. Taking a closer look at the tails of the 
distribution, the decrease in ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the right 
tail is much higher than the left tail, i.e. the ratio of positive Black Swans to 
extreme values decreases by 13% whereas the ratio of negative Black Swans to 




Irrespective of the higher proportion of decrease in the probability of extreme 
events being Black Swans when there is provision for structural breaks, the data 
appear normalized with decreased skewness in segments as compared to the full 
sample i.e. in the right tail, without breaks 75% of all extreme values are Black 
Swans, and this reduces to 67% when structural breaks are taken into account; in 
the left tail, 64% of all extreme values are Black Swans when a provision for 
structural breaks does not exist and this reduces to 62% when structural breaks 
are taken into account. 
 
Summarizing these results depicts that identification of structural breaks reduce 
the probability of extreme events being classified as Black Swans while reducing 
tail asymmetry in the distribution and that foreign exchange markets display 
contrary trends to the equity markets in terms of skewness where the probability 
of extreme events is concerned. 
 
In order to analyse the transformation in the frequency of Black Swans to extreme 
values in foreign exchange markets before, during, and post the Global Financial 
Crisis, segments were chosen which were closest to the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers (15.09.2008). These segments are given in the table 13 below: 










Pre-Crisis 18/07/2001 24/10/1997 09/06/2003 21/08/1998 06/07/2001 
Crisis 08/07/2007 31/07/2007 08/09/2008 13/09/2007 10/01/2008 
Post Crisis 21/12/2015 20/07/2009 29/06/2009 13/09/2010 13/05/2009 
  Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-Crisis NA 18/08/2004 18/08/2004 02/12/1998 24/09/2003 
Crisis 20/07/2005 12/08/2008 12/08/2008 27/08/2006 21/11/2007 











Pre-Crisis 27/05/1997 27/08/1998 26/10/1999 27/05/1997 22/07/2005 
Crisis 26/03/2006 01/05/2008 21/10/2006 20/11/2007 10/03/2008 
Post Crisis 11/06/2009 08/10/2013 23/06/2009 27/01/2009 02/12/2014 









Pre-Crisis 22/12/1994 29/07/1998 26/02/2001 17/12/1997 12/07/2000 
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Crisis 06/12/2005 24/12/2002 26/11/2005 27/07/2007 05/12/2003 











Pre-Crisis 26/08/1998 15/10/2001 26/05/1998 27/08/1998 01/12/1998 
Crisis 18/01/2008 21/02/2008 07/08/2008 11/01/2006 14/04/2008 












Pre-Crisis 23/06/2006 27/05/1998 11/08/1998 01/09/1998 20/10/1998 
Crisis 06/11/2007 03/12/2001 17/03/2008 12/08/2008 02/03/2004 
Post Crisis 08/07/2011 04/05/2009 19/05/2009 16/12/2011 15/11/2011 
  UK Sterling     
Pre-Crisis 04/01/1994     
Crisis 28/06/2002     
Post Crisis 17/06/2010     
 
It is important to note that while most of the break dates regarding the advent of 
the Global Financial Crisis are similar for the countries in the dataset yet there are 
a few that experienced the decline much later. A plausible explanation for his could 
be the lead-lag effect caused by the delay in information diffusion across global 
equity markets.  
 
Table 14 summarizes the change in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in 
the segment before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 and compares to 
the segment within which the crisis came to the forefront of global financial 
markets. It then delves deeper into the probability of extreme events in the 
segment following the crisis. 
 
Table 14 – Ratio of Black Swans to extreme values ex-post and ex-ante the GFC (2008) 








Pre-crisis 66.67% 46.15% 57.14% 43.75% 50.00% 
Crisis 22.22% 91.67% 83.33% 56.25% 62.50% 
Difference  -109.86% 68.62% 37.73% 25.13% 22.31% 
Post-crisis 100.00% 35.71% 67.86% 50.00% 43.75% 
Difference  150.41% -94.26% -20.54% -11.78% -35.67% 
  Chinese Yuan 
Danish 
Krone 
Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis  NA 36.36% 36.36% 43.33% 50.00% 
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Crisis 56.52% 38.89% 38.89% 15.38% 96.88% 
Difference  NA 6.71% 6.71% -103.56% 66.14% 
Post-crisis 83.33% 44.44% 44.44% 21.43% 0.00% 











Pre-crisis 55.00% 128.85% 75.00% 101.79% 132.61% 
Crisis 65.91% 56.67% 63.89% 100.00% 55.56% 
Difference  18.09% -82.14% -16.03% -1.77% -87.00% 
Post-crisis 7.14% 64.29% 90.91% 125.00% 50.00% 
Difference  -222.22% 12.62% 35.27% 22.31% -10.54% 










Pre-crisis 100.00% 95.83% 75.00% 61.54% 94.44% 
Crisis 72.22% 68.57% 75.00% 75.00% 119.23% 
Difference  -32.54% -33.47% 0.00% 19.78% 23.30% 
Post-crisis 61.11% NA 43.33% 28.57% 100.00% 











Pre-crisis 38.00% 88.24% 44.44% 150.00% 46.00% 
Crisis 60.00% 83.33% 54.55% 94.05% 81.82% 
Difference  45.68% -5.72% 20.48% -46.68% 57.59% 
Post-crisis 14.29% 92.50% 35.71% 100.00% 68.75% 












Pre-crisis 100.00% 85.00% 76.92% 42.31% 67.86% 
Crisis 80.00% 45.00% 37.50% 55.56% 64.29% 
Difference  -22.31% -63.60% -71.85% 27.24% -5.41% 
Post-crisis 110.00% 47.22% 85.71% 37.50% 77.78% 
Difference  31.85% 4.82% 82.67% -39.30% 19.05% 
 
UK Sterling 
    
Pre-crisis 41.30%     
Crisis 64.29%     
Difference  44.24%     
Post-crisis 0.00%     
Difference  NA     
Table 14 – Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the full sample and segments (with 





While the forex markets of the 31 countries on average display a declining ratio of 
Black Swans to extreme events as the Global Financial Crisis become apparent, 
the rate of decline increases in the succeeding segment suggesting that the rate 
of variability reduced substantially in the aftermath of the crisis i.e. there were 7% 
less Black Swans to extreme values in the segment preceding the Global Financial 
Crisis and 13% fewer in the succeeding segment. One plausible explanation of this 
behaviour, similar to the equity markets, is that markets had begun showing 
evidence of distress and investors were starting to expect the worst, thereby 
reducing the probability to a collapse. This means that the probability of the 
occurrence of a Black Swans is not constant with the expectation of increased 
volatility in markets by the participants, in fact, that leads to a reverse trend – a 
decrease in variability. 
 
A closer look at the results, however, reveal that is there no dominant trend in the 
number of currencies that follow that trend. Half of the countries in the data set 
(such as Argentine Peso, Fijian Dollar, majority of the developing Asian currencies) 
experienced a smaller ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in preceding 
segments of the Global Financial Crisis and the other half experienced a reverse 
trend (such as Australian Dollar, Canadian Dollar, Euro, UK Sterling, Singapore 
dollar). This trend between global currencies remains consistent when comparing 
succeeding segment with the one that includes that Lehman Brothers fall. 
 
An important implication of these results is that because returns in equity markets 
displayed more Black Swans to extreme values in preceding segments, a finding 
that is contradictory to the average trend found in foreign exchange markets, there 
are strong implications for the purposes of diversification. This reverse trend could 
be a possible strategy for risk divergence during periods of high volatility. Possible 
causes of this trend could be the heightened responsiveness of equity markets in 
comparison to forex markets and/or the reversal of the positive extremal 
dependence during a crisis (Walid et al., 2011, Diamandis and Drakos, 2011, 




4.6.2 Model 2 outcomes 
Summary of the frequency of the Black Swan clusters in the full sample 
and segments (with breaks) of the residuals of daily forex returns  
 
In order to assess the probability of extreme events when there is a provision of 
structural breaks while negating the effects of volatility persistence in the forex 
returns, the residuals of the best fit ARMA-APARCH model were tested for 
homogeneity of Black Swans. The following table 15 summarizes the frequency of 
Black Swans overall and in the left and right tail of the residuals (see Appendix 11 
for detailed results).  
 













Right tail  -125% 5.00% -353% -4.88% 0% 












Right tail  22.30% -18.20% -6.90% -25.80% -5.56% 












Right tail  28.80% 4.17% 15.40% 1.98% N/A 
Left tail  -3.64% -46.10% 0% -41.70% -309% 













Right tail  -21.70% -16.51% -88.73% 6.32% 2.02% 












Right tail  20.07% 8.00% 6.90% 14.46% 0% 















Right tail  -3.92% 7.60% -2.15% 0% 25.42% 




   
 
Right tail  6.06%     
Left tail  -8.34%     
Table 15 - Summary of the frequency of Black Swans in the full sample and segments (with 




An inspection of the results reveals that with the exception of the Canadian Dollar 
and the Euro, all currencies display a different frequency once there is a provision 
for breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamics of the underlying distribution. 
While there is 35% increase in the number of Black Swans when there is a 
provision for breaks, upon closer examination, this result is analogous to all the 
currencies i.e. majority of the currencies (18 of 31) display, on average, 53% more 
Black Swans in the segments as opposed to the full sample whereas the remaining 
(11 of 31) display 11% fewer Black Swans when there is a provision of breaks. 
The currency with the highest number of Black Swans in segments, as opposed to 
the full sample, is Brazilian Real i.e. when there was no provision for breaks, Black 
Swans constituted 0.02% of trading days and once a provision was provided for, 
Black Swans constituted 0.84% of the trading days. The currency which exhibited 
an extreme decline in the number of Black Swans when there was a provision for 
structural breaks was South Korean Won which showed a decline of 27%. 
 
The second outcome of this analysis is the reduction in the skewness of the 
distribution which normalises even further when there is a provision of breaks and 
without the effect of volatility clustering i.e. when there is no provision for breaks 
57% of the Black Swans are positive and the remaining are negative and when 
there is a provision for breaks 55% of the Black Swans remain positive while the 
remaining are negative. This endorses the result in section 6.2 that the 
unaccounted structural breaks in the underlying mean/variance dynamic of the 
distribution could be a possible cause for skewness in forex markets even when 
autocorrelation in the returns have been weeded out. 
 
Keeping this consistent skewness in mind, the final result of this analysis was to 
scrutinize the degree of change in the different tails of the distribution when there 
is a provision for structural breaks. Overall, there is a greater increase in negative 
Black Swans (32%) in comparison to positive Black Swans (26%) when there is a 
provision for breaks. This translates as even though structural breaks attempt to 
normalize the data and reduce skewness on the right tail that was resulting from 
volatility clustering in returns, forex markets pertinaciously remain more 
susceptible to positive shocks as opposed to negative ones. 
 
Overall these results indicate that forex returns, even with the application of the 
most efficient parametric volatility models, understate the probability of extreme 
events. Application of structural breaks exposes the probability experiencing 
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extreme events to be much higher than the initial examination. When comparing 
these trends to the equity stock markets, it is a distinctly antipode result as 
standardized residuals of equity market returns show a lower probability of 
experiencing negative extreme returns whereas standardized residuals of the daily 
forex markets depict a higher probability of experiencing positive extreme results.  
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
daily forex returns  
 
This section will focus on the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in segments 
and full samples once the auto-correlation in returns has been sieved using 
residuals from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. The results presented in table 16 
below summarize the extreme variability markets experience without the effect of 
volatility clustering (see Appendix 12 for detailed results). 












Right tail  -121.94% 9.96% -347.59% -1.55% 4.96% 






Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Right tail  22.31% -14.90% -3.57% -21.53% 1% 












Right tail  32.69% 7.50% 18.75% 5.90% N/A 
Left tail  0.29% -42.80% 3.33% -37.77% -305.77% 










Right tail  -16.75% -16.51% -87.05% 12.88% 7.33% 











Right tail  26.63% 14.07% 10.41% 18.16% 4.96% 













Right tail  3.49% 12.56% 4.41% 1.68% 28.76% 




   
 
Right tail  9.40%     
Left tail  -5%     
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Table 16 - Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of the best fit 
ARMA-APARCH model. Clusters on the left and right tail are representative of the skewness of the 
data. 
 
Table 16 results regarding the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the 
residuals provide fertile grounds for trend comparisons with two other important 
variables: the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the returns and 
persistence of skewness in the residuals. 
 
With regard to the first observation, removing auto-correlation between returns 
using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model has substantially reduced the ratio of Black 
Swans to extreme values. In returns, section 1.6.3 depicted that 70% of all 
extreme values were Black Swans when structural breaks were not accounted for, 
in residuals this ratio is 48%. When structural breaks are accounted for, returns 
had exhibited that 64% of all extreme values could be identified as Black Swans, 
although in residuals, this ratio drops to 50%. It can be clearly deduced from these 
results that the high number of Black Swans identified in the returns were resulting 
from volatility clusters or ‘Black Swans swarms’ instead of a single Black Swan.  
 
With respect to the second result of persistence, the data remains skewed to the 
right irrespective of dependence between the data as well as the existence of 
structural breaks. For example: in the right tail, with a provision for breaks, 55% 
of extreme values are Black Swans as compared to the left tail where 46% of the 
extreme values are Black Swans. Results in section 1.6.3, with respect to returns, 
display the same skewness, i.e. with a provision for structural breaks 67% of all 
extreme values were Black Swans in the right tail as compared to 62% on the left 
tail. These results can be interpreted as accounting for structural breaks and auto-
correlation between data, forex markets, in general, and on average, continue to 
exhibit a persistent skewness to the right suggesting that markets remain more 
volatile during upswings rather than downturns. 
 
A final finding from Table 16 results regarding the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values in the residuals, when structural breaks are taken into account, can be 
summarized that appears to be quite contrary to the results in the previous 
sections is the increase in the average number of extreme events that can be 
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identified as Black Swans i.e. there is a marginal increase of 3% in extreme events 
that are identified as Black Swans in the segments as compared to the full sample. 
This result can be translated as an overestimation of the frequency of positive 
Black Swans within extreme values when structural breaks are not accounted.  
 
To further investigate if the increased volatility in the forex market during the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 emerges from a single swarm or a cluster, the model 
distinguishes the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values within segments of the 
residuals from the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model identified in the previous section. 
The results revealed in table 17 illustrate that the increasing ratio of Black Swans 
to extreme values experienced from pre-crisis to during crisis periods in the returns 
were in fact clusters of Black Swans instead of a single occurrence. 
  
Table 17 – Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in residuals ex-post and ex-ante the GFC (2008) 




Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar Chilean Peso 
Pre-crisis 16.67% 44.23% 46.43% 22.92% 44.12% 
Crisis 2.78% 41.67% 66.67% 31.25% 75.00% 
Difference  -179.18% -5.97% 36.18% 31.02% 53.06% 
Post-crisis 50.00% 28.57% 50.00% 37.50% 37.50% 






Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis NA 22.73% 22.73% 40.00% 50.00% 
Crisis 45.65% 44.44% 38.89% 57.69% 79.69% 
Difference  NA 67.07% 53.71% 36.62% 46.61% 
Post-crisis 16.67% 55.56% 50.00% 28.57% 0.00% 










Pre-crisis 45.00% 80.77% 62.50% 85.71% 2.17% 
Crisis 61.36% 36.67% 77.78% 37.50% 50.00% 
Difference  31.02% -78.97% 21.87% -82.67% 313.55% 
Post-crisis 7.14% 50.00% 40.91% 112.50% 50.00% 











Pre-crisis 33.33% 87.50% 125.00% 55.77% 100.00% 
Crisis 45.83% 52.86% 52.50% 41.67% 73.08% 
Difference  31.85% -50.40% -86.75% -29.15% -31.37% 
Post-crisis 55.56% NA 40.00% 28.57% 100.00% 








Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
Singapore 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis 30.00% 73.53% 48.15% 100.00% 44.00% 
Crisis 30.00% 83.33% 22.73% 65.48% 54.55% 
Difference  0.00% 12.52% -75.07% -42.35% 21.48% 
Post-crisis 7.14% 50.00% 42.86% 100.00% 68.75% 











Pre-crisis 100.00% 55.00% 57.69% 34.62% 46.43% 
Crisis 60.00% 40.00% 62.50% 22.22% 61.90% 
Difference  -51.08% -31.85% 8.00% -44.32% 28.77% 
Post-crisis 100.00% 19.44% 35.71% 50.00% 66.67% 
Difference  51.08% -72.13% -55.96% 81.09% 7.41% 
  UK Sterling         
Pre-crisis 47.83%         
Crisis 28.57%         
Difference  -51.52%         
Post-crisis 10.00%         
Difference  -104.98%         
Table 17 depicts the difference in the ratio of black swans to extreme values in the forex market segments before 
and after the Global Financial Crisis. 
 
With respect to the alteration of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in 
residuals ex-post and ex-ante the Global Financial Crisis, table 17 results 
corroborate the findings of the previous section albeit with a reduced persistence 
i.e. the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values decreases by 2% during the crisis 
period (which was 6% in the returns) when compared to the preceding segments 
and reduces by a further 9% (which was 13% in the returns) in the succeeding 
segment. Although there appear to be no dominant trends in the data, the average 
decline in the ratio illustrate and reiterate that foreign exchange markets, like 
equity markets, had started to exhibit signs of financial stress and key market 
participants had recognized these signs early thereby reducing exposure by 
positioning themselves in risk-averse investment strategies. This is a prime 
example of a self-defeating prophecy where investors had started to fear the worst 
before the fall of the Lehman Brothers and because they expected the worst and 
took conservation investment strategies, they consequently reduced the 




4.7 Discussions and Implications 
In this investigation, the central aim was to gain a better understanding about the 
evolution of tail risk, via a focus on the nature and frequency of Black Swans when 
there is a provision that recognizes structural breaks in the first and second 
moments of the underlying stochastic process in foreign exchange markets with 
an additional scaffolding of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
 
The findings clearly indicate that when the model identifies and embraces 
significant breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic of the return’s distribution, 
it affects the probability of Black Swans occurring. Empirical results of section 4.6.1 
and 4.6.2 permit the evident rejection of the first null hypothesis regarding the 
homogeneity of the various clusters of Black Swans when structural breaks are 
included i.e. in returns, there is dominant trend of a 5% reduction in the occurrence 
of Black Swans in segments as opposed to full samples and in residuals, there is a 
35% reduction in the manifestation of Black Swans. Overall, these results indicate 
that ignoring structural changes or latent non-linearities in the underlying 
distribution could lead to an erroneous estimation of financial risk via kurtosis 
estimates in foreign exchange markets i.e. accounting for structural breaks 
reduces the probability of the occurrence of extreme events. 
 
The second corresponding finding is regarding the nature of Black Swans which 
allows deeper understanding about the existence of skewness in the distribution. 
Summarizing the skewness trends in section 6, foreign exchange markets 
consistently display a higher propensity of experiencing a marginally higher 
frequency of Black Swans during positive shocks as opposed to negative ones i.e. 
with a provision for structural breaks, the greater part of total Black Swans occur 
on the right tail - 52% and 57% in the returns and residuals respectively. 
Therefore, while accounting for structural breaks reduces tail asymmetry, the forex 
market remains skewed to the right unlike the equity market which skews to the 
left. 
 
The third major finding of this chapter was regarding the second aspect of the 
research question about the evolution of tail risk ratio ex-ante, during and ex-post 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. It investigates the question: Were markets 
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experiencing a steady increase in volatility up until the fall of the Lehman Brothers 
on 15th September 2008 and if so, how did the ratio advance when markets 
supposedly started to stabilize in the succeeding segment. Summarizing the 
particularly remarkable but uniform results in section 6.3 and 6.4, there is 
evidence of a consistent trend between the returns and residuals of the data i.e. 
with the inclusion of the effects of latent non-linearity in the mean and/or variance 
dynamic, majority of the 31 currencies illustrated a decreasing trend leading up to 
the fall of the Lehman brothers (returns exhibited a 7% lower ratio of Black Swans 
to extreme values in the preceding segments and residuals a 2% decline). This 
deteriorating volatility remains evident in the segment succeeding the fall of the 
Lehman Brothers i.e. returns demonstrate 13% fewer Black Swans to extreme 
values and this ratio falls to 9% in residuals indicating that a proportion of that 
volatility was resulting from volatility clustering in the data. 
 
The final hypothesis this chapter tested was the behaviour of Black Swans in 
foreign exchange markets in relation to the equity markets. The results in section 
6 reveal that the probability of Black Swans in foreign exchange markets is 
distinctly contrasting to the probability of Black Swans in equity markets in every 
aspect tested i.e. trend when structural breaks are accounted for, evolution during 
highly volatile periods as well as skewness.  
 
With regards to structural breaks, accounting for them in the daily returns of equity 
markets, with the exception of Iceland and Slovakia, all countries bared a 20% 
decline in the occurrence of Black Swans whereas in foreign exchange markets 
there was a 20% increase in half the sample and 21% decrease in the other half. 
In residuals, this antipodean trend between forex and equity markets endures at 
a lower potency i.e. in equity markets Black Swans occurred 12% less frequently 
and in forex markets, there was a 35% increase in the appearance of Black Swans. 
The findings indicate that removing auto-correlation from the data, ignoring latent 
non-linearity in equity markets overestimates volatility whereas in foreign 
exchange markets it underestimates it. 
 
In reference to the evolution of the Black Swan to extreme value ratio, after 
correcting auto-dependence in the returns, in equity markets, the segment 
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preceding the Global Financial Crisis had 32% more Black Swans to extreme values 
and this ratio declined to 10% in the succeeding segment. For foreign exchange 
markets, the preceding segment had 2% more Black Swans to extreme values and 
this reduced by an additional 9% in the succeeding segment.  
 
Reducing Black Swans in the succeeding segment to the Global Financial Crisis fits 
in with the current literature (see (Uppal and Ullah Mangla, 2013), that studied 
five developed countries along with five leading emerging countries; (Iorgulescu, 
2015) for 36 equity markets) that markets had begun to stabilize therefore 
reducing the probability of future Black Swans taking place. However, the declining 
proportion of extreme events that can be classified as Black Swans from the 
preceding segment culminating into the segment which includes the fall of the 
Lehman Brothers is contrary to the literature. This finding suggests that in general 
financial markets globally had begun to experience increased financial volatility 
long before the fall of the Lehman Brothers in 2008. While returns continued to 
exhibit a higher number of volatility clusters or Black Swan swarms due to 
amplified integration, spill-over and leverage effects, having accounted for them 
using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model effectively reduced the probability of 
heterogeneous Black Swans occurring within the crisis period (see (Iorgulescu, 
2015) for empirical study on 36 markets from six continents showing higher 
integration  between global financial markets even before the occurrence of the 
crisis as well as lower correlation during the crisis for markets in the Asia/Pacific 
region). 
 
Finally with regards to skewness of the Black Swan distribution, while equity 
markets remained skewed to the left (56% of the total back swans occurred in the 
left tail of returns and 61% in the left tail of the residuals), foreign exchange 
markets depicted a persistent skewness to the right (54% on the right tail of the 
returns distribution and 57% on the right tail of the residuals distribution). This 
contrary trend between the two financial markets with regards to the probability 
of Black Swans indicates a possible opportunity for international portfolio 





Financial models that have traditionally assumed normality in distribution of 
financial market returns have grossly underestimated the probability of extreme 
events while invalidating the inferences drawn from asset pricing models that 
follow that assumption. However, having being crippled by a barrage of financial 
crisis that were neither predicted nor accommodated in existing models, has led 
to the increasing awareness about the significance of information in the tails of the 
distribution i.e. the Gaussian distribution grossly underestimate the probability of 
extreme events. 
 
In this chapter, the main goal of understanding the extreme tails of the returns 
distribution of the foreign exchange markets when there is a provision for 
structural breaks was achieved by looking at Black Swans and extreme values in 
35 currency markets when there was a provision for breaks versus without with 
an additional scaffolding of the Global Financial Crisis. The chapter allows for an 
in-depth study of the homogeneity of Black Swans in the presence of structural 
breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic of the underlying distribution along 
with corrections for auto-correlation among the data as well as any leverage effects 
by using the best-fit ARMA-APARCH models.  
 
The focal contribution of the empirical results found that by accounting for latent 
non-linearity in the mean and/or variance dynamic of the forex returns, the 
skewness of the distribution was significantly reduced leading to a more 
symmetrical tail, similar to the equity market returns. 
 
The empirical results provide a clarity regarding the nature of Black Swans and 
their evolution during the Global Financial Crisis. While the homogeneity of Black 
Swans in strongly rejected with the provision of structural breaks, the evolution of 
the Black Swan to extreme value ratio elucidates that much of the volatility in 
foreign exchange markets resulted from volatility clustering and leverage effects 
in the market. When each of these are accounted for, volatility essentially declines 




These results have a strong implication with regards the risk hedging strategies 
that could be used by market participants as well as the potential for portfolio 
diversification between foreign exchange and equity markets. There is also an 
implication for asset pricing models that overestimate risk during crisis periods and 





Chapter 5: Understanding the occurrence of 




A popular method of measuring volatility without imposing parametric assumptions 
on the error term are stochastic volatility models. These assume that since 
volatility is latent i.e. unobservable, proxies such as absolute returns, squared 
returns and log squared returns can be used instead. What has not been explored 
yet, is the viability of these volatility proxies to study the occurrence of highly 
improbable events stemming from the volatility dynamics of the distribution. 
 
An additional justification for studying highly improbable occurrences in these 
volatility proxies is that although the occurrence of an extreme event in returns 
will affect both the mean and variance of the distribution, a surge in the probability 
of the occurrence of a highly improbable event holds the potential to increase the 
variance without affecting the mean. Therefore, understanding the degree of 
overlap/difference in the occurrence of highly improbable events from mean and 
volatility dynamics individually could contribute to a clearer understanding of 
extreme risk; this could then be translated into asset pricing and forecasting 
models. 
 
The following chapter will further this conclusion by examining the riskiness of risk 
i.e. highly improbable events in the volatility dynamics of forex and equity markets 
and compare it to highly improbable events in the return dynamics. It will carry 
out this investigation in two ways: first it will identify Black Swans and extreme 
values in each tail using volatility proxies and compare them to Black Swans and 
extreme values; second it will undertake the same investigation vis-à-vis an 
ARMA-APARCH model to include heteroscedasticity in the variance with an 
additional scaffolding of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  
 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II sets the context for the 
research with a literature review, followed by section III which provides the specific 
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research questions this chapter seeks to answer. Section IV and section V make 
available the description of the data and the research methodology used to obtain 
results. The final segments of the chapter are section VI which presents the 
empirical results on the frequency of Black Swans and extreme returns that exist 
in the stock market, and section VII which discusses the implications for key 
market participants. Section VIII concludes. 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to scrutinize extreme volatility that results 
from the conditional variance of the returns using non-parametric measures and 
comparing it to the extreme volatility from the conditional means of the returns 
obtained using parametric measures. 
 
Studying volatility is imperative from a risk management and asset pricing 
perspective however, in the past decade, volatility has also been explicitly used as 
the basis of financial assets since it is actively traded in the form of futures, 
options, and variance and volatility swaps with the key players being institutional 
investors, hedge funds and banks. 
 
The study of volatility of volatility has substantial facets in literature but the depth 
of such studies remains emergent. The following sections will review the various 
facets of volatility of volatility starting with expected volatility of volatility followed 
by realized volatility of volatility and finally implied volatility. Each section will 
cover assumptions, methodologies, model alterations over time and performance. 
The review concludes with a section on extreme volatility of volatility which is of 
particular interest to the research questions of this chapter. 
 
Expected volatility of volatility  
One of the most recent strands is volatility of expected volatility; see a recent 
paper by Baltussen et al. (2018) studying the risk of volatility or in other words 
the volatility of expected volatility found that stocks with a lower volatility of 
volatility characteristic outperformed their riskier counterparts when studied from 
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1996 to 20168, i.e. the uncertainty of future volatility is an important predictor of 
stock prices.   
 
In terms of modelling, a study that looked at the comparative effectiveness of 
GARCH and stochastic volatility models in forecasting the expected volatility of 
volatility found that SV models were only slightly more accurate than GARCH 
models specifically in case where financial assets display high volatility of volatility9 
on the Euro, Pound and Japanese Yen against the Dollar (Ding and Meade, 2010). 
 
Realized volatility of volatility  
Another popular strand is realized volatility which has led to modelling of 
“observable” volatility and predicting future volatility; see Corsi et al. (2008) that 
modelled volatility of realised volatility along with log realized variance of the 
residuals of a conventional time series from 1985 to 2004 while allowing for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering effects. Incorporating these properties improved 
the overall model-fit as well as the predictive performance of the model. 
 
In terms of modelling, a seminal and fairly recent paper by Barndorff-Nielsen et 
al. (2010) developed a model-free way that decomposed realized variance into 
positive and negative semi-variances by adding high frequency intraday squared 
returns. Using this model led to improved realized variance forecasts  (Patton and 
Sheppard, 2015), allow an understanding of cross-section equity returns 
(Bollerslev et al., 2017), and permitted a clearer untangling of positive and 
negative returns in the options market (Feunou and Okou, 2019) 
 
Stochastic volatility of volatility 
Stochastic volatility models remain one of the most popular methods in literature 
to model time-varying volatility of financial assets that also allowing for the 
inclusion of other stylized properties of volatility such as the clustering and 
leverage effect. One of the primary assumptions of SV models is that volatility is 
                                                             
8 The study was across American and European stock markets and the results  
9 The GARCH model set the conditional variance as a function of lagged squared residuals and  
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unobservable and hence proxies are used to measure latent volatility such as 
squared returns, absolute returns, log squared returns, etc.  
 
Over time, extensions of SV models allowed for the incorporation of long memory 
(Comte and Renault, 1998), non-linear mean reversion, stochastic leverage 
(Veraart and Veraart, 2012) as well as the implied volatility smile and asymmetries 
(Heston, 1993) also known as multifactor SV models. 
 
Extreme volatility of volatility  
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 highlighted the importance of including tail risk 
hedging tools within portfolios such as index put options or volatility index futures 
and options.  
 
A recent study by Park (2015) used the implied volatility index (VIX) options to 
explore volatility of volatility finding that it was a good proxy for forecasting for 
tail risk hedging returns in the presence of jump risk, asymmetries, skewness, 
liquidity, as well as variance risk premiums.  
 
While the literature on tail risk is ever-expanding, yet there are no clear indicators 
of tail risk that emerge. This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the 
possibility of volatility of volatility as a tail risk indicator. 
 
5.3 Research question 
Conventional literature of financial risk measures the frequency and probability of 
highly improbable events in the mean dynamics of the financial markets. As a 
result, traditional financial models that focus on volatility resulting from a change 
in the mean dynamics do not allow for the inclusion of volatility that can result 
from a change in the volatility dynamics. Additionally, changes in the volatility 
dynamics  might not be directly observable by a change in the mean and therefore 




Therefore, in order to measure the frequency of highly improbable events 
contributing to tail risk, this chapter will study the number of Black Swans and 
extreme events in volatility dynamics and then compare it to those in the mean 
dynamics. If the two are indeed different, the chapter will then analyse the degree 
of this difference to determine the importance of the inclusion of extreme volatility 
resulting from a change in the volatility dynamics. 
 
This chapter, moreover, endeavours to provide a study of the behaviour of these 
Black Swans pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis using non-parametric 
measures of volatility. Specifically, I measure the evolution of tail risk in forex 
markets during the Global Financial Crisis resulting from a change in the volatility 
dynamics of the asset returns such as absolute returns, squared returns, and, log 
squared returns. To ensure the robustness of the results, each volatility measure 
is corrected for long memory, fat tails and unit roots by using first-order 
differentiation combined with the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model. An additional 
robustness check, that integrates the findings of the first two empirical chapters, 
is the incorporation of probable non-linearity’s in the mean and/or variance 
dynamic of the underlying returns generating process that are known to create 
and upward bias in the kurtosis measures during a crisis. 
 
The two key aspects of the research question embedded within this chapter are: 
- Are highly improbable events from the volatility dynamics the same as the 
ones that arise from the mean dynamics in foreign exchange markets? If 
not, then what is the degree of similarity or lack thereof between these 
extreme events resulting from a change in volatility dynamics versus mean 
dynamics?  
- What is the evolution of the occurrence of these extreme events resulting 
from the volatility dynamics of the forex market during the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008? 
 
These questions will be answered using two models: The first model will compare 
the frequency of Black Swans resulting from the volatility of volatility and then 
testing their similarity when using conditional mean while recognizing multiple 
structural breaks in the underlying process of both data sets. The second model 
98 
 
will further improve estimates by using the residuals of both return-based 
measures and proxy-based measures obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH 
model to correct conditional heteroscedasticity and/or correlations between the 
values. The second model will additionally study the transformation of the Black 
Swans to extreme value during the Global Financial Crisis to understand the 
evolution of Black Swans in forex markets resulting from volatility dynamics and 
comparing it to the results to the equity market which are studied in the chapter 
6. 
 
5.4 Data  
In order to understand the evolution of Black Swans in forex markets, daily returns 
of the currency market were obtained from the DataStream software for 31 
countries denoted in the US Dollar – the same ones as in Chapter 4. These returns 
were converted into three volatility proxies: Absolute returns, squared returns and 
log returns. This section presents the descriptive statistics of each of the proxies 
finding evidence of severe kurtosis, skewness, and non-normality followed by a 
section that illustrates the stationarity of the chosen data sets. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The following table 18 lists the mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis of each volatility 
proxy. 
Table 18 – Summary Statistics of differenced Absolute returns (Forex Market) 
 Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5710 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 1.10% 0.71% 0.85% 0.48% 
Skewness 0.47 -0.08 0.06 -0.14 
Kurtosis 615.20 15.54 20.57 9.44 
 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5839 2828 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.52% 0.12% 0.57% 0.57% 
Skewness -0.02 1.41 0.02 0.02 
Kurtosis 8.89 92.62 2.60 2.59 
 Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4557 5839 4953 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.64% 0.03% 0.71% 0.34% 
Skewness -1.64 1.24 -0.58 0.13 
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Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 
No. of obs. 5839 4953 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 1.27% 0.47% 0.89% 0.85% 
Skewness -0.23 0.48 0.02 0.63 
Kurtosis 74.86 20.86 903.26 120.99 




No. of obs. 5611 5839 5839 5454 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.75% 1.07% 0.73% 0.66% 
Skewness 0.18 6.14 0.03 0.04 
Kurtosis 115.07 295.55 6.90 68.86 
 Norwegian Krone Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
No. of obs. 5839 4742 5577 5271 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.66% 0.29% 0.71% 1.46% 
Skewness -0.02 -0.21 -0.06 7.11 
Kurtosis 5.66 38.56 4.65 371.31 







No. of obs. 5839 2586 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.33% 0.76% 0.85% 0.78% 
Skewness 0.16 -0.10 -0.13 1.64 
Kurtosis 12.20 14.77 5.07 130.45 
 Swedish Krona 
Taiwan New 
Dollar 
UK Sterling  
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5839  
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
Standard Dev. 0.64% 0.26% 0.49%  
Skewness 0.02 -0.54 0.02  
Kurtosis 3.44 29.33 4.95  
 
 
Table 19 – Summary Statistics of differenced Squared Returns (Forex market) 
 Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5710 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.32% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.01 0.07 -1.14 -0.36 
Kurtosis 1197.70 299.53 252.71 196.74 
 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5839 2828 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.42 2.80 0.03 0.05 
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Kurtosis 160.18 613.44 75.37 77.54 
 Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4557 5839 4953 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.11% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.27 3.82 -1.18 0.16 
Kurtosis 2257.31 1069.91 880.84 115.43 
 Indonesian Rupiah Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 
No. of obs. 5839 4953 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.20% 0.02% 0.24% 0.10% 
Skewness 0.17 1.71 0.00 1.06 
Kurtosis 308.10 179.78 2663.65 686.47 




No. of obs. 5611 5839 5839 5454 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.06% 0.25% 0.02% 0.04% 
Skewness 0.06 16.59 0.35 -0.09 
Kurtosis 1055.58 2280.85 96.52 732.93 
 Norwegian Krone Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
No. of obs. 5839 4742 5577 5271 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.56% 
Skewness -0.22 -0.53 -0.90 8.75 
Kurtosis 148.14 162.38 64.97 926.72 
 Singapore Dollar Solomon Isl Dollar 
South African 
Rand 
South Korean Won 
No. of obs. 5839 2586 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 
Skewness 1.21 -1.01 -2.63 1.83 
Kurtosis 241.04 113.98 191.06 950.62 
 Swedish Krona 
Taiwan New 
Dollar 
UK Sterling  
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5839  
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
Standard Dev. 0.02% 0.00% 0.01%  
Skewness 0.69 -8.00 -0.02  
Kurtosis 85.57 749.39 129.25  
 
 
Table 20 – Summary statistics of differenced Log squared returns (Forex market) 
 Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 3653 5620 5257 5635 
Mean -1.61% -0.14% -0.70% -0.82% 
Standard Dev. 264.99% 293.06% 291.02% 297.05% 
Skewness 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 
Kurtosis 1.59 0.59 0.76 0.69 
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 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5506 2441 5697 5663 
Mean -1.30% -2.75% -0.26% -0.26% 
Standard Dev. 288.92% 280.79% 330.99% 317.76% 
Skewness 0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.01 
Kurtosis 0.70 0.85 0.99 0.55 
 Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 3902 4753 4785 4867 
Mean -2.82% -0.11% 0.23% -0.16% 
Standard Dev. 276.87% 258.72% 296.64% 267.92% 
Skewness -0.04 0.08 0.00 0.07 








No. of obs. 4897 3741 3579 5611 
Mean -2.88% 0.47% -4.24% -0.69% 
Standard Dev. 272.25% 237.40% 280.27% 294.71% 
Skewness 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.02 
Kurtosis 0.79 0.17 0.32 0.90 




No. of obs. 3073 5557 5607 3649 
Mean -3.10% -1.08% -0.13% -2.04% 
Standard Dev. 273.82% 296.04% 302.37% 262.96% 
Skewness 0.00 0.07 -0.02 0.00 




Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
No. of obs. 5706 3791 5386 4832 
Mean -0.82% -1.03% 0.78% -2.17% 
Standard Dev. 319.22% 267.52% 304.32% 310.08% 
Skewness -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 
Kurtosis 1.07 0.54 1.02 1.41 







No. of obs. 5547 1508 5634 5143 
Mean -0.75% -3.28% -0.38% -2.83% 
Standard Dev. 291.83% 288.92% 315.86% 295.56% 
Skewness 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.08 
Kurtosis 0.52 0.64 1.05 0.74 
     




No. of obs. 5705 5073 5661 
Mean -1.04% -4.38% -0.22% 
Standard Dev. 312.45% 294.75% 307.99% 
Skewness 0.00 0.07 -0.01 




For comparative purposes I provide the descriptive statistics of these proxies 
without differencing in Appendix 35, 36, and 37. 
 
 
Volatility proxies – in first differences 
 
One of the principal innovations of this study is that its volatility proxies (absolute, 
squared and log-squared returns) are examined in first differences. This 
transformation is very convenient in terms of modelling because it overcomes the 
problem of estimates based on bounded series (the absolute and squared returns 
are by construction positive and the log-squared returns are practically always 
negative). However, it is more than simply modelling convenience since 
differencing even series that are widely accepted as not having a unit root (i.e. 
over-differencing) is a suggested method to deal not only with high persistence in 
the series (see (Barros et al., 2016, Meese and Singleton, 1982, Wright, 1999, 
Baillie and Bollerslev, 2002, Taylor, 2008)) but also with a certain class of breaks 
namely location shifts (Hendry, 2003). These two are key features of the financial 
series – in fact a very large strand of literature attributes the very high or infinite 
persistence of GARCH-type models to the presence of unaccounted for breaks 
(Bissoondeeal et al., 2019, Karanasos et al., 2014a, Karanasos et al., 2016, 
Karanasos et al., 2014b, Karoglou, 2006a, Karoglou, 2010b) . 
 
For completeness, I also provide the graphical evidence of stationarity, of the final 




As before, there are two general models that I use, namely a completely non-
parametric one and one based on the residuals of the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model 
– which is possible due to the aforementioned use of differencing the volatility 
proxies. It is worth noting at this stage that in the chosen setting, the ARMA part 
effectively models the evolution of the volatility of the returns; and the APARCH 
part, the evolution of the volatility of volatility, implying effectively a form of 
autoregressive kurtosis in the same spirit as Brooks et al (2005).  
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The return function can be specified as: 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡 ∙ 𝜇,                           𝜀𝑡 = 𝜎𝑡 ∙ 𝑧𝑡                             𝑧𝑡~𝑁(0,1) 
Where the data in the underlying distribution is assumed to independent and 
identically distributed. If the model is correctly specified then 
𝐸𝑡−1(𝑟𝑡
2) = 𝐸𝑡−1(𝜎
2 ∙ 𝑧2) = 𝜎𝑡
2 
This equation justifies the use of squared returns as an adequate proxy for 
understanding ex-post volatility.  
However, the model that specifically addresses the research questions about the 
volatilities that arise from the mean and the variance can be specified as:  




Wherein, the volatilities in the mean will inferred in the variance of the returns, 
and therefore can be appreciated however the volatilities arising in the variance 
are not axiomatic in the mean of the returns and therefore need to be investigated 
distinctively using volatility proxies such as squared returns, log squared returns, 
and absolute returns. 
Within the ARMA-APARCH model, the conditional mean of the returns process can 
be defined by the ARMA (p, q) process of autoregressive order p and moving 
average order of n as:  






𝜖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜖𝑡 
In order to capture the heteroskedastic properties of the returns process as well 
as the leverage effects, the conditional variance of the returns process can be 
defined by the APARCH (m, n):  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡𝜎𝑡;         𝑧𝑡~𝑁(0,1)               
𝜎𝑡









In both cases, I am seeking to obtain the timing of the extreme events in the 
underlying volatility proxies; and then compare them to those obtained in the 
previous chapter. Each observation of the two that is not the same would 
effectively signify an extreme event that has its source on the volatility and not 









The remainder of this section is dedicated to providing some evidence of the 
literature that justifies the use of differencing the volatility proxies. It begins with 
the presence of unit roots and structural changes in the forex series, followed by 
the evidence of the presence of unit root and near unit root in volatility proxies for 
the forex market returns and concludes with the presence of high volatility 
persistence in forex returns and proxies.  
 
Unit roots and Structural changes in Foreign exchange data 
 
The earliest evidence on the existence of non-stationarity in exchange rates 
corrected with differencing10 dates to the early 19th century (Bilson, 1980, Cornell, 
1977, Cumby and Obstfeld, 1980, Fuller et al., 1981, Hakkio, 1981, Tryon, 1979, 
Hansen and Hodrick, 1980) until more formal testing for unit roots gained 
popularity due to the introduction of large sample distribution theory for unit roots 
by Fuller et al. (1981), Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Hasza and Fuller (1979). 
Where unit roots are found to be present, the standard asymptotic theory cannot 
be applied and will result in spurious statistical inferences if ignored. At this time, 
it became standard practice in financial modeling to test for stationarity using Unit 
root tests. 
 
One of the elementary studies formally testing the presence of unit roots within 
foreign exchange data, using weekly spot and forward exchange rates of the US 
Dollar against the Swiss Franc, the Canada Dollar and the German Mark for the 
time period of 1976 to 1981 (Meese and Singleton, 1982) found conclusive 
evidence of the presence of unit roots; these were corrected using first-order 
differencing, following which the coefficients of the first-order lag autoregressive 
model were found to be characterised by random walk (Additionally, ample 
evidence on the non-stationarity of univariate time-series spot and forward 
exchange rate frameworks were pivoted by Cornell (1977), Mussa (1979), Corbae 
and Ouliaris (1986)11).  
                                                             
10 Differencing in the form of time 
11 The study conducted univariate tests for the presence of unit roots in daily spot exchange rates tested for 
unit roots in Univariate tests reveal strong evidence for the presence of a unit root in the univariate time‐series 




These investigations were furthered by Baillie and Bollerslev (2002) revealing that 
the time-dependent heteroscedasticity and severe kurtosis was more prevalent in 
daily exchange rate data tested using the Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips and Perron, 
1988) on the spot and forward exchange rates of the US dollar against the 
currencies of UK, West Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Japan, and Canada12. 
 
By the late nineteenth century, one essential drawback of conventional unit root 
tests came to light - the integral disregard of structural breaks in the underlying 
volatility structure of the financial returns (see, for examples (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981, Said and Dickey, 1985, Phillips and Perron, 1988, Kwiatkowski et al., 1992).  
 
This was remedied by the development of advanced unit root tests that explicitly 
considered structural shifts in the constant terms and slope parameters by deriving 
a limiting distribution for the volatility test statistic (see, for examples, (Perron, 
1989, Perron, 1990, Perron and Vogelsang, 1992). However, these advanced unit 
root test assumed homoscedasticity in the underlying variance structure of the 
data.   
 
One of the seminal papers that highlighted the effect of shifts in innovation 
variance was by Hamori and Tokihisa (1997) which found evidence that 
heteroscedasticity in the variance structure leads to the invalidation of the 
conventional unit root asymptotes unless the heteroscedasticity follows a GARCH 
type specification that is stationary (i.e. the unconditional variance is well-defined 
and constant) (Kim and Schmidt, 1993, Seo, 1999, Ling et al., 2003). 
 
However, empirically the assumption of mean reversion remains highly 
questionable and volatility in financial data displays persistent variation from its 
mean. This obstinate volatility variation in time series impairs the invariance 
principle due to size distortions (see (Boswijk, 2001, Kim et al., 2002, Cavaliere, 
2005)).  This has led to non-parametrically corrected versions of the unit root tests 
                                                             
12  The presence of unit roots signifying time-varying conditional heteroscedasticity were confirmed using the 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests which was highly significant for all the currencies tested. 
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that do not display size distortions due to permanent changes in the innovation 
variance (see (Cavaliere and Taylor, 2007, Beare, 2004, Boswijk, 2005, Beare, 
2018); others recommend identifying the structural breakpoints within the 
variance structure of the time series before the testing of unit roots (for more 
evidence see (Kim et al., 2002).  
 
Unit roots in proxies  
Volatility itself is inherently unobservable, therefore the use of volatility proxies to 
gain understanding of the nature of volatility has become common practice in 
literature. In this case, volatility proxies such as squared returns, absolute returns 
and/or log squared returns can be considered as a conditionally unbiased estimator 
of latent conditional variance and can potentially increase the efficiency of the 
financial model and lead to superior parameter estimates. However, most studies 
have found evidence that squared returns and absolute returns are too noisy and 
highly persistent and therefore they have been arbitrated as inadequate estimators 
of latent volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Andersen et al., 2005, Hansen 
and Lunde, 2006, Patton, 2011).  
 
This motivated the investigation of this noise, its nature and causation: typically 
found to be from structural breaks in the volatility process and the inability of 
conventional ARCH models to capture cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. For the 
former, many studies show that there are structural breaks in the volatility process 
and these breaks could be one of the causes of high persistence in the volatility 
process (Lobato and Savin, 1998, Granger and Hyung, 1999). For the latter 
causation of why volatility proxies could be misjudged as too noisy can be 
attributed to the restrictive nature of GARCH models that assume that conditional 
volatility depends only on lagged information. These models do not take cross-
sectional information into account and therefore what is being classified as ‘noise’ 
could be arising from multiple cross-sectional factors if asset returns follow linear 
factor models as suggested by Fama and French. Hwang et al. (2007) found that 
by using the SVMSR (stochastic volatility Markov switching regime) model that 
allowed for structural breaks, the level of persistence in the data is reduced and 
the resulting estimators are more efficient. They found their results to be 
applicable to GARCH models that allow for structural breaks. While it is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to identify and test for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity in 
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factors of the financial returns, the results from literature are being used as 
evidence to specify a model that identifies structural breaks as well as uses GARCH 
parameters to estimate latent volatility.  
 
Having established the efficiency of volatility proxies once structural breaks are 
accounted for and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity has been corrected, many 
studies adopted absolute and squared returns to model asset returns; the earliest 
one can be traced back to Taylor (2008) where first lag coefficients of absolute 
and squared returns were used to test the hypothesis that return series are strictly 
stationary (the study used UK share index, US stock Index, UK agricultural futures, 
US corn futures among others).  Finding conclusive evidence to reject this null 
hypothesis of a linear structure in returns led to revelation of the ability of using 
volatility proxies13 to understand temporal properties of a return series (Cao and 
Tsay, 1992, Granger and Ding, 1995). For example: the study by Taylor (2008) 
found that correlation coefficients of lagged volatility proxies are almost always 
positive and larger than the correlation coefficients of the lagged values of the 
returns signifying higher volatility clustering in volatility proxies in comparison to 
returns caused by a variation in the conditional variance; Granger and Ding (1995) 
found that autocorrelation between lagged absolute returns of the S&P 500 index 
decline slowly when time decay (𝜃) is positive and that long-memory is strongest 
when 𝜃 = 1, consequently suggesting that an exponential distribution is most 
appropriate to model risk. 
 
These findings are particularly interesting to the current study as it allows for an 
enhanced understanding of the behaviour of extreme volatility during periods of 
high volatility. Additional studies have found evidence of the superior forecasting 
ability of volatility proxies, long-memory of absolute returns (Ding et al., 1993a)14 
which can be efficiently captured using APARCH models. 
 
While the literature agrees unanimously on the heteroscedasticity present in the 
volatility of financial time series it remains divided on how the fluctuations in 
volatility should be modelled. There is the ARCH literature which assumes volatility 
                                                             
13 Absolute returns denoted as |𝑟𝑡| and squared returns denoted as |𝑟𝑡
2| 
14 Data set included daily closing prices from the S&P 500 stock index from the period of 1928 to 1991. 
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is observable and stationary (see (Bollerslev et al., 1992, Bollerslev et al., 1994) 
for a detailed review of different ARCH models) and the alternative is stochastic 
volatility models that assume that volatility is unobservable hence must be 
modelled using volatility proxies (see (Hansen, 1995, Ruiz, 1994, Taylor, 1994) 
for a detailed review). 
 
The stochastic volatility models assume that the log of squared time series returns 
follow an ARMA process and therefore the largest autoregressive root of the 
process is the same as that of the volatility process which indicates that it is 
possible to test for stationarity of innovations in volatility by conducting a unit root 
test on the log of squared returns. However, this process was not valid with large 
sample sizes since the data exhibited a large negative moving average which is 
indicative that conventional unit roots test suffer from size distortions (Schwert, 
2002, Pantula, 1991, Harvey et al., 1994). This issue was resolved by proposed 
unit roots tests by Pantula (1991), Stock (1994), Wright (1999).  
 
Using the seminal work of Wright (1999) who tested the hypothesis of 
nonstationary stochastic volatility in financial data with the help of proxies such as 
absolute returns, squared returns and log of squared returns15 using the 
fractionally integrated stochastic volatility model that did not require restrictive 
assumptions regarding the specification for the error term distribution, proposed 
by Breidt et al. (1998), found strong evidence rejecting the presence of unit roots 
at all conventional significance levels, however could not reject the presence of 
near unit roots in the series conceding to the presence of long 
memory/considerable persistence in the asset returns.  
 
High persistence in Volatility proxies 
A final justification for using differencing in volatility proxies is that it allows for 
the correction of long memory in the financial data. Studies have shown that long-
range persistence cannot be adequately modelled by autoregressive conditional 
                                                             
15 The author used stock market data from 1982-1994 (S&P 500 index) as well as foreign exchange data (dollar 
to pound, dollar to mark and dollar to yen exchange rates) from 1986-1996. 
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heteroskedastic (ARCH), Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) and standard stochastic models  (Breidt et al., 1998).  
 
Numerous studies have found evidence that real exchange rates (DM and Yen 
against the US Dollar) contain innovations that can be classified as fractionally 
integrated with slow reversion to mean and therefore contain long memory 
properties (Caporale and Gil‐Alana, 2004) (see (Dufrénot et al., 2008) for similar 
results for five European, namely France, UK, Netherlands, Germany and Portugal 
currencies using non-linear integration models; the study found evidence of unit 
roots in the series as well).  
 
Long memory in volatility has also been estimated in various papers using semi-
parametric estimates, the results of which further contribute to the existing pool 
of evidence in literature regarding its presence in financial asset returns (Lobato, 
1999, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997). While there are varied methods that exist, 
the most prevalent ones are the Long memory stochastic volatility model by Breidt 
et al. (1998) and the FIEGARCH model (Fractionally Integrated Exponential 
GARCH) by Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996). The LMSV model has a memory 
parameter that can be the GPH estimator by  Geweke and Porter‐Hudak (1983)16, 
or the GSE parameter (Gaussian Semi-Parametric estimator) by Kunsch (1987). 
However, there also exists trifling evidence that in some cases these estimators 
make assumptions that are violated when tested on data. For example, the Long 
memory stochastic volatility model that uses the GPH estimator assumes that the 
data used is Gaussian (see (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997, Deo and Hurvich, 
2001)); the limiting distribution of the GSE estimator does not assume normality 
but that the data generation process is characterised by increments that are linear 
suggesting asymptotic normality. 
 
Barros et al., 2016 is one of the very few studies that have found evidence of long 
memory as well as the presence of unit roots in the Chinese Yuan against the US 
Dollar. 
                                                             
16 The GPH estimator models the log periodogram of a proxy series such as absolute returns, squared returns, 
and log squared returns using ordinary linear regression. The estimate is then incorporated into a stochastic 




5.6 Empirical Results 
The following results will test the hypothesis of the homogeneity of the different 
clusters of Black Swans in return series when compared to differenced volatility 
proxies: namely absolute returns, squared returns, and log squared returns. It will 
then scrutinize the tails of these distributions with regards to the skewness to gain 
an understanding of the probability of occurrence of negative versus positive Black 
Swans. 
 
The following section will begin by presenting model 1 outcomes and illustrate the 
degree of overlap of Black Swans between returns and the three proxies 
individually (with the inclusion of structural breaks in all data sets) along with other 
properties such as skewness and the final section of model 1 will conclude by 
summarizing the degree of overlap overall. 
 
The second section of the empirical results will render the results of model 2 and 
illustrate the degree of overlap of Black Swans between residuals of returns and 
residuals of the volatility proxies along with the evolution of volatility of volatility 
during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 as the focal point. 
 
5.6.1 Model 1 outcomes 
Summary of the innovation in extreme conditional variance between 
returns and differenced absolute returns of the daily foreign exchange 
market 
The following table 21 compares the frequency of Black Swans in the daily returns 
of the foreign exchange market and compares it to the frequency of Black Swans 
in chosen volatility proxy – differenced absolute returns. Both data series are 
inclusive of the provision of structural breaks in the mean and/or variance dynamic 
which account for latent non-linearity in the underlying data structure. The table 
also tests for the homogeneity of Black Swans in the left and right tail thereby 
scrutinizing the skewness of the volatility distribution (see Appendix 19 for detailed 
results).  














Right tail  28.77% 17.19% 21.13% -30.75% 15.42% 











Right tail  -22.31% -101.16% -91.63% -28.77% -37.81% 












Right tail  -17.59% -22.31% -4.26% 21.03% -12.03% 
Left tail  -17.59% 18.23% -35.42% 13.06% -3.06% 













Right tail  -4.26% 23.92% 19.42% 14.66% 8.70% 












Right tail  0.00% 1.98% -12.14% 26.42% -18.23% 














Right tail  -17.59% 19.11% 25.38% -45.20% -20.07% 
Left tail  -3.28% -37.04% -20.97% 3.39% 10.82% 
  UK Sterling         
Right tail  -23.84%         
Left tail  -16.99%         
 
The returns of all 31 countries depict a difference in the frequency of Black Swans 
in returns as compared to absolute returns with the latter having a higher 
frequency in 76% of the cases excluding Pakistani Rupee and Russian Rouble which 
showed no difference. Also, on average, there were 6% additional Black Swans in 
the differenced absolute returns in comparison to the return series (representing 
an increase from 1.36% of trading days in the return series to 1.42% of the trading 
days in the absolute return series).  
 
However, a nuanced analysis at the results divulges an antagonistic trend – while 
largely, there are a higher number of Black Swans in the absolute returns, yet 7 
of the 29 countries maintain a higher frequency of Black Swans in the returns 
(1.68% of the trading days are Black Swans) as opposed to the absolute returns 
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(1.49% of the trading days are Black Swans) with the highest frequency of Black 
Swans within returns occurring in the Argentine Peso.  
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme conditional variance between 
returns and squared returns of the daily foreign exchange market 
The following table 22 compares the frequency of Black Swans in returns and 
contrasts it to the frequency of Black Swans in differenced squared returns of the 
foreign exchange market of 31 countries while allowing for non-linearity in the 
mean/variance structure. It also breaks down the frequency of Black Swans on the 
left and right tails of each distribution to observe skewness in the volatility 
structure (see Appendix 20 for detailed results). 












Right tail  93.43% -23.36% 7.41% -92.43% -21.36% 











Right tail  109.86% -160.94% -145.53% -78.85% 0.00% 












Right tail  -50.31% -6.67% 39.47% 27.63% -6.19% 













Right tail  9.10% 121.11% 32.09% -42.05% 26.57% 











Right tail  -60.98% 71.29% -53.63% 65.81% -28.14% 












Right tail  -10.92% -4.26% -8.27% -111.44% 4.55% 
Left tail  -6.45% -41.69% -77.32% -77.32% 5.26% 
 UK Sterling     
Right tail  -67.37%     
Left tail  -63.60%     
      
The frequency of Black Swans captured by returns and squared returns are not 
homogenous. In every country, there is a significant difference between the 
numbers of Black Swans in the returns series versus the differenced squared 
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returns series which reiterates the conclusion that volatility arising from variance 
of returns is varied to the volatility arising from mean. Also, there are on average 
11% more Black Swans in the differenced squared return series (where Black 
Swans accounted for 1.52% of the trading days) in comparison to returns (where 
Black Swans accounted for 1.31% of the trading days). It is a well-known fact that 
there are substantially more correlations between absolute returns and squared 
returns as compared to returns themselves (Taylor, 2008, Kariya et al., 1990, Ding 
et al., 1993b) which explains the higher frequency of Black Swans in the squared 
returns. This trend can be seen in 18 of the 31 countries within the data set. The 
remaining 13 countries depict higher percentage of Black Swans in returns (1.68% 
of the trading days) as opposed to squared returns (1.20% of the trading days).  
The above results are consistent with the results from table 21 (absolute returns). 
Summary of the innovation in extreme conditional variance between 
returns and log squared returns of the daily foreign exchange market 
The following table 23 reports the results on the frequency of Black Swans in 
returns in comparison to differenced log squared returns of the foreign exchange 
market of 31 countries while accounting for structural changes in the mean and/or 
variance dynamic of the underlying series (see Appendix 21 for detailed results). 












Right tail  22.41% 60.36% 125.71% 29.29% 78.86% 











Right tail  14.05% -90.70% 12.35% 35.57% 100.72% 












Right tail  73.87% 139.35% 94.47% 198.80% 156.89% 
Left tail  73.87% 160.97% 143.35% 181.94% 240.09% 













Right tail  84.44% 35.77% 79.13% 134.58% 138.99% 












Right tail  25.14% 209.86% 22.11% 104.80% 99.85% 
















Right tail  271.88% 46.07% 84.25% -11.42% 83.28% 




      
  
Right tail  51.91%         
Left tail  43.17%         
 
Among the three volatility proxies in the model, the most significant and counter-
intuitive results emerge in the results comparing the frequency of Black Swans in 
returns and differenced log squared returns i.e. there are a higher frequency of 
Black Swans in returns as opposed to log squared returns.  
 
Overall, there are 82% more Black Swans in returns (1.36% of the trading days 
were classified as Black Swans) as opposed to the log squared returns (0.61% of 
the trading days were identified as Black Swans). This trend is seen in currency 
returns of 29 out of the 31 countries in the data set; the only exceptions are Danish 
Krone and Norwegian Krone where there are 24% and 2% more Black Swans in 
the returns as opposed to the log squared returns respectively.  
 
Degree of overlap between returns (mean dynamics) and the proxies 
(volatility dynamics) of the daily foreign exchange market 
The following table presents the degree of similarity between the extreme events 




Differenced Absolute returns 95.0%* 
Differenced Squared returns 81.9%* 
Differenced Log Squared returns 40.8%** 
*Returns have higher frequency of Black Swans ** Proxies have higher frequency of Black Swans 
It is clear from the summary that there is a slight discrepancy between extreme 
events in returns versus those in the proxies of the returns.  
Accounting for volatility from mean dynamics plays an essential role in asset 
pricing and hedging strategies and results show that a change in the volatility 
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(resulting from mean) is accounted for in traditional models. However, these 
parametric models do not account for the extreme events resulting from the 
volatility of volatility (resulting from volatility dynamics of the asset distribution). 
This disregard of changes in volatility of volatility could let to potential 
misspecification of risk faced by investors and market participants and hence hold 
the potential to be an integral indicator of overall financial risk. 
 
With respect to log-squared returns, majority of scholarly literature tends to 
exclude it as a volatility proxy because it if the asset returns are close to zero, 
then transforming it to log-squared returns yields a highly negative number; if it 
is zero then the transformation is undefined. Such an extreme negative numbers 
tends to distort overall model estimates (Cavalcante and Assaf, 2004, Pereira, 
2004, Christodoulakis and Satchell, 2005). The focus of this chapter is sizable 
distortion in financial markets due to a crisis, i.e. heightened tail risk from the 
volatility dynamics of asset returns during a crisis and not small innovations, 




5.6.2 Model 2 outcomes 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced absolute returns of the daily foreign exchange 
market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 24 determines the frequency of Black Swans in the residuals 
of the conditional volatility mean and variance of daily returns of the forex market 
of 31 countries along with the differenced absolute returns. Both data sets are 
inclusive of multiple structural breaks in the underlying returns process (see 
Appendix 22 for detailed results). 












Right tail  -143.01% -71.93% -66.43% -120.48% -100.30% 











Right tail  -128.82% -126.94% -156.95% -57.34% -75.96% 











Right tail  -116.12% -94.62% -57.62% -51.94% -173.55% 
Left tail  194.49% 244.18% 349.57% 170.41% 78.76% 











Right tail  -65.69% -43.44% -51.74% -75.72% -66.33% 











Right tail  -144.17% -88.32% -105.07% -71.59% -106.56% 













Right tail  -65.55% -75.75% -61.68% -137.42% -188.84% 
Left tail  288.88% 256.43% 283.22% 321.84% 232.64% 
  UK Sterling         
Right tail  -153.23%         
Left tail  321.80%         
 
The empirical results of table 24 can be summarized into two key trends: first, that 
overall there are fewer Black Swans in both residuals and absolute residuals in 
comparison to returns and absolute returns respectively which is consistent with 
the results in equity markets, second the skewness of the two distributions: 
residuals of returns are heavily skewed to the left whereas residuals of absolute 
returns are heavily skewed to the right. 
 
Regarding the first result, there are 24% fewer Black Swans in residuals as 
compared to returns and 0.73% fewer Black Swans in residuals of absolute returns 
in comparison to absolute returns themselves. The decrease in the frequency of 
Black Swans in both data sets is because of the correction of conditional kurtosis 
in returns by using the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model i.e. volatility is higher in 
returns and absolute returns due to the common phenomena of volatility clustering 




The second result entertains the possibility of equivalence of the distributions. 
Indeed, a comparison of the tails of the two distributions shows that the majority 
of the positive Black Swans exist in the absolute residuals (72%) whereas an 
overwhelming number of negative Black Swans exist in the residuals (91%). 
 
In anticipation of the results of the next chapter, these results are consistent with 
equity market trends in residuals and absolute residuals. 
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced Absolute returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model  
The following section, table 25, delves deeper into the nature of the volatility of 
volatility by considering the transformation in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
value during the pre- and post- Global Financial crisis periods. This will be 
accomplished by surveying the transformation in the ratio of Black Swans to 
extreme values in the residuals of absolute differenced returns of the foreign 
exchange markets of 34 countries ex ante and ex post the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008. Specifically, it will study the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the 
segment before the crisis labelled as pre-crisis and after the crisis labelled as post 
crisis in the following table 25 while keeping the central time segment consistent 
to the fall of the Lehman Brothers on 15th of September, 2008. The dates of the 
chosen segments for each of the 34 countries are: 










Pre-Crisis 18/07/2001 24/10/1997 09/06/2003 21/08/1998 06/07/2001 
Crisis 08/07/2007 31/07/2007 08/09/2008 13/09/2007 10/01/2008 
Post Crisis 21/12/2015 20/07/2009 29/06/2009 13/09/2010 13/05/2009 
  Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-Crisis NA 18/08/2004 18/08/2004 02/12/1998 24/09/2003 
Crisis 20/07/2005 12/08/2008 12/08/2008 27/08/2006 21/11/2007 











Pre-Crisis 27/05/1997 27/08/1998 26/10/1999 27/05/1997 22/07/2005 
Crisis 26/03/2006 01/05/2008 21/10/2006 20/11/2007 10/03/2008 
118 
 
Post Crisis 11/06/2009 08/10/2013 23/06/2009 27/01/2009 02/12/2014 









Pre-Crisis 22/12/1994 29/07/1998 26/02/2001 17/12/1997 12/07/2000 
Crisis 06/12/2005 24/12/2002 26/11/2005 27/07/2007 05/12/2003 











Pre-Crisis 26/08/1998 15/10/2001 26/05/1998 27/08/1998 01/12/1998 
Crisis 18/01/2008 21/02/2008 07/08/2008 11/01/2006 14/04/2008 












Pre-Crisis 23/06/2006 27/05/1998 11/08/1998 01/09/1998 20/10/1998 
Crisis 06/11/2007 03/12/2001 17/03/2008 12/08/2008 02/03/2004 
Post Crisis 08/07/2011 04/05/2009 19/05/2009 16/12/2011 15/11/2011 
  
UK Sterling 
    
Pre-Crisis 04/01/1994     
Crisis 28/06/2002     
Post Crisis 17/06/2010     
 
 
The following table 26 summarizes the change in the volatility of volatility before, 
during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 











Pre-crisis 0.00% 73.08% 71.43% 56.25% 73.53% 
Crisis 1.39% 83.33% 16.67% 58.33% 75.00% 
Difference  N/A 13.13% -145.51% 3.63% 1.98% 
Post-crisis   42.86% 67.86% 16.67% 37.50% 
Difference  N/A -66.49% 140.38% -125.25% -69.31% 
  Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis N/A  45.45% 54.55% 56.67% 50.00% 
Crisis 58.70% 50.00% 55.56% 15.38% 84.38% 
Difference  N/A 9.54% 1.83% -130.42% 52.33% 
Post-crisis 16.67% 66.67% 66.67% 35.71% 50.00% 
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Pre-crisis 80.00% 121.15% 81.25% 85.71% 121.74% 
Crisis 68.18% 76.67% 77.78% 50.00% 66.67% 
Difference  -15.99% -45.75% -4.36% -53.89% -60.21% 
Post-crisis 50.00% 92.86% 54.55% 112.50% 50.00% 
Difference  -31.01% 19.16% -35.48% 81.09% -28.77% 










Pre-crisis 100.00% 79.17% 75.00% 86.54% 127.78% 
Crisis 77.78% 51.43% 67.50% 66.67% 96.15% 
Difference  -25.13% -43.14% -10.54% -26.09% -28.44% 
Post-crisis 55.56% N/A  66.67% 64.29% 0.00% 











Pre-crisis 64.00% 79.41% 74.07% 100.00% 58.00% 
Crisis 50.00% 83.33% 59.09% 88.10% 77.27% 
Difference  -24.69% 4.82% -22.59% -12.67% 28.69% 
Post-crisis 35.71% 90.00% 85.71% 100.00% 93.75% 












Pre-crisis 100.00% 95.00% 88.46% 69.23% 60.71% 
Crisis 85.00% 70.00% 50.00% 50.00% 85.71% 
Difference  -16.25% -30.54% -57.05% -32.54% 34.49% 
Post-crisis 100.00% 58.33% 42.86% 58.33% 77.78% 
Difference  16.25% -18.24% -15.41% 15.41% -9.71% 
  
UK Sterling 
        
Pre-crisis 67.39%         
Crisis 66.67%         
Difference  -1.07%         
Post-crisis 30.00%         




The table 26 summarizes the change in the extreme tails of the residuals of the 
differenced absolute returns; it is important to note that while there is a change in 
extreme value constantly, in some cases there are no Black Swans identified within 
those extreme values, therefore in such cases the cell has been labelled as NA and 
ability to measure change in the ratio becomes limited. 
 
The evidence presented in the table 26 can be categorized into two key results: 
first that the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of the 
differenced absolute returns decrease substantially from pre-crisis to the crisis 
period in majority of the countries in the dataset, second that the decline in the 
ratio becomes more significant from the crisis to the post-crisis time period with 
more than half the countries showing a consistent decline across all three time 
periods. 
 
Regarding the first result, there were on average 40% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values in the residuals of the differenced absolute returns for 20 of the 
31 countries in the data set. This result is consistent with the results derived from 
the residuals of returns found in chapter 2 but the decline is more pronounced in 
the residuals of the volatility proxy.  
 
The second result shows that out of these 20 countries; 10 continued to stabilize 
in the consecutive segment (with 28% fewer Black Swans to extreme values in the 
post crisis period), 8 displayed a higher ratio of Black Swans to extreme values 
(on average there were 51% more Black Swans to extreme values in the post-
crisis period suggesting continued extreme volatility) and 2 were NA values (New 
Guinea Kina and Nigerian Naira). Of the remaining 11 countries, which 
demonstrated a higher ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the crisis period 
as compared to the pre-crisis period 6 stabilized in the post crisis period (with the 
ratio of Black Swans to extreme value declining by 63%) while 4 continued to 
experience greater extreme volatility (with a rise in the ratio of Black Swans to 
extreme values of 19%) and the Argentine Peso was incomparable. Overall, the 
trend of declining tails of the extreme volatility distribution remains dominant with 
the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values decreasing to half of their number in 
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the post-crisis period when compared to the crisis period in 16 of the countries in 
the data set. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced squared returns of the daily foreign exchange 
market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
The following table 27 summarizes the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of 
daily forex returns of 31 countries and compares it to the frequency of Black Swans 
in residuals of the selected volatility proxy which is squared returns. It also takes 
an in-depth look at the tails of both the distributions to compare and contrast the 
number of positive and negative Black Swans (see Appendix 23 for detailed 
results). 
 












Right tail  -109.93% -92.23% -77.88% -170.99% -96.43% 




Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Right tail  -86.50% -175.49% -193.72% -86.11% -28.19% 











Right tail  -153.02% -67.22% -9.61% -40.61% -100.64% 











Right tail  -49.21% 33.18% -40.62% -92.58% -22.03% 











Right tail  -162.15% -24.60% -133.95% -74.80% -106.56% 












Right tail  -48.11% -108.16% -85.14% -180.06% -59.74% 
Left tail  288.88% 256.43% 283.22% 321.84% 232.64% 
  UK Sterling         
Right tail  -179.26%         
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Left tail  252.49%         
 
The results of the empirical table 27 above can be summarized into three key 
findings: first that that there are fewer Black Swans in the residuals of both returns 
and squared returns in comparison to the returns themselves; second residuals of 
squared returns have more Black Swans than the residuals of the returns and 
finally there are more negative Black Swans in residuals of squared returns in 
comparison to residuals of returns which have more positive Black Swans. 
 
With respect to the first result, there are 24% fewer Black Swans in the residuals 
of returns and 9% fewer Black Swans in the residuals of squared returns. The 
significant decrease in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of returns align 
with stylized properties of financial returns known as conditional heteroscedasticity 
which has been corrected here using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. 
 
Regarding the second result, even though the decrease in extreme volatility is 
higher in residuals of returns yet the residuals of squared returns continue to have 
more Black Swans in comparison to residuals of the returns i.e. 1.44% of trading 
days in the residuals of squared returns were Black Swans in comparison to 1.06% 
of the residuals of returns. This trend is seen in the forex market of 23 of the 31 
countries in the data set which have 53% more Black Swans in the residuals of 
squared returns as compared to residuals of returns. 
 
Finally, the third result which investigates the tails of extreme volatility of both 
distributions, shows that while there are more Black Swans in the right tail of the 
residuals of squared returns, the reverse is true for residuals of returns which have 
a higher incurrence of Black Swans in the left tail i.e. 0.48% of the residuals of 
returns were classified as negative Black Swans in comparison to 0.04% of the 




Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced squared returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model  
The following table 28 captures the modification to the extreme tails of the 
unconditional measure of variance during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 
specifically, it reports the results of the hypothesis testing the homogeneity of 
Black Swans when markets are under stress. 
 
Table 28 - Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of squared residuals (forex market) ex-post and ex-ante the 
GFC (2008) 








Pre-crisis 33.33% 88.46% 71.43% 114.58% 108.82% 
Crisis 2.78% 41.67% 66.67% 106.25% 62.50% 
Difference  -248.49% -75.29% -6.90% -7.55% -55.46% 
Post-crisis 100.00% 42.86% 57.14% 87.50% 18.75% 
Difference  358.35% 2.82% -15.42% -19.42% -120.40% 
  Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis   95.45% 100.00% 73.33% 50.00% 
Crisis 39.13% 88.89% 83.33% 3.85% 59.68% 
Difference  N/A -7.13% -18.23% -294.79% 17.69% 
Post-crisis 8.33% 88.89% 83.33% 71.43% 50.00% 











Pre-crisis 115.00% 76.92% 37.50% 57.14% 21.74% 
Crisis 77.27% 83.33% 44.44% 100.00% 63.89% 
Difference  -39.76% 8.00% 16.99% 55.96% 107.80% 
Post-crisis 100.00% 100.00% 40.91% 137.50% 50.00% 
Difference  25.78% 18.23% -8.29% 31.85% -24.51% 
  Mexican Peso 
New Guinea 
Kina 






Pre-crisis 116.67% 100.00% 75.00% 103.85% 61.11% 
Crisis 43.06% 5.88% 62.50% 83.33% 23.08% 
Difference  -99.68% -283.32% -18.23% -22.01% -97.39% 
Post-crisis 94.44%   80.00% 78.57% 100.00% 













Pre-crisis 76.00% 20.59% 79.63% 100.00% 54.00% 
Crisis 60.00% 100.00% 122.73% 102.38% 86.36% 
Difference  -23.64% 158.05% 43.26% 2.35% 46.96% 
Post-crisis 114.29% 50.00% 92.86% 150.00% 118.75% 












Pre-crisis 87.50% 90.00% 107.69% 98.08% 14.29% 
Crisis 45.00% 105.00% 112.50% 100.00% 100.00% 
Difference  -66.50% 15.42% 4.37% 1.94% 194.59% 
Post-crisis 120.00% 127.78% 64.29% 112.50% 33.33% 
Difference  98.08% 19.63% -55.96% 11.78% -109.86% 
  
UK Sterling 
        
Pre-crisis 84.78%         
Crisis 57.14%         
Difference  -39.45%         
Post-crisis 70.00%         
Difference  20.29%         
 
The results in table 28 can summarized into three key trends: first that the ratio 
of Black Swans to extreme vales decreases in the crisis period as compared to the 
pre-crisis period, second that this trend is reversed in the post crisis period wherein 
there are more Black Swans within the extreme values and finally the trend seen 
in the residuals of the differenced squared returns of the forex market are 
antipodal to the equity markets across all segments. 
 
With respect to the first result, overall there are 24% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period but upon 
further examination there are two interesting findings: while the residuals of 
majority of the countries in the data set show significantly fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values in the crisis period (i.e. there are 83% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values in the residuals of 17 of the 31 countries in the data set) yet there 
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are 13 countries that display a reverse trend of 52% more Black Swans to extreme 
values in the crisis period as compared to the preceding segment. 
 
Regarding the second result, of the 17 countries which displayed a dominant trend 
of a lower Black Swan to extreme value ratio in the crisis period as compared the 
preceding segment, only 4 continued to stabilize with 40% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values post crisis; 12 displayed higher probability of Black Swans 
occurring after a crisis with 93% more Black Swans to extreme values in the post 
crisis segment, and the New Guinea Kina was incomparable.  
 
The submissive trend of the 13 countries which displayed a higher ratio of Black 
Swans to extreme values during the crisis period, 6 continued to experience higher 
volatility with 25% more Black Swans to extreme value post crisis while 7 of the 
countries stabilized with 45% fewer Black Swans to extreme values in the segment 
succeeding the crisis. Overall, on average, there were 21% more Black Swans to 
extreme values post crisis which indicated a slow response to the financial crisis 
with extreme volatility persistently mounting in consecutive segments. 
 
In anticipation of the results of the next chapter, when these results are compared 
to the equity markets, the asymmetric response to the Global Financial Crisis 
remains consistent with both markets reacting in an antipodal manner. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced log squared returns of the daily foreign exchange 
market obtained from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
The following table 29 summarizes the frequency of Black Swan in residuals17 of 
returns and compares it to the residuals of differenced log squared returns of the 
forex market of 31 countries. It also looks at the tails of the volatility distribution 
                                                             
17 Residuals are standardized and have been obtained by fitting the daily returns and differenced log squared 
daily returns with the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. Both returns series are inclusive of potential structural 
breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamic that could be caused by economic, political and/or 
financial crisis in the respective country. 
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for both data sets, comparing and contrasting the number of positive and negative 
Black Swans in each series (see Appendix 24 for detailed results). 
 












Right tail  -25.19% 227.64% 242.70% 194.50% 226.80% 











Right tail  69.27% 288.95% 201.40% 199.17% 166.37% 












Right tail  165.72% 145.16% 190.85% 252.55% 109.75% 
Left tail  -30.64% 83.23% 66.23% 129.90% 78.73% 












Right tail  232.62% 203.66% 213.93% 272.91% 149.26% 











Right tail  288.93% 197.33% 172.18% 241.97% 201.40% 













Right tail  215.82% 253.83% 190.33% 230.21% 225.03% 
Left tail  109.73% -162.54% -66.43% -92.48% 21.61% 
  UK Sterling         
Right tail  207.89%         
Left tail  -73.29%         
 
The key findings of the table 29 can be broken into two key themes: first comparing 
the average frequency of Black Swans in residuals to returns it is noticed that while 
residuals of returns have lower occurrences of Black Swans yet the frequency is 
higher in residuals of log squared returns, as compared to the log squared returns 
themselves; second while residuals of returns have higher frequency of Black 
Swans overall, residuals of returns have higher number of Black Swans in the right 
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tail and residuals of log squared returns have a higher number of Black Swans in 
the left tail. 
 
Regarding the first result, while the residuals from returns consistently show lower 
volatility in comparison to the returns themselves in stock and forex markets, 
residuals from volatility proxies do not show such consistently i.e. while residuals 
from absolute returns and squared returns depicted fewer Black Swans in 
comparison to the returns however residuals of log squared returns depict the 
reverse trend (0.61% of trading days in log squared returns were Black Swans 
whereas 0.83% of trading days were identified as Black Swans in log squared 
residuals). This result is keeping in mind the tenacious result that volatility proxies 
(both returns and residuals) have fewer Black Swans, on average, than the returns 
themselves. For example: 20 of the countries in the data set, have on average 
79% more Black Swans in residuals in comparison to the log squared residuals. 
 
The second result categorically focuses on the tails of volatility of residuals and log 
squared residuals. It is found that there is a significantly higher frequency of 
positive Black Swans in residuals (on average, 0.71% of trading days with positive 
returns were Black Swans once the effect of volatility clustering was corrected in 
comparison to 0.11% of trading days with positive log squared returns) and there 
are a slightly greater number of negative Black Swans in log squared residuals. 
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced Log Squared returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 30 summarizes the transformation in the extreme tails of the 
unconditional volatility measure that has been corrected for serial correlation i.e. 
it analyses the change in ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals 
of differenced log squared returns of the forex market of 34 countries. 
Table 30 - Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of log squared returns (forex market) ex-post and ex-ante 
the GFC (2008) 








Pre-crisis 0.00% 36.00% 42.86% 56.52% 29.41% 
Crisis 57.14% 100.00% 33.33% 50.00% 25.00% 
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Difference  N/A 102.17% -25.13% -12.26% -16.25% 
Post-crisis 50.00% 50.00% 35.71% 40.91% 28.57% 
Difference  -13.35% -69.31% 6.90% -20.07% 13.35% 
  Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro Fijian Dollar 
Hong Kong 
Dollar 
Pre-crisis   63.64% 27.27% 29.17% 0.00% 
Crisis 35.00% 72.22% 66.67% 50.00% 28.57% 
Difference  N/A 12.66% 89.38% 53.90% N/A 
Post-crisis 33.33% 38.89% 37.50% 16.67% 0.00% 











Pre-crisis 20.00% 22.73% 42.86% 26.19% 8.33% 
Crisis 50.00% 29.17% 23.33% 16.67% 31.25% 
Difference  91.63% 24.95% -60.80% -45.20% 132.18% 
Post-crisis 50.00% 41.67% 33.33% 7.14% 0.00% 
Difference  0.00% 35.67% 35.67% -84.73% N/A 










Pre-crisis 0.00% 56.25% 25.00% 36.00% 33.33% 
Crisis 52.86% 44.44% 31.58% 50.00% 38.89% 
Difference  N/A -23.56% 23.36% 32.85% 15.42% 
Post-crisis 50.00%   66.67% 50.00% 0.00% 











Pre-crisis 72.92% 3.85% 53.85% 50.00% 37.50% 
Crisis 40.00% 0.00% 40.91% 36.84% 68.18% 
Difference  -60.04% N/A -27.48% -30.54% 59.78% 
Post-crisis 57.14% 25.00% 41.67% 50.00% 25.00% 












Pre-crisis 16.67% 55.56% 32.61% 57.69% 33.33% 
Crisis 35.71% 65.79% 33.33% 66.67% 47.37% 
Difference  76.21% 16.91% 2.20% 14.46% 35.14% 
Post-crisis 0.00% 82.35% 50.00% 29.17% 25.00% 
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Difference  N/A 22.46% 40.55% -82.67% -63.91% 
  
UK Sterling 
        
Pre-crisis 36.36%         
Crisis 42.86%         
Difference  16.43%         
Post-crisis 40.00%         
Difference  -6.90%         
 
 
The results from table 30 above can be summarized into three key trends: first 
that there are more Black Swans to extreme values in the crisis period as compared 
to the preceding segments, second that this ratio decline post crisis and finally that 
forex and equity markets have asymmetric responses to crisis. 
 
With respect to the first result, majority of the countries in the data set have more 
Black Swans to extreme values in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis 
period, i.e. there are 47% more Black Swans within the extreme values during the 
segment that contains the fall of the Lehman Brothers as compared to the previous 
segment. However, there are a few countries in the data set whose forex market 
displayed a reverse trend, i.e. 9 of the 31 countries had 31% fewer Black Swans 
to extreme values. 
 
Regarding the second result, of the 17 countries that had experienced higher 
probability of the occurrence of Black Swans in the crisis period, 5 were 
incomparable, 4 continued to encounter a great number of Black Swans within the 
extreme values (i.e. they had 35% more Black Swans post crisis) however the 
remaining 8 started to stabilize with 70% fewer Black Swans to extreme values. 
Of the 9 countries that had experienced fewer Black Swans during the crisis period 
only 2 continued to stabilize with 35% lesser Black Swans post crisis, 2 displayed 
on change in the ratio post crisis and the remaining 6 exhibited 18% more Black 
Swans to extreme values. Overall there were 15% fewer Black Swans to extreme 
values across all countries indicating that markets were at their worst during the 




Finally, the response of the forex market across the 3 segments continues to 
remain contrary to the equity markets within which the residuals of the differenced 
log squared returns had experienced a polar trend ex post and ex ante the Global 
Financial Crisis. 
 
Degree of overlap between residuals of returns (mean dynamics) and the 
residuals of proxies (volatility dynamics) of the daily foreign exchange 
market 
 
The following table presents the degree of similarity or overlap between the 
extreme events from mean dynamics (residuals of returns) versus those from the 
volatility dynamics (residuals of volatility proxies) and while there is a significant 
level of overlap across the data sets, there is clear evidence that there is a degree 
of dissimilarity between the two. 
 Residuals 
Residuals 100% 
Differenced Absolute residuals 66.8%* 
Differenced Squared residuals 63.4%* 
Differenced Log Squared residuals 69.5%** 
*Returns have higher frequency of Black Swans ** Proxies have higher frequency of Black Swans 
 
This table presents evidence that there is a difference in the extreme events from 
mean dynamics and volatility dynamics when heteroscedasticity is accounted for.  
 
Accounting for volatility from mean dynamics plays an essential role in asset 
pricing and hedging strategies and it is well known in the literature that a change 
in the volatility (resulting from mean) is accounted for in traditional models 
however volatility reflected in returns by itself does not account for the extreme 
events resulting from the volatility of volatility (resulting from volatility dynamics). 
This disregard of changes in volatility of volatility could let to potential 
misspecification of risk faced by investors and market participants and hence 
possesses the potential to be an integral indicator of overall financial risk. 
 
With respect to log-squared returns, majority of scholarly literature tends to 
exclude it as a volatility proxy because it if the asset returns are close to zero, 
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then transforming it to log-squared returns yields a highly negative number; if it 
is zero then the transformation is undefined. Such an extreme negative numbers 
tends to distort overall model estimates (Cavalcante and Assaf, 2004, Pereira, 
2004, Christodoulakis and Satchell, 2005). The focus of this chapter is sizable 
distortion in financial markets due to a crisis, i.e. heightened tail risk from the 
volatility dynamics of asset returns during a crisis and not small innovations, 




With respect to the main research question that tests the degree of 
overlap/similarity between Black Swans in forex markets when using unconditional 
measures of volatility such as volatility proxies against the mean dynamics, the 
null is strongly rejected in all three of the proxies (when testing within returns of 
the volatility proxies as well as within the residuals of those proxies). 
 
In the forex market, for two of the three volatility proxies (namely the residuals of 
absolute returns and residuals of squared returns), contain fewer Black Swans than 
the residuals that are derived from their respective counterparts. This result is 
clearly linked to the clustering effect evident in financial markets that has been 
filtered using the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model and therefore the probability of 
highly extreme returns is reduced substantially.  
 
Another supplementary result is that the degree of decrease is higher from returns 
to residuals and much lower from volatility proxies to their respective residuals i.e. 
there is a 24% decrease in Black Swans from returns to residuals where as there 
is only a 0.73% and a 9% decrease in the number of Black Swans from the 
absolute returns and squared returns to their respective residuals. This signifies 
that there is a greater clustering effect in returns which is captured by the 
conditional heteroscedasticity models and that there is sparse negative correlation 
in volatility proxies to begin with. This is contrary to the evidence18 found in 
                                                             
18 The authors found significant positive autocorrelation within the absolute returns for long lags in the S&P stock 
market and proposed the use of the ARMA-APARCH model to model the conditional variance of absolute returns. 
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literature indicating that there is higher correlation in volatility proxies as 
compared to returns (Ding et al., 1993a, Taylor, 2008). However, it should be 
underlined that this is clearly because of differencing the series of the volatility 
proxies – in effect, already assuming there is either a unit root or at least a very 
high volatility persistence. 
 
Log squared returns and residuals however present an antipodal trend with 31% 
more Black Swans in the residuals as opposed to the log squared returns. In 
anticipation of the results of the next chapter, these results are reciprocated in the 
equity markets as well further validating the rejection of the homogeneity of Black 
Swans in the presence of structural breaks and with the correction of conditional 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
Scrutinizing the residuals of returns against the residuals of the volatility proxy, 
the emergent trend is that there are a greater frequency of Black Swans within the 
residuals of the volatility proxies in comparison to the returns i.e. there are 25% 
and 29% more Black Swans in the residuals of absolute returns and squared 
returns respectively in comparison to the residuals of the returns. While a possible 
explanation of this behavior could be that proxies tend of be noisy estimators, it 
could also signify latent volatility trends that are better captured by non-
parametric volatility measures like proxies rather than the return-based measures. 
Once again, the log squared returns display a polar trend with 31% more Black 
Swans in the residuals of returns as compared to the residuals of the log squared 
returns. 
 
Finally, examining the tails of the highly extreme returns once the clustering effect 
has been removed, reveal that the distribution of absolute residuals and squared 
residuals are skewed heavily to the right whereas the distribution of log squared 
residuals is skewed to the left.  
 
With respect to the final question regarding the transformation of the Black Swans 
during the Global Financial Crisis when compared to the conceding and preceding 
133 
 
segments, the trend is more gradual in comparison to the results obtained in the 
previous sections and remain mixed.  
 
It is observed in the residuals of absolute and squared returns is that on average 
there are fewer Black Swans in crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period 
which increases slightly post crisis within the residuals of the squared returns. The 
residuals of the log squared returns display a reverse trend with a higher ratio 
during the crisis period which declines in the consecutive segment.  
 
A possible justification of these mixed results could be that the application of the 
ARMA-APARCH model averaged out most of the variability in the series, however, 
the model still rejects the hypothesis of homogeneity of Black Swans because the 
clusters differ in size irrespective of the presence of a dominant trend. 
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
The empirical results of the chapter clearly indicate that extreme tail risk is not 
homogenous when it arises from mean and variance. In the returns, it was found 
that there was a significant difference in the frequency of Black Swans in the 
volatility proxies when compared to the frequency of Black Swans in the returns 
i.e. on average, in comparison to the returns, both absolute returns and squared 
returns depicted more Black Swans whereas log squared returns displayed less 
Black Swans.  
 
A similar result is mirrored in the residuals of the returns when compared to the 
residuals of the proxies which were obtained using the best fit ARMA-APARCH 
model to control for the effect of stylized properties of financial returns such as 
volatility clustering. There is a significant difference in the frequency of Black 
Swans, i.e. on average, in comparison to the residuals of returns, residuals of 
absolute and squared returns have a higher number of Black Swans whereas 




From an investors point of view, these results signify the importance of including 
volatility from mean dynamics along with volatility dynamics to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the overall tail risk present in the market during a crisis. 
It is also important for a market participant to be aware that regime shifts or 
structural breaks in the mean and/or variance structure of the returns could also 
lead to overly-inflated kurtosis and tail asymmetry measures if they are not 
accounted for.  
 
By incorporating measures of structural breaks and obtaining inferences about tail 
risk from both mean and the variance of the returns, market participants can 
assess the true level of tail risk present in the market. This can be incorporated 




Chapter 6: Understanding the evolution of tail risk 
in the equity markets using unconditional volatility 
measures combined with the ARMA-APARCH 
model  
6.1 Introduction 
Understanding the underlying properties of a financial time series is pivotal to 
using the appropriate empirical models that incorporate those inherent 
characteristics in order to draw efficient inferences and make sound financial 
investment decisions. As a result, there are a multitude of financial models in the 
empirical literature (such as numerous variations of the auto-regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity models, asset pricing models and extreme value 
theory models) that measure volatility in the stock markets by using innovations 
in returns as well as return proxies (such as absolute returns, squared returns, log 
squared returns and range). This is done to capture the cardinal conditions of 
financial markets returns such as heteroscedasticity, fat tails, negative skewness, 
etc. 
 
While models that use innovations in returns to measure volatility remain popular 
in the financial literature, the debate continues to rage regarding the efficiency of 
those financial models that use volatility proxies to measure latent volatility of 
financial asset returns in Equity markets.  
 
There is conflicting evidence on their suitability to measure extreme volatility in 
stock market when they are under stress. These contradictions are disconcerting, 
because models that use proxies could be used for practical applications by 
investors in decisions regarding timings of entering/leaving the markets, portfolio 
selection that matches investors risk preference with the appropriate return level 
and pricing of financial assets by deriving the premium based on variance 
estimates provided by the model (Forsberg and Bollerslev, 2002, Liu et al., 2012, 
Bee et al., 2016). 
 
Therefore, while there are a myriad of papers that have focused on financial market 
volatility using traditional financial models in literature, the contribution of this 
chapter is noteworthy: it aims to model extreme tail risk arising from the variance 
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of return distributions using the frequency of Black Swans measured via 
differenced volatility proxy measures. Specifically, this chapter will investigate 
extreme tail risk in equity markets by identifying black swans in the dynamics of 
volatility proxies and comparing them to those identified in the mean dynamics 
using a model specification that takes into account the possible presence of 
structural breaks in the mean and/or volatility dynamic of each of these series. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section II sets the context for the 
research with a literature review, section III provides the specific research 
questions this chapter seeks to answer, Section IV makes available the description 
of the data, and, section V presents the research methodology used to obtain 
results. The final segments of the papers are: section VI, which presents the 
empirical results on Black swans from innovations in the mean dynamics versus 
those from volatility dynamics that exist in the stock market, and, section VII 
discusses the implications of the empirical results for key market participants. 
Section VIII concludes. 
 
6.2 Literature Review  
Volatility itself is inherently unobservable, therefore the use of volatility proxies to 
gain understanding of the nature of volatility has become common practice in 
literature.  
 
In this case, volatility proxies such as squared returns, absolute returns and/or log 
squared returns can be considered as a conditionally unbiased estimator of latent 
conditional variance and can potentially increase the efficiency of the financial 
models leading to superior parameter estimates.  
 
However, some studies have found empirical evidence that certain volatility 
proxies such as squared returns and absolute returns are too noisy and highly 
persistent. As a result of this, these proxies have been arbitrated as inadequate 
estimators of latent volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Andersen et al., 




Moreover, while volatility proxies such as absolute and squared returns became 
known to be adversely affected due to microstructure noise, it led to the 
popularization of range-based volatility estimators of which the Parkinson is first 




) (ln 𝐻𝑡 − ln 𝐿𝑡)
2 wherein we take the difference between the Intraday High 
returns (Ht) and Intraday Low returns (Lt). 
 
Consequently, a myriad of literature suggests that intra-day range is a more 
efficient method of estimating realized volatility because it captures intraday price 
fluctuations more accurately in comparison to squared or daily returns which depict 
low volatility if the closing price is similar to the opening price despite the presence 
of multiple extreme fluctuations during the trading day. For example, a study that 
allowed for structural breaks in the lagged log range of the S&P 500 data while 
using autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models found that the model 
is superior based on long range in-sample and out-sample forecasts (Brandt and 
Jones, 2006).  
 
An additional reason, is that the distribution of log range, conditional on volatility, 
is known to be approximately Gaussian  (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Alizadeh 
et al., 2002).  
 
Finally, the integrated variance of estimates from range based proxies are more 
precise when compared to the estimates based on absolute and squared returns 
(Christensen and Podolskij, 2007, Martens and Van Dijk, 2007).  
 
The model specification of this chapter will combine every volatility proxy, including 
range, with conditional volatility models, specifically the best fit ARMA-APARCH 
model as these most aptly capture the well-known properties that time series 
depict such as volatility clustering, highly negative correlation between returns as 




Another important consideration in extreme volatility modelling is to test for 
market efficiency in volatility proxies of stock returns, which is the rate of decay 
of arbitrage with the arrival of new information. If this decay is rapid, it indicates 
that the market has a short memory and therefore follows the martingale process.  
 
However, if that is not the case then there is evidence of long-term correlation in 
volatility of volatility, i.e. there is a persistent statistical dependence between 
distant price observations of the time series indicating that the volatility at long 
lags have long memory properties, therefore, providing evidence against markets 
being efficient. In these cases, there is evidence of the presence of unit roots, near 
unit roots or long-term memory in the data set. 
 
Consequently, an audit of the empirical literature revealed various studies that 
have found evidence against market efficiency by proving the manifestation of unit 
roots, near unit roots and/or long memory in the data. A study which established 
the presence of unit roots in absolute and squared returns in every equity market 
included in the data set (Assaf, 2016), (Cavalcante and Assaf, 2004) for the 
Brazilian stock market, (Kilic ̂, 2004) for the Istanbul equity market, (Kang and 
Yoon, 2007) for the Korean stock market). A more comprehensive study that 
tested the hypothesis of long range memory in a wider set of volatility proxies 
(namely absolute returns, squared returns, log squared returns, and range), in the 
equity markets of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, used the wavelet 
approach combined with the GARCH family of models finding significant 
asymmetric long range properties in the volatility of each of the equity markets 
(Kumar and Maheswaran, 2013). 
 
The strengthening evidence on the presence of unit roots in volatilities of asset 
returns fuelled an interest in the origins and potential causes of these long memory 
properties, the one of interest is the possibility that these processes were non-
linear and that was being wrongly perceived as unit root non-stationarity.  
 
Here the literature divides into two strands: One that assume that non-linearity is 
being confused for non-stationarity (see (Diebold and Inoue, 2001, Davidson and 
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Sibbertsen, 2005) for further evidence and see (Granger and Hyung, 2004) for 
evidence that absolute returns of the S&P equity market display long memory 
persistence which could be explained by undetected structural breaks) and the 
other examines the possibility that process itself could be non-linear while 
displaying long memory (see a study that furthered that conclusion by examining 
the possibility that absolute returns in foreign exchange markets19 can continue to 
display long memory properties while containing non linearity in the subsamples 
discovered that only three of the seven currencies displayed pure memory, the 
remaining appeared to display marginal nonlinearity along with long memory  
(Baillie and Kapetanios, 2007). 
 
In conclusion, taking into consideration the multitude of evidence against market 
efficiency in volatility proxies, this chapter will be using first-order differences to 
account for the potential presence of unit roots, near unit roots and/or long 
memory in the data. 
 
6.3 Research Question 
Previous studies have focused on singular and/or at most binary measures of 
extreme volatility within the GARCH framework which leads to the need for a 
comprehensive and thorough analysis of the nature of Black Swans arising from 
mean and volatility dynamics demonstrated through the behaviour of global 
financial markets when undergoing financial collapse.  
 
While chapters 3 and 4 have studied the probability of highly extreme returns 
occurring in the equity and forex markets respectively using returns and residuals 
from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model and tested the homogeneity of Black Swans 
when structural breaks are included in the model, this chapter studies the nature 
of Black Swans using unconditional volatility measures such as differenced 
volatility proxies when markets are undergoing extreme financial distress in trying 
to understand the difference in extreme events affecting mean dynamics versus 
those from the volatility dynamics. 
                                                             
19 Daily absolute returns on seven major currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar were studied, namely Canada, 




It further tests the degree of similarity or overlap between Black Swans in mean 
dynamics versus volatility dynamics.  
 
Therefore, it proposes to use absolute returns, squared returns, log squared 
returns and intraday range as volatility proxies to measure the behaviour of 
extreme values known as Black Swans overall and during periods of 
economic/financial crisis. It proposes to riposte to the following research 
questions: 
The two key research questions embedded within this study are: 
- Are highly improbable events from the volatility dynamics in equity markets 
the same as the ones that arise from the mean dynamics? If not, then what 
is the degree of similarity or lack thereof between these extreme events 
resulting from a change in volatility dynamics versus mean dynamics?  
 
- What is the evolution of the occurrence of these extreme events resulting 
from the volatility dynamics of the forex market during the Global Financial 
Crisis of 2008? 
 
These questions will be answered using two models: The first model will compare 
the evolution of Black Swans from mean dynamics (using conditional measures 
like returns) and compare the degree of similarity against Black Swans identified 
in the volatility dynamics (using proxy-based measures) while recognizing multiple 
structural breaks in the underlying process of both data sets.  
 
The second model will further improve estimates by using the residuals of both 
return-based measures and proxy-based measures obtained from the best fit 
ARMA-APARCH model to correct conditional heteroscedasticity and/or correlations 
between the values that might lead improper inferences if there is a clustering 
effect.  
 
The second model will additionally study the degree of overlay of the Black Swans 
to extreme values from volatility dynamics during the Global Financial Crisis to 
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understand the evolution of Black Swans in forex markets while comparing the 
results to the equity markets which are studied in the chapter 5. 
 
6.4 Methodology 
The methodological approach adopted here is very similar to the one described in 
Chapter 5 and therefore I refer the reader to there for more details. Once again, I 
empirically test the behaviour of Black Swans in financial – here equity - markets 
and compare those captured in the returns process with those captured in the 
processes of volatility proxies namely the absolute returns, squared returns, 
range, and log squared returns. 
 
However, it is worth noting that an interesting expansion that equity markets make 
available is that it is possible to also construct range-based estimators of volatility. 
In other words, unlike the forex markets, where our volatility proxies were based 
on the information set encompassed in the daily returns series, since the volatility 
proxies were effectively (non-linear) transformations of the return series, for 
equity markets we can also search for Black Swans in information that lies in the 
intraday returns.  
 
Indeed, range-based volatility estimators are found to be highly efficient, in 
stochastic volatility models that estimate realized variance, when compared to 
return-based measures as well as volatility proxies such as squared returns, as 
they are known to being approximately Gaussian as well as being impervious to 
micro-structure noise (Alizadeh et al., 2002, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, 
Brandt and Diebold, 2003, Martens and Van Dijk, 2007, Fuertes et al., 2009). In 
this chapter I use the Parkinson range, the use of which is extant in literature as 
it is known to be an unbiased estimator of daily volatility which is supposed to be 
at least five time more efficient than squared returns (Parkinson, 1980) calculated 
as:  
Parkinson’s range = (
1
4 ln 2









The following table 31 presents the descriptive statistics of the differenced absolute 
returns for the equity markets. 
Table 31 – Summary statistics of differenced Absolute returns (Equity market)  
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
No. of obs. 6254 7922 9492 8949 6882 5771 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.84% 1.18% 0.87% 0.93% 0.95% 1.19% 
Skewness 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 0.26 -0.07 0.60 
Kurtosis 5.22 6.81 12.63 12.83 7.15 15.37 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 
No. of obs. 6903 5208 7664 7530 13405 7209 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.02% 1.39% 1.44% 1.27% 1.09% 1.71% 
Skewness 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.15 
Kurtosis 6.15 36.61 11.95 5.91 9.05 8.30 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 
No. of obs. 6621 6100 8706 7585 4796 13405 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.42% 2.23% 1.18% 1.34% 1.40% 1.15% 
Skewness 0.15 0.92 0.10 0.19 -0.09 0.15 
Kurtosis 9.00 1862.95 9.66 6.97 3.98 11.09 




No. of obs. 10797 4533 7403 8708 4014 7664 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.41% 1.50% 1.38% 1.20% 0.60% 1.32% 
Skewness 0.14 -1.20 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.20 
Kurtosis 8.98 68.29 7.23 8.40 7.16 12.00 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
No. of obs. 5763 6100 5917 2382 7401 7663 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.64% 1.02% 1.53% 1.51% 1.25% 1.27% 
Skewness -0.05 -0.17 -0.60 0.23 0.05 -0.08 
Kurtosis 6.17 8.26 33.37 411.27 6.32 5.03 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
No. of obs. 7013 7141 9730 13405   
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   
Standard 
Dev. 
1.00% 2.27% 1.07% 0.94%   
Skewness 0.22 0.06 0.10 0.18   




Clearly, there is ample evidence of leptokurtosis and skewness in the data. The 
same holds true also for the squared returns – as depicted in the following table 
32.  
Table 32 – Summary statistics of differenced squared returns (Equity market) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
No. of obs. 6254 7922 9492 8949 6882 5771 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 
Skewness 2.20 -0.59 -1.05 2.04 -0.98 6.45 
Kurtosis 117.32 84.92 264.02 229.57 227.34 347.16 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 
No. of obs. 6903 5208 7664 7530 13405 7209 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.05% 0.15% 0.11% 0.07% 0.06% 0.13% 
Skewness -0.61 0.15 0.15 -0.68 0.73 0.48 
Kurtosis 214.59 397.75 301.26 72.02 200.47 150.63 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 
No. of obs. 6621 6100 8706 7585 4796 13405 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.11% 2.19% 0.07% 0.08% 0.07% 0.07% 
Skewness 2.14 0.02 1.68 0.37 -0.71 2.42 
Kurtosis 189.25 2967.73 172.70 87.16 50.88 350.32 




No. of obs. 10797 4533 7403 8708 4014 7664 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.09% 0.23% 0.09% 0.07% 0.02% 0.11% 
Skewness 0.26 -12.47 1.31 0.91 0.56 4.20 
Kurtosis 252.29 1709.68 107.70 106.52 139.70 937.53 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
No. of obs. 5763 6100 5917 2382 7401 7663 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.11% 0.05% 0.18% 0.48% 0.07% 0.07% 
Skewness -0.25 -1.10 -3.60 -0.29 -0.13 -0.62 
Kurtosis 99.37 153.56 893.12 1164.17 145.33 61.27 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
No. of obs. 7013 7141 9730 13405   
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   
Standard 
Dev. 
0.05% 0.21% 0.08% 0.07%   
Skewness 0.99 0.40 0.29 0.03   




Below is the descriptive statistics of the differenced log squared returns.  
Table 33 – Summary statistics of differenced Log squared returns (Equity market) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
No. of obs. 5909 7187 8729 8312 6298 5232 
Mean -0.47% -2.93% -2.00% -2.05% -1.31% -1.61% 
Standard 
Dev. 
314.40% 318.99% 310.89% 310.70% 314.24% 293.32% 
Skewness -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
Kurtosis 0.97 1.78 1.73 1.30 1.77 0.89 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 
No. of obs. 6407 4877 7165 7131 12534 6503 
Mean -0.99% -1.48% -1.44% -1.47% -2.27% -3.75% 
Standard 
Dev. 
301.02% 306.84% 318.55% 329.92% 310.95% 320.72% 
Skewness 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
Kurtosis 1.07 1.50 2.23 1.43 1.25 1.49 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 
No. of obs. 6127 5382 7190 6768 4575 12129 
Mean -2.95% -0.91% -1.81% -4.34% -1.45% -2.14% 
Standard 
Dev. 
315.34% 325.69% 320.04% 310.35% 315.50% 319.87% 
Skewness -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Kurtosis 1.70 1.25 2.02 1.21 1.17 1.40 




No. of obs. 9724 4243 6829 8169 3764 7158 
Mean -3.54% -2.19% -2.60% -1.69% -0.80% -1.28% 
Standard 
Dev. 
320.38% 311.38% 316.71% 310.35% 309.15% 307.61% 
Skewness -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
Kurtosis 1.03 0.96 1.16 1.05 1.75 0.90 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
No. of obs. 5287 5742 4450 2192 6933 7133 
Mean -2.73% -3.13% 0.19% -1.37% -1.95% -2.71% 
Standard 
Dev. 
325.14% 318.10% 348.72% 313.82% 318.08% 314.89% 
Skewness 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 
Kurtosis 1.44 1.93 0.59 1.75 1.41 1.55 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
No. of obs. 6576 6627 7728 12389   
Mean -3.40% -3.46% -1.90% -1.42%   
Standard 
Dev. 
313.24% 305.42% 310.53% 320.46%   
Skewness -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01   
Kurtosis 1.50 1.25 1.27 1.25   
 
Below is the descriptive statistics of the Parkinson’s range for the returns.  
Table 34 – Summary statistics of differenced Log squared returns (Equity market) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
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Mean 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.08% 0.03% 
Skewness 8.88 8.80 9.55 22.14 46.25 12.53 
Kurtosis 122.26 108.45 171.39 828.22 2229.92 259.31 
 Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland 
Mean 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.06% 0.11% 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 0.06% 
Skewness 18.26 14.46 6.19 8.51 20.91 18.26 
Kurtosis 396.88 249.73 58.16 137.58 826.17 396.88 
 Hungary Ireland Israel Italy Japan Luxembourg 
Mean 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 0.02% 0.01% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.01% 0.03% 0.04% 0.48% 0.03% 0.03% 
Skewness 3.88 13.99 26.45 10.51 4.89 14.76 
Kurtosis 18.99 352.58 1115.33 130.66 36.12 373.90 
 Mexico Netherlands Norway Portugal Korea Spain 
Mean 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.17% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 
Skewness 15.05 17.63 7.37 6.98 6.95 7.91 
Kurtosis 254.54 599.12 84.97 64.86 75.10 132.23 
 Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK USA  
Mean 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01%  
Standard 
Dev. 
0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02%  
Skewness 8.03 8.11 15.69 5.24 11.66  
Kurtosis 129.60 108.71 442.73 39.95 214.15  
 
For comparative purposes, I provide the descriptive statistics of the un-differenced 
volatility proxies in Appendix 32, 33 and 34. 
 
6.6 Empirical Results 
The following section will begin by presenting model 1 outcomes and illustrate the 
degree of overlap of Black Swans between returns of 35 stock markets and the 
three proxies individually (with the inclusion of structural breaks in all data sets) 
along with other properties such as skewness and the final section of model 1 will 
conclude by summarizing the degree of overlap overall. 
 
The second section of the empirical results will render the results of model 2 and 
illustrate the degree of overlap of Black Swans between residuals of returns and 
residuals of the volatility proxies along with the evolution of volatility of volatility 




6.6.1 Model 1 Outcomes 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and 
differenced absolute returns of the daily stock exchange market 
The following table 35 presents the frequency of Black Swans in daily stock returns 
of 34 countries and compares it to the frequency of Black Swans in differenced 
absolute returns. Both data sets, returns and absolute returns incorporate multiple 
structural breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamics. The table also 
displays the skewness of both distributions by comparing and contrasting the 
frequency of Black Swans in the left and right tails (see Appendix 25 for detailed 
results). 
Table 35 – Difference in the frequency of Black Swans between returns and absolute returns (Equity market) 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  -69.31% -29.27% -102% -21% -14% 
Left tail  34.83% 20.66% -140% 17.59% -9.53% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  -41% -40.55% 0.00% -25.7% 5.26% 
Left tail  17.80% 21.83% -13.06% -8.70% 4.17% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  4.51% -5.41% -19.89% -6.60% -27.90% 
Left tail  -1.38% 7.55% -17.52% 14.31% 22.01% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  -39.73% -38.80% -21.50% 0.05% -27.19% 
Left tail  26.57% 14.84% 5.41% 17.44% 32.28% 




Right tail  -1.80% -47.96% -42.70% -28% -44.47% 
Left tail  14.17% 34.23% -9.53% 35.28% 31.24% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  -42.90% -7.28% 0.00% -37.9% -18.60% 
Left tail  2.11% 29.78% 31.85% 6.78% 2.15% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  -31.37% -32.54% 1.38% -7.23%   
Left tail  20.76% -2.06% -23.20% 2.56%   
 
The empirical findings of the table 35 can be summarized into three key results: 
first that there are a higher frequency of Black Swans in the absolute returns in 
147 
 
comparison to the returns, second, there are comparatively more negative Black 
Swans in the absolute returns as compared to returns and more positive Black 
Swans in the returns as compared to absolute returns and finally that the returns 
distribution seems skewed to the right with more positive Black Swans where the 
absolute returns seems more normally distributed with approximately the same 
number of Black Swans in the left and right tails. 
 
With respect to the first result, on average there are 5% more Black Swans in 
absolute returns (1.35% of the trading days were identified as Black Swans) as 
compared to the returns (1.29% of the trading days were classified as Black 
Swans). While this trend is consistent in 24 of the 34 countries, the remaining, 
namely, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia have a higher frequency of Black Swans in returns as 
opposed to absolute returns. 
 
Regarding the second result, examining the frequency of Black Swans in the tails 
individually for both data sets shows that while absolute returns have 25% more 
Black Swans in the left tail (0.73% of the trading days in absolute returns were 
Black Swans as compared to returns wherein 0.57% of the trading days were Black 
Swans); returns have 7% more Black Swans in the right tail. 
 
Finally, the distribution of Black Swans for returns appears to be skewed to the 
right (56% of Black Swans appear on the right) whereas the distribution of Black 
Swans for absolute returns appears normal with an equivalent number of Black 
Swans on both tails. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and 
squared returns of the daily stock exchange market 
The following table 36 presents the frequency of Black Swans in the daily equity 
returns of 34 benchmark stock indices and parallels it to the frequency of Black 
Swans in the differenced squared returns while taking into account latent Non-
linearities in the underlying mean and/or variance structure in both data sets. It 
also delves into the frequency of Black Swans in the left and right tails of both data 
148 
 
sets comparing their ability to capture extreme values (see Appendix 26 for 
detailed results). 
Table 36 – Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in returns versus squared returns (Equity market) 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  -53.52% -7.70% 0.00% -3.25% -26.20% 
Left tail  -124.43% -43.18% -6.45% -22.8% -35.40% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  4.17% -37.22% 26.47% -31% -61.90% 
Left tail  -43% -77.77% 27.33% -31.2% -79.08% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  -34.80% -30% -21.03% -2.20% -5.99% 
Left tail  -49.90% -27% -14.84% 4.65% -34.10% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  -12.52% -50.40% 21% -24.7% 10.92% 
Left tail  -49.11% -96.80% -3.90% -16.3% -59.47% 




Right tail  -36% -23.18% -22.30% -7.80% -41.36% 
Left tail  -25.50% -82.51% -51.10% -77% -77.01% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  -4.08% 25.80% 20.07% -24.5% -56% 
Left tail  -55.96% 3.85% -13.35% -68% -64% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  -21.06% -33.35% -15.60% 21.06%   
Left tail  -73.19% -49.53% -11.60% 7.80%   
 
The empirical results have identified three key manifestations of Black Swans: first, 
on average there are a higher number of Black Swans in the squared daily returns 
of equity markets; second that squared returns have a higher frequency of 
negative Black Swans that are not being captured by the returns series themselves 
and finally the returns series is more skewed in comparison to squared returns 
that have approximately the same number of Black Swans in the left and right 
tails. 
 
Regarding the first result, there are on average 27% more Black Swans in the 
squared returns (1.71% of the trading days have Black Swans) in comparison to 
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the returns (1.29% of the trading days have Black Swans) themselves. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Ding et al. (1993a) and Taylor (2008) 
that there are higher autocorrelation between squared returns as opposed to the 
returns themselves and the higher frequency of Black Swans in the squared returns 
can be rendered to that. However, looking at each country individually, 28 of the 
34 countries show this trend and the remaining 6 countries, namely Estonia, Japan, 
Slovakia, Spain, USA and Iceland exhibit an antagonistic orientation i.e. there are 
a higher frequency of Black Swans in the returns as opposed to the squared 
returns.   
 
With respect to the second result, the squared returns possess 42% more Black 
Swans in the left tails (0.85% of the trading days in squared returns and 0.57% 
of the trading days in returns) and 16% more Black Swans in the right tails as 
compared to the returns (0.86% of trading days in squared returns and 0.72% of 
trading days in returns). While serial negative volatility clustering is a stylized fact 
of financial returns, it is magnified in squared returns and hence the higher 
frequency of Black Swans in squared returns as compared to the returns alone. 
 
Finally, concerning the final result, while the returns series seems skewed to the 
right with a slightly higher percentage of Black Swans in the right tails, the squared 
returns seem to be more normally distributed with an equal number of Black Swans 
in both tails. The highest percentage of difference in the frequency of Black Swans 
in the left tails capture by both data sets was in the Australian Stock market where 
returns had 0.24% of negative Black Swans and squared returns had 0.83% of 
negative Black Swans which is difference of 124%. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and log 
squared returns of the daily stock exchange market 
The following table 37 presents the frequency of Black Swans in the daily equity 
returns of 34 benchmark stock indices and counterparts it to the frequency of Black 
Swans in the differenced log squared returns while taking into account latent Non-
linearities in the underlying mean and/or variance structure in both data sets. It 
also delves into the frequency of Black Swans in the left and right tails of both data 




Table 37 – Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in returns versus log squared returns (Equity market) 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  29.16% 60.92% 12.03% 41.57% 10.37% 
Left tail  -48.42% 20.37% 5.93% 3.86% 16.62% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  79.80% 39.15% 43.74% -23.4% 5.32% 
Left tail  35.87% -1.39% 58.49% -18.2% -5.44% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  -1.00% 29.30% 40.53% 18.49% 46.60% 
Left tail  0.92% 30.20% 36.87% 29.17% 22.30% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  57.92% 27.60% 52.20% 54.93% 66.21% 
Left tail  -8.93% -9.85% -1.66% 45.81% -23.80% 
  Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
Right tail  39.30% 48.13% -28.70% 80.20% 49.19% 
Left tail  18.90% -1.13% -49.20% 12.40% 8.81% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  34.50% 160% -62.97% 71.30% -0.57% 
Left tail  -25.46% 120% -77.63% 4.29% 10.70% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  66.06% 30.00% 44.80% 28.33%   
Left tail  -25.54% 25.67% 39.70% 27.79%   
 
The empirical results comparing the frequency of Black Swans in returns and log 
squared returns exhibit exceedingly antipodean trends in comparison to the 
previous two volatility measures of absolute returns and squared returns i.e. there 
are a higher frequency of Black Swans in returns as opposed to the different log 
squared returns. The second inference that can be drawn about these results is 
that while it is more pronounced in forex market, nevertheless it holds in majority 
of the stock markets as well. 
 
With respect to the first result, there are 24% more Black Swans in returns (1.29% 
of the trading days were identified as Black Swans) in comparison to the log 
squared returns (where only 1% of the trading days were Black Swans). This trend 
is seen in 29 out of the 34 countries in the data set. The exceptions are Australia, 
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Germany, Finland, New Zealand, and Slovenia, where returns, on average, have 
26% less Black Swans in comparison to log squared returns. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and 
range of the daily stock exchange market 
 
The following table 38 presents the summary of the frequency of Black Swans in 
daily returns and compares them to the frequency of Black Swans discovered in 
the differenced daily range of the equity market of 29 countries. It also analyses 
the frequency of these clusters in the tails of the distributions of both data sets, 
effectively providing results on the skewness of the data given that there exists a 
provision for latent Non-linearities in the mean and/or variance dynamic of the 
series resulting from potential and multiple structural breaks (see Appendix 28 for 
detailed results). 
Table 38  – Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in returns versus range (Equity market) 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  -127% -19.78% -58% -16.90% 29.90% 
Left tail  -32.67% 14.31% -24% 8.60% 40.50% 
  Czech Denmark Finland France Germany 
Right tail  -47.49% -30.20% -41.87% -82% -52% 
Left tail  11.11% -2.33% -32.66% -52% -42.90% 
  Greece Iceland Hungary Ireland Israel 
Right tail  -27% -71.23% 8.84% -15.75% -109% 
Left tail  -29% -46.67% 12.49% 12.87% -21% 
  Italy Japan Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 
Right tail  -115% -16% -112.98% -11.26% -77.49% 
Left tail  -47.20% -0.40% -16.74% -18.42% -6.86% 
  Norway Portugal Korea Spain Sweden 
Right tail  -92% -89.10% -22% -55.95% -41.94% 
Left tail  -17% -4.98% -23% 3.62% -49.40% 
  Switzerland Turkey U.K. U.S.A.   
Right tail  -26.05% -59% 1.74% -14%   
Left tail  23.83% -42% 3.24% -8.90%   
 
The results can be summarized into two key trends: first, there are a greater 
number of Black Swans’ clusters in the range data set as opposed to the returns, 
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second the data becomes more normalized in the range while it is skewed to the 
left for the returns. 
 
Regarding the first result, on average, there are 29% fewer clusters of Black Swans 
in returns as compared to the range. This trend is seen in 25 of the 29 countries 
in the data set with the exception of Hungary, Switzerland, U.K., and Chile which 
had 13% more cluster of Black Swans in the returns as opposed to the range 
indicating that extreme tail risk arising from variance in returns is lower as 
compared to that arising from the mean. 
 
With respect to the second result, analysing the tails independently, the 
distribution of the extreme volatility is skewed to the left in the returns i.e. with 
56% of the total clusters existing on the left tail whereas the distribution is more 
normalized for the range i.e. 48% on the left tail and 53% of the right tail. 
 
These results are similar to those of absolute and squared returns. 
 
Degree of overlap between residuals of returns (mean dynamics) and the 
residuals of proxies (volatility dynamics) of the equity market 
The following table presents the degree of similarity or overlap between the 
extreme events from mean dynamics (residuals of returns) versus those from the 
volatility dynamics (residuals of volatility proxies) and while there is a significant 
level of overlap across the data sets, there is clear evidence that there is a degree 
of dissimilarity between the two. 
  Returns 
Returns 100% 
Differenced Absolute returns 85.7%* 
Differenced Squared returns 54.3%* 
Differenced Log Squared returns 78.4%** 
Range 80.7%** 
*Returns have higher frequency of Black Swans ** Proxies have higher frequency of Black Swans 
This table presents evidence that there is a difference in the extreme events from 
mean dynamics and volatility dynamics when heteroscedasticity is accounted for.  
Accounting for volatility from mean dynamics plays an essential role in asset 
pricing and hedging strategies and it is well known in the literature that a change 
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in the volatility (resulting from mean) is accounted for in traditional models 
however volatility reflected in returns by itself does not account for the extreme 
events resulting from the volatility of volatility (resulting from volatility dynamics). 
This disregard of changes in volatility of volatility could let to potential 
misspecification of risk faced by investors and market participants and hence 
possesses the potential to be an integral indicator of overall financial risk. 
 
With respect to log-squared returns, majority of scholarly literature tends to 
exclude it as a volatility proxy because it if the asset returns are close to zero, 
then transforming it to log-squared returns yields a highly negative number; if it 
is zero then the transformation is undefined. Such an extreme negative numbers 
tends to distort overall model estimates (Cavalcante and Assaf, 2004, Pereira, 
2004, Christodoulakis and Satchell, 2005). The focus of this chapter is sizable 
distortion in financial markets due to a crisis, i.e. heightened tail risk from the 
volatility dynamics of asset returns during a crisis and not small innovations, 




6.6.2 Model 2 Outcomes 
The following section of empirical results have been obtained from the application 
of model 2 wherein returns along with the volatility proxies have been filtered 
through the best fit ARMA-APARCH model in order to obtain residuals that have 
been corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity to understand the volatility of 
volatility in financial markets. Both returns and volatility proxies are regardful of 
multiple structural breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamics of the 
returns process. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced absolute returns of the daily stock exchange 
market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 39 summarizes the frequency of Black Swans in residual and 
differenced absolute residuals while accounting of latent Non-linearities in the 
underlying structure of the asset returns (see Appendix 29 for detailed results). 
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Table 39  – Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of returns versus residuals of absolute returns (Equity 
market) 
Difference in the 
frequency of Black 
Swans in residuals of 
returns vs residuals 
of absolute returns 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  
-236.80% -154.11% -144% -167.5% -113% 
Left tail  
321.78% 393.12% 415.80% 405.97% 346.50% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  
-169.40% -136.40% -58.84% -92.90% -173.16% 
Left tail  
245.59% 343.34% 253.84% 313.50% 352.52% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  
-120% -89.22% -120.10% -83.71% -98.10% 
Left tail  
404.30% 380.61% 376.07% 363.68% 418.90% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  
-131.03% -197% -128.60% -120.9% -66.03% 
Left tail  
378.33% 54.53% 352.60% 313.49% 207.83% 
  Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
Right tail  
-147% -188.82% -176% -148.3% -174% 
Left tail  
299.40% 376.01% 257.90% 355.44% 313.46% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  
-129.15% -92.20% -20.19% -188% -126.90% 
Left tail  
325.76% 418.90% 256.37% 371.30% 368.80% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  
-186.20% -112.05% -98.40% -147%   
Left tail  
358.24% 373.70% 385% 343.32%   
 
The empirical results of table 39 can be summarized into the following key trends: 
first, there are significantly fewer Black Swans in the residuals and absolute 
residuals compared to returns and absolute returns respectively; second that there 
is a higher frequency of Black Swans in differenced absolute residuals in 
comparison to the residuals and finally although there are higher Black Swans in 
absolute residuals overall, most of them are on the right tail, and negative Black 




With respect to the first result, residuals have 36% fewer Black Swans in 
comparison to returns and absolute residuals have approximately 8% fewer Black 
Swans as compared to the absolute returns. This result is expected since 
conditional heteroscedasticity models were used and therefore the removal of 
volatility clustering or dependence between returns has reduced the number of 
Black Swans overall. A corresponding conclusion that can be drawn from these 
results is that while there is serial correlation between returns and absolute 
returns, a counter conclusion is that it is lower within absolute returns in 
comparison to returns which could be a result of ARMA-APARCH models not being 
able to adequately capture the conditional heteroscedasticity between absolute 
returns due to divergent factors affecting extreme volatility.  
 
With regards to the second result, comparing the frequency of Black Swans 
between residuals and absolute residuals there are 34% more Black Swans in the 
latter (1.25% of the trading days were Black Swans) than the former (0.90% of 
the trading days were identified as Black Swans). This result was seen in 32 out 
of the 34 countries in the data set with the exception of Slovenia and Luxembourg. 
 
However, while the majority of Black Swans (99%) in absolute residuals occur on 
the right tail with very few on the left tail; an overwhelming number of negative 
Black Swans exist in residuals of returns (0.56% of the trading days) in comparison 
to residuals of absolute returns (0.03% of the trading days). 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced Absolute returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model  
The results so far have displayed the consistent trend of fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values in residuals of absolute returns in comparison to the residuals of 
returns of the stock market for 34 countries within the data set. This section will 
examine the behaviour of the volatility of volatility in the residuals of differenced 
absolute returns obtained using the best-fit ARMA-APARCH model by scrutinizing 
the change in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in segments before, 
during and after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 with the central time 




Table 40 – Structural breaks identified in residuals of absolute forex returns during, ex-ante and ex-post the GFC (2008) 
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada 
Pre-Crisis 29/10/2001 08/10/1992 26/07/2007 29/10/1997 
GFC 27/07/2007 30/07/2007 17/01/2008 21/08/2009 
Post-Crisis 21/07/2009 09/11/2009 26/05/2009 06/01/2012 
Country Chile Czech Denmark Estonia 
Pre-Crisis 12/06/1998 07/04/1994 14/07/1997 04/06/1996 
GFC 18/05/2007 24/06/2006 10/08/2007 22/10/2008 
Post-Crisis 05/12/2011 15/06/2010 02/07/2009 05/12/2011 
Country France Germany Greece Hungary 
Pre-Crisis 15/04/2003 19/06/2003 27/09/2001 09/07/1993 
GFC 17/01/2008 17/01/2008 25/06/2008 06/04/2005 
Post-Crisis 18/05/2009 20/07/2009 16/10/2014 25/01/2012 
Country Iceland Ireland Israel Italy 
Pre-Crisis 26/08/2004 11/02/1988 05/04/1995 10/04/2003 
GFC 12/12/2008 26/07/2007 23/04/2005 08/09/2008 
Post-Crisis 08/03/2011 13/07/2010 21/09/2009 26/05/2009 
Country Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 
Pre-Crisis 14/03/1986 28/03/2003 09/01/2001 10/07/2003 
GFC 02/05/2006 11/05/2007 19/10/2007 17/01/2008 
Post-Crisis 23/07/2009 05/08/2010 28/07/2009 20/07/2009 
Country New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal 
Pre-Crisis 01/01/2001 17/12/1992 08/06/1995 28/02/2003 
GFC 09/01/2008 16/05/2006 08/02/2005 11/01/2008 
Post-Crisis 27/08/2009 06/08/2009 31/05/2010 11/12/2008 
Country Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Pre-Crisis 04/04/2007 08/01/1988 13/04/2004 28/06/2004 
GFC 20/11/2012 12/04/2006 28/07/2008 29/07/2008 
Post-Crisis 20/06/2014 19/01/2009 08/07/2010 09/04/2010 
Country Turkey UK USA Finland 
Pre-Crisis 30/10/1998 13/02/1989 31/03/1998 22/07/2003 
GFC 19/04/2006 19/07/2005 21/10/2006 27/07/2007 
Post-Crisis 26/05/2010 21/07/2010 21/07/2010 21/07/2009 
Country Japan Slovakia   
Pre-Crisis 23/02/1990 12/02/2003   
GFC 08/01/2008 11/09/2008   
Post-Crisis 22/05/2009 01/07/2010   
 
The results of this section will examine the homogeneity of Black Swans in the 
unconditional measure of extreme volatility during a crisis after negative serial 
correlation between the data points have been taken care of. 
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Table 41 - Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in residuals of absolute returns ex-ante and ex-post the 
GFC (2008) 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Pre-Crisis 46.67% 78.21% 59.26% 59.68% 50.00% 
Crisis 33.33% 33.33% 50.00% 57.14% 53.23% 
Difference -33.66% -85.29% -16.99% -4.35% 6.26% 
Post Crisis 42.86% 37.50% 62.50% 62.50% 50.00% 
Difference 25.15% 11.79% 22.31% 8.97% -6.26% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Pre-Crisis 86.36% 57.41% 77.14% 77.27% 57.69% 
Crisis 68.75% 40.00% 62.50% 58.33% 12.50% 
Difference -22.80% -36.13% -21.05% -28.12% -152.94% 
Post Crisis 70.00% 66.67% 68.75% 37.50% 61.11% 
Difference 1.80% 51.09% 9.53% -44.18% 158.69% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Pre-Crisis 50.00% 61.11% 86.67% 8.33% 73.53% 
Crisis 37.50% 55.88% 64.71% 83.33% 31.25% 
Difference -28.77% -8.95% -29.22% 230.29% -85.57% 
Post Crisis 50.00% 83.33% 58.33% 70.00% 60.00% 
Difference 28.77% 39.96% -10.38% -17.43% 65.23% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Pre-Crisis 65.63% 75.00% 58.51% 76.47% 22.73% 
Crisis 68.18% 44.44% 12.50% 38.89% 38.89% 
Difference 3.81% -52.33% -154.35% -67.62% 53.71% 
Post Crisis 14.29% 83.33% 55.88% 56.25% 58.33% 
Difference -156.26% 62.87% 149.75% 36.91% 40.54% 
  Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
Pre-Crisis 100.00% 66.67% 57.89% 67.14% 80.56% 
Crisis 71.43% 50.00% 40.00% 33.33% 61.36% 
Difference -33.65% -28.77% -36.97% -70.03% -27.22% 
Post Crisis 50.00% 57.14% 59.09% 31.25% 66.67% 
Difference -35.67% 13.35% 39.02% -6.44% 8.30% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Pre-Crisis 57.69% 96.67% 10.00% 52.33% 53.33% 
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Crisis 50.00% 80.00% 40.00% 76.92% 83.33% 
Difference -14.31% -18.93% 138.63% 38.52% 44.63% 
Post Crisis 60.00% 83.33% 33.33% 42.31% 33.33% 
Difference 18.23% 4.08% -18.24% -59.77% -91.64% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA  
Pre-Crisis 50.00% 70.00% 66.07% 50.00%  
Crisis 50.00% 56.25% 58.62% 56.45%  
Difference 0.00% -21.87% -11.96% 12.13%  
Post Crisis 64.29% 56.25% 35.71% 35.71%  
Difference 25.14% 0 -49.57% -45.79%  
 
The results of table 41 above can be summarized into two keys trends: first, that 
there is a considerable decline in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the 
crisis period in comparison to the pre-crisis period and second that this trend was 
reversed significantly in the period following the crisis indicating a slow spread of 
extreme volatility in the stock markets. 
 
Regarding the first result, 25 out of 34 countries in the data set report 44% fewer 
Black Swans to extreme values in the segment marked the beginning of the Global 
Financial Crisis in comparison to the segment preceding it. These results are 
consistent with the residuals of returns found in chapter 1, however, they are more 
pronounced in residuals of the absolute returns i.e. the reduction in Black Swans 
to extreme values was 32% in the residuals of the returns in comparison to 44% 
in residuals of differenced absolute returns. This trend of declining Black Swans to 
extreme values is persistent in the foreign exchange market as well which has 
implications for potential portfolio diversification benefits. For the remaining, 9 
countries, Switzerland had no Black Swans within the extreme values, the other 8 
had 66% more Black Swans per extreme values in the crisis period as compared 
to the pre-crisis period. 
 
The second result indicates that out of the 25 countries that had fewer Black Swans 
in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period, 6 continued to stabilize 
with the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values declining by 24% in the post-crisis 
period but the remaining 19 display a counterintuitive trend of higher ratio of Black 
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Swans to extreme values which has increased by 40%. Of the remaining 9 
countries which has higher Black Swans in the crisis period as compared to the 
pre-crisis period, only Luxembourg displays a consistent increase across the three 
segments with 41% more Black Swans to extreme values post-crisis, 7 countries 
had higher Black Swans in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period 
but stabilized in the post-crisis period with 65% fewer Black Swans to extreme 
values and the remaining one was incomparable. Overall, 12 of the countries in 
the data set had fewer Black Swans to extreme values in the post crisis period and 
the remaining 21 countries had higher Black Swans to extreme values. 
 
A potential explanation of both the results is that while most countries had fewer 
Black Swans to extreme values in the pre-crisis period as compared to the crisis 
period, these increased significantly in the post-crisis period due to the slow spread 
of the effects of the financial crisis to these markets. These results are antipodal 
to the trend seen in foreign exchange markets resulting an asymmetric response 
to a severe financial crisis indicating a possible portfolio diversification benefit for 
investors. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced squared returns of the daily stock exchange 
market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 42 summarizes the empirical results comparing the frequency 
of Black Swans in standardized residuals of returns and residuals of the volatility 
proxy namely the differenced squared returns. It further analyses the tails of both 
the distributions to find evidence of kurtosis. Both distributions are corrected for 
potential latent Non-linearities in the mean and/or variance dynamic (see Appendix 
30 for detailed results). 
Table 42 - Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of returns versus residuals of squared returns (Equity 
market) 
Difference in the 
frequency of Black 
Swans in residuals of 
returns vs residuals 
of squared returns 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  
-279.43% -154.11% -129.71% -160.1% -143.79% 
Left tail  
321.78% 213.94% 415.83% 405.97% 116.23% 
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  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  
-180.30% -154.43% -27.15% -119.9% -207.17% 
Left tail  
355.45% 343.34% 225.07% 382.77% 352.52% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  
-156.12% -122.86% -122.21% -39.16% -84.79% 
Left tail  
404.25% 380.61% 376.07% 294.97% 349.59% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  
-137.79% -268.03% -112.70% -122.4% -163.69% 
Left tail  
378.33% 294.32% 260.97% 382.81% 317.70% 
  Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
Right tail  
-168.32% -218.34% -185.34% -181.7% -228.79% 
Left tail  
79.70% 215.06% 270.71% 125.18% 244.15% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  
-122.69% -92.82% -63.72% -226.4% -159.54% 
Left tail  
325.76% 407.97% 256.37% 210.37% 368.80% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  
-208.04% -147.17% -96.08% -162.8%   
Left tail  
358.25% 373.72% 384.95% 412.68%   
 
The results of table 42 can be précised into three key outcomes: first, there are 
significantly fewer Black Swans in residuals of returns and squared returns in 
comparison to returns and squared returns respectively; second, on average there 
are a greater number of Black Swans in squared residuals in comparison to 
residuals and finally residuals have a longer left tail when compared to the left tail 
of squared residuals whereas squared residuals have a considerably longer right 
tail compared to the right tail of residuals. 
 
Regarding the first result, overall using an ARMA-APARCH model has significantly 
reduced the frequency of Black Swans in residuals and squared residuals i.e. there 
are 36% fewer Black Swans in residuals and almost 13% fewer Black Swans in 
squared residuals. This result confirms the observations of the significant reduction 
in residuals in comparison to the residuals from the volatility proxy which was 
witnessed in absolute residuals. It validates the result that there are alternate 
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causes of volatility in the volatility proxy that cannot be captured adequately by 
GARCH class models. 
 
With respect to the second result, there are 53% more Black Swans in squared 
residuals in comparison to residuals, i.e. in squared residuals, 1.51% of the trading 
days were identified as Black Swans whereas only 0.90% of the trading days in 
the residuals data set were identified as Black Swans. These results are consistent 
with the findings in the previous section wherein the residuals of the volatility 
proxy had higher Black Swans than the residuals of the returns themselves. 
 
The final result delves into the individual tails of both the distributions wherein 
residuals of returns have an especially longer left tail with 94% of the total negative 
Black Swans and only 6% occurring the residuals of squared returns. With respect 
to the right tail, 80% of the total positive Black Swans occurred in the residuals of 
squared returns as opposed to the 20% that arose in the residuals of returns. 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced squared returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model  
The following table 43 demonstrates the transformation of volatility of volatility in 
the residuals of differenced squared equity returns of 34 countries ex post and ex 
ante the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  
Table 43 - Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in residuals of squared returns ex-ante and ex-post the 
GFC (2008) 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Pre-Crisis 96.67% 70.51% 77.78% 79.03% 100.00% 
Crisis 50.00% 41.67% 50.00% 92.86% 54.84% 
Difference -65.92% -52.61% -44.18% 16.12% -60.08% 
Post-Crisis 85.71% 81.25% 87.50% 68.75% 75.00% 
Difference 53.90% 66.78% 55.96% -30.06% 31.31% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Pre-Crisis 81.82% 87.04% 61.43% 45.45% 92.31% 
Crisis 78.13% 90.00% 50.00% 91.67% 87.50% 
Difference -4.62% 3.35% -20.59% 70.14% -5.35% 
Post-Crisis 60.00% 73.33% 31.25% 106.25% 94.44% 
Difference -26.40% -20.48% -47.00% 14.76% 7.64% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Pre-Crisis 116.67% 113.89% 63.33% 8.33% 41.18% 
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Crisis 137.50% 94.12% 76.47% 16.67% 75.00% 
Difference 16.43% -19.07% 18.85% 69.31% 59.96% 
Post-Crisis 125.00% 66.67% 70.83% 80.00% 80.00% 
Difference -9.53% -34.48% -7.66% 156.86% 6.45% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Pre-Crisis 78.13% 100.00% 71.28% 114.71% 31.82% 
Crisis 84.09% 94.44% 87.50% 77.78% 94.44% 
Difference 7.36% -5.72% 20.51% -38.85% 108.80% 
Post-Crisis 21.43% 116.67% 97.06% 81.25% 100.00% 
Difference -136.72% 21.13% 10.37% 4.37% 5.72% 




Pre-Crisis 150.00% 95.83% 57.89% 94.29% 116.67% 
Crisis 92.86% 87.50% 90.00% 144.44% 115.91% 
Difference -47.96% -9.10% 44.12% 42.66% -0.65% 
Post-Crisis 100.00% 121.43% 45.45% 93.75% 133.33% 
Difference 7.41% 32.77% -68.31% -43.23% -5.72% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Pre-Crisis 65.38% 120.00% 3.33% 77.91% 80.00% 
Crisis 66.67% 60.00% 60.00% 115.38% 83.33% 
Difference 1.94% -69.31% 289.04% 39.28% 4.08% 
Post-Crisis 57.50% 77.78% 50.00% 50.00% 50.00% 
Difference -14.79% 25.95% -18.23% -83.62% -51.08% 
  
Switzerland Turkey UK USA 
 
Pre-Crisis 50.00% 90.00% 66.07% 100.00%  
Crisis 80.00% 103.13% 81.03% 95.16%  
Difference 47.00% 13.61% 20.41% -4.96%  
Post-Crisis 100.00% 56.25% 71.43% 107.14%  
Difference 22.31% -60.61% -12.62% 11.86%  
 
The key findings of table 43 can be summarized into three key trends: first, overall 
there the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values increases in the crisis period as 
compared to the pre-crisis period, second, this ratio declines slightly in the post-
crisis period and finally, that while both of the above results are averages, delving 
deeper into them, shows counterintuitive results. 
 
Regarding the first result, overall, there is an increase in the ratio of Black Swans 
to extreme values in the residuals of the differenced squared returns of 13%. 
However, scrutinizing the trend further reveals a divided trend, i.e. 19 countries 
had 47% more Black Swans contained within the extreme values in the segment 
recognized as the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis in comparison to the 
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preceding segment yet for the remaining 15 countries in the data set, the trend is 
reversed, i.e. there are 30% fewer Black Swans to extreme values. 
 
Regarding the second result, of the 19 countries which had a higher ratio of Black 
Swans to extreme values during the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis 
period, 13 stabilized in the post crisis period with 43% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values and the remaining 6 continued to experience extreme volatility in 
the succeeding segment with 36% more Black Swans to extreme values. Out of 
the remaining 15 countries in the data set which had a low ratio of Black Swans to 
extreme vales in the crisis period as compared to the pre-crisis period, only 3 
continued to stabilize with 43% fewer Black Swans to extreme values in the 
succeeding period while the remaining 12 displayed antipodal trends of 28% more 
Black Swans to extreme values. Overall, there were 3% fewer Black Swans to 
extreme values when averaged across all the equity markets in the data set. 
 
Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced log squared returns of the daily stock exchange 
market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 44 presents the frequency of Black Swans in residuals20 of 
returns and compares it to the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of differenced 
log squared returns. The table also presents the tails of the volatility distribution 
of both data sets to scrutinize the recurrence of positive and negative Black Swan 
cluster (see Appendix 31 for detailed results). 
Table 34- Difference in the frequency of Black Swans in residuals of returns versus residuals of log squared returns (Equity 
market) 
Difference in the 
frequency of Black 
Swans in residuals of 
returns vs residuals 
of log squared 
returns 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  34.75% 128.82% 143.53% 158.35% 129.68% 
Left tail  -91.66% -54.83% -55.06% -43.31% -82.84% 
                                                             
20 Residuals are standardized and have been obtained by fitting the daily returns and differenced log squared 
daily returns with the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. Both returns series are inclusive of potential structural 
breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamic that could be caused by economic, political and/or 
financial crisis in the respective country. 
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  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
Right tail  167.30% 170.41% 311.29% 277.16% 102.84% 
Left tail  -43.46% -69.38% -23.42% -59.12% -89.37% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
Right tail  212.77% 210.35% 172.24% 171.67% 219.65% 
Left tail  -102.01% -51.14% -50.18% -33.36% -22.99% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
Right tail  219.65% 125.15% 177.03% 189.66% 270.69% 
Left tail  -43.61% -98.87% -67.87% -73.62% -51.20% 
  Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
Right tail  156.72% 91.52% 138.52% 189.61% 250.70% 
Left tail  -53.21% -64.66% -109.97% -86.45% -96.55% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Right tail  299.30% 152.50% 102.39% 178.23% 150.31% 
Left tail  -114.40% 77.30% -76.78% -80.67% -73.09% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
Right tail  97.17% 194.96% 161.01% 99.32%   
Left tail  -77.85% -57.99% -80.90% -83.79%   
 
The results of table 44 can be categorized into three key trends: first that while 
there are consistently fewer Black Swans in the residuals of returns yet residuals 
of the log squared returns depict a reverse trend; second, there are a greater 
frequency of Black Swans in residuals of the log squared returns in comparison to 
the residuals of the returns and finally that there are a higher number of negative 
Black Swans in the log squared residuals whereas the reverse is true for residuals 
which have a greater number of positive Black Swans. 
 
Regarding the first result, while residuals of returns and other volatility proxies 
such as absolute returns and squared returns have fewer Black Swans in the 
residuals as opposed to the returns, the reverse is true for the residuals of log 
squared returns as there are 11% more Black Swans in log squared residuals as 
compared to log squared returns.  
 
Additionally while the residuals of the daily differenced log squared returns of the 
forex market have a lower number of Black Swans than the residuals of the daily 
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returns (i.e. there are 23% more Black Swans in the former as compared to the 
latter), equity markets are displaying a converse trends where residuals of the 
daily differenced log squared returns have a higher frequency of Black Swans in 
comparison to the residuals of the returns themselves (1.13% of the trading days 
in the residuals of the log squared returns were classified as Black Swans in 
comparison to 0.93% of the residuals of the daily returns). This result is seen in 
29 of the 34 countries in the data set where residuals of log squared returns have 
15% more Black Swans that the residuals of the returns. 
 
The final result focuses on the tails of the volatility in returns and log squared 
returns once the effect of conditional heteroscedasticity has been corrected i.e. it 
measures the frequency of Black Swans on the left and right tail of the residuals 
of daily returns and compares it to the tails of the residuals of differenced log 
squared returns. The table shows that while there are more Black Swans in the 
left tail of the residuals of the log squared returns the contrary is true for residuals 
of returns which show a higher number of Black Swans in the right tail. 
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced Log-Squared returns obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model
  
The following table 45 illustrates the renovation of extreme volatility as evidenced 
by the residuals of the unconditional measure of choice, i.e. differenced log 
squared returns of the equity markets of 34 countries ex post and ex ante the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 defined here as the date of the fall of the Lehman 
Brothers. Keeping the central component of the crisis consistent across all 
markets, the table 46 lists the transition of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme 
values by comparing the crisis period to the preceding and succeeding segments 
respectively. 
Table 45 - Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in residuals of log squared returns ex-ante and ex-post 
the GFC (2008) 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
1.Pre-Crisis 40.00% 58.57% 56.00% 51.72% 40.00% 
2.Crisis 60.00% 66.67% 25.00% 33.33% 57.14% 
3.Difference 40.55% 12.95% -80.65% -43.94% 35.67% 
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4.Post-Crisis 64.29% 50.00% 87.50% 78.57% 37.50% 
5.Difference 6.90% -28.77% 125.28% 85.75% -42.12% 
  Czech Denmark Estonia Finland France 
1.Pre-Crisis 44.44% 60.00% 45.45% 60.00% 70.83% 
2.Crisis 56.67% 80.00% 25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 
3.Difference 24.29% 28.77% -59.78% -18.23% -104.15% 
4.Post-Crisis 40.00% 42.86% 75.00% 56.25% 55.56% 
5.Difference -34.83% -62.42% 109.86% 11.78% 79.85% 
  Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland 
1.Pre-Crisis 50.00% 55.88% 57.14% 45.45% 65.63% 
2.Crisis 25.00% 53.13% 60.94% 41.67% 56.25% 
3.Difference -69.31% -5.06% 6.43% -8.70% -15.42% 
4.Post-Crisis 56.25% 50.00% 63.64% 50.00% 50.00% 
5.Difference 81.09% -6.06% 4.33% 18.23% -11.78% 
  Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg 
1.Pre-Crisis 75.00% 50.00% 71.43% 56.67% 54.55% 
2.Crisis 47.50% 38.89% 37.50% 43.75% 62.50% 
3.Difference -45.68% -25.13% -64.44% -25.87% 13.61% 
4.Post-Crisis 0.00% 58.33% 53.33% 57.14% 50.00% 
5.Difference NA 40.55% 35.22% 26.71% -22.31% 




1.Pre-Crisis 25.00% 79.17% 58.33% 63.64% 67.65% 
2.Crisis 60.53% 50.00% 50.00% 62.50% 54.76% 
3.Difference 88.42% -45.95% -15.42% -1.80% -21.13% 
4.Post-Crisis 50.00% 28.57% 70.00% 50.00% 33.33% 
5.Difference -19.11% -55.96% 33.65% -22.31% -49.64% 
  Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
1.Pre-Crisis 84.62% 35.00% 60.71% 61.25% 60.71% 
2.Crisis 16.67% 25.00% 112.50% 62.50% 54.55% 
3.Difference -162.47% -33.65% 61.68% 2.02% -10.71% 
4.Post-Crisis 63.16% 12.50% 16.67% 62.50% 60.00% 
5.Difference 133.22% -69.31% -190.9% 0.00% 9.53% 
  Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
1.Pre-Crisis 63.64% 57.14% 63.46% 0.00%   
2.Crisis 60.00% 46.67% 71.43% 53.45%   
3.Difference -5.88% -20.25% 11.83% NA   
4.Post-Crisis 42.86% 46.67% 50.00% 41.67%   
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5.Difference -33.65% 0.00% -35.67% -24.90%   
21 
The results provided in table 45 can be summarized into three key trends: first, 
that there is a smaller percentage of Black Swans in the pool of extreme values 
during the crisis period in comparison to the pre-crisis period, second that on 
average there are a slightly higher number of Black Swans to extreme values in 
the post crisis period and finally, the response of the equity markets is asymmetric 
to the response of the forex markets across the three segments. 
 
Regarding the first result, there are on average 17% fewer Black Swans to extreme 
values in the crisis period as compared to the preceding segment however 
scrutinizing this trend further reveals that while majority of the countries presented 
fewer Black Swans (22 of the 34 countries in the data set had 40% fewer Black 
Swans to extreme values) there were a few countries that displayed the reverse 
trend (12 of the countries in the data set had 27% more Black Swans to extreme 
values in the crisis period).  
 
With respect to the second result, of the 22 countries that experienced a lower 
probability of the occurrence of Black Swans during the crisis period, only 7 
continued that trend with 31% fewer Black Swans to extreme value, the remaining 
14 displayed 57% more volatility ex post the fall of the Lehman brothers. Of the 
12 countries that showed a higher percentages of Black Swans to extreme values 
during the crisis segment, only 2 continued with the persistent trend with a slightly 
higher ratio of 6% more Black Swans to extreme values in the segment following 
the crisis, while 8 had started to stabilize with 55% fewer Black Swans to extreme 
value, 2 had no change the remaining were incomparable. 
 
Finally, the equity market continues to display an antipodal trend across the three 
segments when compared to the forex market 
 
                                                             
21 It is important to note that while there are a higher number of missing values in the results using 
residuals of the log squared returns, there are significant trends that support the results obtained from 
the other volatility proxies. 
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Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of 
returns and differenced range of the daily stock exchange market from best 
fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 46 presents the frequency of Black Swans in residuals22 of daily 
returns and compares it to the frequency of Black Swans in the residuals of 
differenced range using the Parkinson’s method. The table also presents the tails 
of the volatility distribution of both data sets to scrutinize the recurrence of positive 
and negative Black Swans (see Appendix 32 for detailed results). 






of returns vs 
residuals of 
range 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Right tail  -250.83% -135.91% -161.20% -136.6% -68.14% 
Left tail  57.17% 79.56% 367.68% 167.23% 99.25% 
  Czech Denmark Finland France Germany 
Right tail  -163.21% -116.94% -109.31% -218.60% -133.71% 
Left tail  138.42% 3.85% 175.48% 237.37% 197.64% 
  Greece Iceland Hungary Ireland Israel 
Right tail  -92.83% -130.30% -78.69% -89.44% -166.80% 
Left tail  64.91% 75.05% 76.42% 342.04% -28.15% 
  Italy Japan Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 
Right tail  -230.98% -96.07% -157.38% -138.8% -213.06% 
Left tail  92.94% 52.24% 58.79% 121.41% 277.27% 
  Norway Portugal Korea Spain Sweden 
Right tail  -186.30% -149.32% -139.10% -196.7% -134.51% 
Left tail  61.82% 217.03% 89.50% 216.46% 137.52% 
  Switzerland Turkey U.K. U.S.A.   
Right tail  -156.92% -113.50% -95.33% -153.30%   
Left tail  277.65% 46.82% 182.84% 61.52%   
 
                                                             
22 Residuals are standardized and have been obtained by fitting the daily returns and differenced log squared 
daily returns with the best fit ARMA-APARCH model. Both returns series are inclusive of potential structural 
breaks in the underlying mean and/or variance dynamic that could be caused by economic, political and/or 
financial crisis in the respective country. 
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The empirical results of table 46 can be summarized into two key findings: first, 
that on average, Black Swans are not homogenous between residuals of returns 
and range, second, that there are more negative clusters of Black Swans in 
residuals of returns and the trend is reversed in residuals of range. 
 
Regarding the first result, there are 57% more clusters of Black Swans in residuals 
of range (wherein 1.53% of the trading days contained Black Swans) as compared 
to the residuals of the returns (wherein 0.86% of the trading days could be 
identified as Black Swans); a trend which is consistent across every country in the 
data set. This result is also similar to the results found in returns and range in 
section 6.6.1. 
 
Regarding the second result, there are a higher frequency of clusters on the left 
tail of the residuals of returns i.e. there are more clusters of negative Black Swans 
in the residuals of returns (62% of the total clusters exist on the left tail); whereas 
in residuals of the range, the trend becomes antipodal i.e. there are a higher 
frequency of clusters on the right tail (88% of the total clusters are positive). 
 
Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of 
differenced Range obtained from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
The following table 47 illustrates the transformational of extreme volatility as 
evidenced by the residuals of the unconditional measure of choice, i.e. differenced 
Parkinson range of the equity markets of 27 countries ex post and ex ante the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008 defined here as the date of the fall of the Lehman 
Brothers. Keeping the central component of the crisis consistent across all 
markets, the table lists the transition of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values 
by comparing the crisis period to the preceding and succeeding segments 
respectively. 
Table 47 - Difference in the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in residuals of range ex-ante and ex-post the GFC (2008) 
  Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Pre-Crisis 83.33% 52.78% 100.00% 70.69% 37.50% 
Crisis 50.00% 100.00% 112.50% 41.67% 25.00% 
Difference -51.08% 63.91% 11.78% -52.86% -40.55% 
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Post-Crisis 21.43% 71.43% 100.00% 78.57% 83.33% 
Difference -84.73% -33.65% -11.78% 63.43% -120.40% 
  Czech Denmark Finland France Germany 
Pre-Crisis 84.62% 70.00% 45.00% 62.50% 87.50% 
Crisis 40.00% 60.00% 110.00% 94.44% 93.75% 
Difference -74.92% -15.42% 89.38% 41.28% 6.90% 
Post-Crisis 55.56% 63.33% 31.25% 125.00% 125.00% 
Difference 32.85% 5.41% -125.9% 28.03% 28.77% 
  Greece Hungary Ireland Israel Italy 
Pre-Crisis 105.00% N/A 37.50% N/A 50.00% 
Crisis 60.00% 60.94% 87.50% 83.33% 105.56% 
Difference -55.96% N/A 84.73% N/A 74.72% 
Post-Crisis 79.17% 45.45% 50.00% 100.00% 75.00% 
Difference 27.72% -29.31% -55.96% 18.23% -34.17% 
  Japan Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands Norway 
Pre-Crisis 37.50% 92.86% 75.00% 87.50% 93.75% 
Crisis 23.33% 120.00% 89.47% 92.86% 87.50% 
Difference -47.45% 25.64% 17.65% 5.94% -6.90% 
Post-Crisis 125.00% 56.25% 0.00% 107.14% 83.33% 
Difference 167.84% -75.77% N/A 14.31% -4.88% 
  Portugal Korea Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Pre-Crisis 73.08% 76.67% 57.58% 77.27% 45.45% 
Crisis 83.33% 43.75% 66.67% 100.00% 70.00% 
Difference 13.13% -56.10% 14.66% 25.78% 43.18% 
Post-Crisis 97.37% 64.29% 75.00% 81.25% 78.57% 
Difference 15.57% 38.48% 11.78% -20.76% 11.55% 
  UK USA       
Pre-Crisis 57.69% 84.48%       
Crisis 71.43% 100.00%       
Difference 21.36% 16.86%       
Post-Crisis 91.67% 55.56%       
Difference 24.95% -58.78%       
 
Overall, there were a higher number of Black Swans during the crisis as compared 
to the preceding segment and a lower number of Black Swans in the succeeding 
segment i.e. there are 6% more Black Swans during the crisis and 6% fewer in 




With respect to the first phase, the dominant trend seen in 16 of the 27 countries 
in the data set is that there were a higher number of Black Swans during the crisis 
period in comparison to pre-crisis period i.e. there are 35% more clusters. For the 
remaining 9 countries, there were a higher frequency of clusters in the ex-ante the 
Global Financial Crisis; the remaining two countries did not have sufficient data for 
comparison. These results led to the overall effect of a greater number of clusters 
during the crisis indicating a higher probability to extremely extreme behaviour in 
the stock market. 
 
With respect to the second result, the dominant trend was slightly different – on 
average the frequency of Black Swans had reduced by 6% but that result was seen 
in 12 of the 27 countries in the data set which experienced 55% fewer clusters, 
the remaining 14 countries continued to experience extreme volatility post the 
Global Financial Crisis with 35% more Black Swans.  
 
Degree of overlap between residuals of returns (mean dynamics) and the 
residuals of proxies (volatility dynamics) of the equity market 
The following table presents the degree of similarity or overlap between the 
extreme events from mean dynamics (residuals of returns) versus those from the 
volatility dynamics (residuals of volatility proxies) and while there is a significant 
level of overlap across the data sets, there is clear evidence that there is a degree 
of dissimilarity between the two. 
  Returns 
Returns 100% 
Differenced Absolute returns 59.4%* 
Differenced Squared returns 34.6%* 
Differenced Log Squared returns 81.3%** 
Range 91.2%** 
*Returns have higher frequency of Black Swans ** Proxies have higher frequency of Black Swans 
This table presents evidence that there is a difference in the extreme events from 
mean dynamics and volatility dynamics in equity markets when heteroscedasticity 




While, accounting for volatility from mean dynamics plays an essential role in asset 
pricing and hedging strategies yet extreme volatility from innovations in the 
volatility dynamics is relatively unexplored territory. There is ample evidence in 
the literature that a change in the volatility (resulting from mean) is accounted for 
in traditional models however as is evident from these results, extreme volatility 
reflected in returns singularly does not account for the extreme events resulting 
from the volatility of volatility (i.e. those resulting from volatility dynamics). This 
disregard of changes in volatility of volatility could let to a potential 
misspecification of overall financial risk faced by investors and market participants 
and hence possesses the potential to become an integral indicator of overall 
market volatility. 
 
With respect to log-squared returns, majority of scholarly literature tends to 
exclude it as a volatility proxy because it if the asset returns are close to zero, 
then transforming it to log-squared returns yields a highly negative number; if it 
is zero then the transformation is undefined. Such an extreme negative numbers 
tends to distort overall model estimates (Cavalcante and Assaf, 2004, Pereira, 
2004, Christodoulakis and Satchell, 2005). The focus of this chapter is sizable 
distortion in financial markets due to a crisis, i.e. heightened tail risk from the 
volatility dynamics of asset returns during a crisis and not small innovations, 





 With respect to the main research question that tests the homogeneity of Black 
Swans in equity markets using unconditional measures of volatility such as 
volatility proxies, the null is strongly rejected in all four of the proxies when testing 
within returns of the volatility proxies as well as the residuals of those returns i.e. 
tail risk is not homogenous when using return-based measures as compared to 
proxy-based measures. 
 
Range-based volatility estimators are found to be highly efficient, in stochastic 
volatility models that estimate realized variance, when compared to return-based 
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measures as well as volatility proxies such as squared returns, as they are known 
to being approximately Gaussian as well as being impervious to micro-structure 
noise (Alizadeh et al., 2002, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, Brandt and Diebold, 
2003, Martens and Van Dijk, 2007, Fuertes et al., 2009). 
 
Specifically, the chapter used the Parkinson range, the use to which is extant in 
literature as it is known to be an unbiased estimator of daily volatility and five time 
more efficient than squared returns (Parkinson, 1980). Raju and Rangaswamy 
(2017) found that the conditional volatility of equity markets that are characterized 
by leptokurtosis and heteroscedasticity are modelled proficiently using intraday 
range-based estimators as compared to inter-day return-based estimators as they 
lead to superior one-day ahead forecasts (see (Maciel and Ballini, 2017) for similar 
results for the S&P 500 and Brazilian main stock market index; (Li and Hong, 2011) 
for proposing a range-based autoregressive volatility model that outperforms 
traditional return based GARCH-type models; (Gerlach et al., 2017) for generating 
superior tail risk forecasts in six financial market returns by estimating Expected 
Shortfall). 
 
The results indicate that in the equity market, the results remain analogous to the 
forex market with three out of the four chosen volatility proxies (i.e. absolute 
returns, squared returns and range) displaying a lower number of Black Swans in 
their residuals that their returns’ counterpart. This reduction in the probability of 
the manifestation of highly extreme values can be attributed to the implementation 
of model 2 which executes an asymmetric power ARCH model to capture the effect 
of time varying volatility of the chosen measures as well any potential leverage 
effects. It is important to note the degree of this decrease in order to comprehend 
the degree of volatility clustering/serial correlation captured by the best fit ARMA-
APARCH model which tend to considerably increase when financial markets 
undergo extreme distress.  
 
The empirical results of model two illustrate that the reduction in the frequency of 
Black Swans is greater in the residuals of returns in comparison to the residuals of 
absolute, squared returns, and range i.e. there is 34% reduction in the number of 
Black Swans in residuals derived from daily equity returns and a 8% and 13% 
174 
 
decrease in the incidence rate in the residuals of absolute returns and squared 
returns respectively and a 14% decrease in the frequency of clusters in the 
residuals of range as compared to the range itself. The log returns, however, 
demonstrate a reverse trend of greater Black Swans (11%) in the log squared 
residuals in comparison to the returns. A final auxiliary conclusion is that the 
decrease is more pronounced in the equity markets as compared to the forex 
market indicating greater clustering phenomena for which extant evidence exists 
in the existing literature. 
 
Both equity and forex markets display symmetric trends with respect to the 
occurrence of Black Swans, however, the trend is more notable in equity markets. 
For example: similar to the forex markets, there are a higher number of Black 
Swans in the residuals of the volatility proxies in comparison to the residuals of 
the returns except the figures are higher i.e. there are 34% and 53% more Black 
Swans in residuals of absolute and squared equity returns respectively in 
comparison to their forex counterparts which had 24% and 29% fewer Black 
Swans. Residuals of log squared returns continue to depict antagonistic tendencies 
with 23% more Black Swans in the residuals of the log squared returns in 
comparison the residuals of the returns. 
 
Examining the tails of the highly extreme returns once the clustering effect has 
been removed, reveal that the distribution of residuals from absolute returns, 
squared returns and range are skewed heavily to the right whereas the distribution 
of log squared residuals is skewed to the left.  
 
With respect to the final question regarding the transformation of the Black Swans 
during the Global Financial Crisis when compared to the conceding and preceding 
segments, the dominant trend observed in the residuals of absolute and log 
squared returns is that on average there are fewer Black Swans in crisis period as 
compared to the pre-crisis period which increases slightly post-crisis. The residuals 
of the squared returns and range display a reverse trend with a higher ratio of 
clusters during the crisis period which declines in the consecutive segment. 
Therefore, Black Swans are not homogenous during the periods of extreme 






By using non-parametric measures such as volatility proxies, namely, absolute 
returns, squared returns, log squared returns and Parkinson’s range, the objective 
of this chapter was to elucidate the behaviour of the volatility of volatility in equity 
markets which are not sufficiently captured by parametric methods that primarily 
address volatilities that arise from mean. For robustness, first-order differences of 
volatility proxies have been taken to conduct the analysis in order to rectify and 
control the effect of unit roots, near unit roots and long-range persistence that are 
subsumed within them. 
 
The empirical results of the chapter provide substantial evidence towards the 
research claim that volatilities arising in the variance are not axiomatic in the mean 
of the returns and therefore need to be investigated distinctively. For example: 
when comparing the frequency of Black Swans in returns with those in the 
volatilities proxies it is found that there are significant differences, rejecting the 
hypothesis of homogeneity of the volatility of volatility i.e. on average, in 
comparison to the mean, there were absolute returns, squared returns and range 
had a higher frequency of Black Swan clusters whereas log squared return had a 
higher frequency of them. This result is consubstantial to the foreign exchange 
market outcomes in chapter 5. 
 
To further validate the outcomes and increase the efficiency of the model, residuals 
of returns and the respective volatility proxies the behaviour of Black Swans were 
investigated within the GARCH framework as well as various adaptations of 
volatility proxies within the GARCH framework. The outcomes of model 2 were 
identical to those found in the returns, i.e. on average, in comparison to the 
residuals of returns, residuals of all the volatility proxies consisted of a higher 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The behaviour of financial markets while undergoing extreme stress has gained 
immense popularity in scholarly literature over the past decade. This interest has 
stemmed partly from the inadequacy of current parametric financial models to 
understand the source of extreme volatility and the corresponding behaviour of 
financial markets and partly from the need to protect against such extreme 
movements in the market. 
 
With respect to studying the extreme volatility in financial markets, two key 
strands of literature emerge. First, classical asset pricing models like CAPM and 
APT which have traditionally ignored extreme tail risk, i.e. the information that lies 
in the tails of an assets’ distribution, by terming them ‘outliers’. This was motivated 
by the seminal work of Edgeworth (1887) which showed that outliers can lead to 
biased coefficient estimates in the least squares regression. Consequently, most 
financial models identify these outliers (those that are 3 standard deviations from 
the mean) and then remedy them (also known as Winsorising).  
 
The second most popular financial tool to understand and forecast volatility has 
been the ARMA-GARCH models introduced by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986). 
These conditional heteroscedastic methods are frequently employed to correct 
inherent properties of financial returns such as long memory and volatility 
clustering. However, it is often observed that the standardized residuals obtained 
from these models continue to display excess kurtosis (Baillie and Bollerslev, 
1989). This implies that the presence of outliers in returns series are not captured 
comprehensively by the GARCH models and hold further information with respect 
to tail risk (Balke and Fomby, 1994, Fiorentini and Maravall, 1996). 
 
My thesis contributes primarily to this literature by focusing principally on the 
evolution of tail risk during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 in the equity and 
forex markets. My research makes two contributions: first that unaccounted 
structural breaks in the mean/variance structure of asset returns can lead to 
excess kurtosis (tail risk) i.e. ignoring structural breaks overestimates the 
probability of the occurrence of an extreme event, and, two that there is a 
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difference in tail risk that arises from the mean dynamics of asset returns and 
those that arise from the variance dynamics of asset returns. 
 
Specifically, chapters three and four contribute to the literature by studying the 
evolution of tail risk when structural breaks in the mean and/or variance structure 
of the underlying asset distribution are taken into account. Additionally, chapters 
five and six delve deeper into the degree of asymmetry of tail risk that arises from 
the mean dynamics of asset returns in comparison to the volatility dynamics. 
 
To test my hypotheses, I apply a superior mean-variance specification (ARMA-
APARCH model that is inclusive of identifying structural breaks) to mean dynamics 
in chapters three (equity markets) and four (forex markets) then to volatility 
dynamics in chapters five (forex markets) and six (equity markets) while 
contextualizing it around the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
 
The results of chapter three and four can be summarized as: first, the inclusion of 
structural breaks reduced kurtosis of the asset returns (i.e. the frequency of black 
swans reduced by 20% in returns and 12% in the residuals of Equity markets; in 
the foreign exchange markets there was a 5% decrease in the frequency of black 
swans in returns and 35% in the residuals); second, the clusters of black swans 
were not homogenous in nature (i.e. their frequency changed from one segment 
to the next justifying the use of structural breaks), finally, the incorporation of 
structural breaks significantly reduced tail asymmetry in the asset returns 
distribution (i.e. the distribution appeared to be normalised). Overall, accounting 
for structural breaks in equity and forex markets significantly reduced tail risk. 
 
With regards to the global financial crisis of 2008, in both equity and forex markets, 
black swans were higher before the crisis and continued to decline over the two 
consecutive segments; one of which included the fall of the Lehman Brothers to 
mark the beginning of the crisis. This means that the markets were displaying 
signs of distress before the fall of the Lehman brothers and much of the heightened 
tail risk was attributable to the effect of conditional heteroscedasticity and 
unaccounted latent non-linearities in the mean and/or variance structure of the 
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asset returns. Once these factors were accounted for, tail risk evidently declined 
in the following two segments. For example, in equity markets, the segment 
preceding the crisis had 32% more black swans in comparison to the segment 
during which the crisis took place. This continued to decline in the succeeding 
segment with 10% fewer black swans. Whereas in forex markets there were 2% 
more black swans in the preceding segment as compared to the crisis segment 
reducing to 9% less after the crisis segment. 
 
Moving on to the results of chapters five and six: first, volatility proxies have a 
higher tail risk in comparison to returns in both equity and forex markets (this 
trend remained consistent even after the elimination of the volatility clustering 
effect using standardized residuals from the best fit ARMA-APARCH model); 
second, there was a difference in the tail risk from mean dynamics in comparison 
to the volatility dynamics in both forex and equity markets (the degree of overlap 
of tail risk between returns and proxies was 65% in equity and forex markets).  
 
Specifically, these results highlight the inadequacy of parametric financial models, 
that estimate volatility from the mean dynamics of asset returns while remaining 
negligent to the volatility from the variance, in capturing the overall tail risk that 
exists in the market during a crisis.  
 
The main implication of my research is that tail risk during the global financial 
crisis was influenced by various factors that are traditionally not incorporated into 
asset pricing models or conditional time series models, such as structural breaks 
in the mean and/or variance structure of the returns and overlooking tail risk 
arising from the variance of the returns. 
 
With respect to these empirical findings, I believe my work will be of interest to 
investors and other financial market participants that deal with asset pricing, 
financial risk management, optimal portfolio selection, and/or option pricing and 
hedging. Specifically, the pricing of options incorporates a perceived crash risk 
which determines the subsequent returns at the date of maturity (Barro, 




By studying the volatility of volatility, market participants could draw clearer 
inferences about tail risk arising from the volatility dynamics of the asset returns. 
For example, the price of an out of the money option is an indication of crash risk 
as perceived by the market. The estimate of this perception of tail risk can be 
improved with my model which incorporates a conditional time-varying crash risk 
factor.   
 
My future work will be focused on developing a forecasting model of asset 
returns/prices that incorporates structural breaks in the underlying data while 
correcting it for conditional heteroscedasticity. Specifically, I am looking at 
developing a variable within an existing appropriate asset pricing model that will 
accommodate the effect of latent non-linearities in the mean and/or variance 
structure of the underlying returns distribution while incorporating tail risk from 
the mean and volatility dynamics of those returns. In short, a model that can 
contain an extreme tail risk measure that is reflective of the changes in the 
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Summary of the frequency of the Black Swans in the full sample and segments (with breaks) of daily 
stock market returns  
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sample (%) 
51.49% 10.62% 18.23% 25.03% 20.29% 2.50% 
4. Ratio of Black 
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78.85% 3.92% 6.45% 22.74% 20.29% -6.90% 
7. Ratio of Black 
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36.55% 14.84% 28.00% 26.73% 20.29% 7.85% 
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Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the full sample and segments (with breaks) 
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3. Difference (%) 56.14% 13.09% 22.36% 29.38% 24.55% 4.21% 
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Swans to Extreme 



















2. Ratio of Black 




















3. Difference (%) 21.07% 7.46% 16.13% 4.53% -236% 10.33% 33.56% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
















5 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 



















6. Difference (%) 22.16% 15.38% 23.24% -6.86% -374% 21.29% 27.38% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
















8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
















9. Difference (%) 20.27% 1.81% 11.66% 15.37% -181 % 2.63% 39.02% 
 Turkey UK USA 
1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 










2. Ratio of Black 











3. Difference (%) 34.37% 13.00% 16.07% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 








8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 








9. Difference (%) 47.74% 11.90% 17.60% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 








5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 



















Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 































3. Difference (%) 30.37% -1.34% 8.96% 60.04% -3.64% 1.94% 
4. Ratio of Black 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 














6. Difference (%) 51.08% 0.00% 11.78% 104.98% 8.00% 17.19% 
7. Ratio of Black 














8 Ratio of Black 















9. Difference (%) 24.69% -1.98% 7.52% 37.04% -13.4% -5.88% 
 
Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 































3. Difference (%) 23.84% 6.73% 2.30% 12.06% 3.08% 9.84% 
4. Ratio of Black 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 














6. Difference (%) 35.67% -8.89% 4.88% 28.77% 8.00% 18.23% 
7. Ratio of Black 














8 Ratio of Black 















9. Difference (%) 19.11% 16.3% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.74% 
 
Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 



































4. Ratio of Black 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 














6. Difference (%) 0.00% -19.6% -57.54% -7.41% -10.1% -5.00% 
7. Ratio of Black 














8 Ratio of Black 















9. Difference (%) -3.28% 0.00% 2.15% -9.24% -7.28% -19.57% 
 New 
Zealand 
Norway Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia 































3. Difference (%) 16.03% 5.31% 24.51% 2.06% -11.44% -69.31% 
4. Ratio of Black 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 














6. Difference (%) 0.00% 4.88% 14.31% 12.8% -25.13% -150.41% 
7. Ratio of Black 














8 Ratio of Black 




















Hungary Iceland Spain Sweden 



































3. Difference (%) -3.67% 12% 3.92% 1.40% -226.4% -3.8% -23% 
4. Ratio of Black 
















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 
















6. Difference (%) 10.54% 7.2% 19.42% 6.90% -297% 27% -21% 
7. Ratio of Black 
















8 Ratio of Black 

















9. Difference (%) -14.66% 15% -2.82% -2.35% -184.6% -16% -26% 
 























3. Difference (%) 2.70% -52% 0.00% 
4. Ratio of Black 








5. Ratio of Black 
Swans – Right 
















Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of daily equity returns 
obtained by using the best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 



































35.02% 1.13% 13.09% 64.39% 0.62% 3.65% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















55.73% 2.47% 15.90% 109.33% 12.26% 18.89% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















29.34% 0.49% 11.65% 41.39% -9.10% -4.17% 
 
Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands 



































29.90% 8.20% 5.94% 18.38% 9.53% 14.29% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 




















41.73% -7.42% 8.52% 35.09% 14.46% 22.68% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















25.17% 17.72% 3.64% 6.32% 6.45% 11.19% 
 
Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 



































-1.90% -8.27% -14.47% -3.75% -6.96% -11% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















0.00% -17.71% -53.71% -2.28% -8.54% -3.64% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















-3.28% 1.87% 5.97% -4.11% -5.81% -18.21% 
 New 
Zealand 
Norway Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia 



































23.10% 18.66% -17.77% 5.29% -8.16% -61.31% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















7.06% 8.70% -27.98% 16.01% -21.85% -142.40% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 














8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 

















30.70% 9.38% -12.44% -4.78% 0.20% -28.77% 
 
Ireland Israel Switzerland Hungary Iceland Spain Sweden 







































-1.42% 15.81% 8.06% 2.88% -221.64% -1.14% -18.38% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 
















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 



















12.78% 11.02% 23.55% 8.38% -292.24% 29.46% -15.42% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 
















8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 



















-12.41% 18.64% 1.32% -0.87% -179.78% -13.19% -20.42% 
 
Turkey UK USA 


























4.08% -48.13% 1.47% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 








5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 











1.38% -38.61% 1.47% 
7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 








8. Ratio of Black 
Swans to 
Extreme Values 


















Summary of the frequency of the Black Swans in the full sample and segments (with breaks) of daily 































































24% 0% 5.41% 22.31% 
19.29
% 
















































7. Negative Black 













































































































-0.8% 1.04% 3.67% -62.6% 
-
5.13% 










































12.9% -21.87% 1.71% -63.1% 0% 
7. Negative Black 





























































































































































































































































26.83% -21.9% 27.76% -10.79% 22.71% 15.42% 18.86% 














































































Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the full sample and segments (with breaks) 





















1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 




























2. Ratio of Black 








































4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 




























































1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 




























2. Ratio of Black 






























3. Difference (%) 4.26% 23.61% 
23.11
% 







4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 























5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 






































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 































































1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 




























2. Ratio of Black 













































4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


























5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





























































1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


















2. Ratio of Black 




















3. Difference (%) 31.79% -14.46% 32.72% -4.23% 24.39% 18.75% 
22.19
% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
























7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





















8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 



























Summary of the frequency of Black Swans in the residuals of forex returns 


























































3. Difference (%) -191% -9.53% -387% 0% 1.94% -24.5% -8.70% 0% 
4. Positive Black 





































-125% 5.00% -353% -4.88% 0% 22.3% -18.2% 
-
6.90% 
7. Negative Black 






































































































-17.6% 9.84% -16.1% -361% 
-
19.7% 
4. Positive Black 




































-25.8% -5.56% 28.8% 4.17% 15.4% 1.98% N/A 
-
21.7% 
7. Negative Black 
































































































































































6.32% 2.02% 20.07% 8.00% 6.90% 
14.46
% 





































































































3. Difference (%) -
4.58% 
12.78% 5.72% 27.19% 6.45% 17.38% -2.47% 



































6. Difference 0% -3.92% 7.60% -2.15% 0% 25.42% 6.06% 












































Summary of the ratio of Black Swans to extreme values in the residuals of the 





















1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 



























2. Ratio of Black 











































4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
























5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 







































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























9. Difference (%) 
-
226.92% 





























1. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























2. Ratio of Black 
















































4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 






















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 






























































1. Ratio of Black 































2. Ratio of Black 









































4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


























5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 










































7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 
























8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 


























































1. Ratio of Black 



















2. Ratio of Black 



















3. Difference (%) 0.38% 20.19% 10.68% 33.75% 8.13% 20.72% 0.86% 
4. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

















5. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 






















7. Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 

















8 Ratio of Black 
Swans to Extreme 





























































































































































Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and differenced absolute returns of 






























2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 29.38% -8.55% -4.26% -14.20% -2.74% 21.62% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 28.77% 17.19% 21.13% -30.75% 15.42% -22.31% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -32.67% -33.95% -14.95% -9.84% -17.59% 2.45% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -101.16% -91.63% -28.77% -37.81% -17.59% -22.31% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -8.96% 17.30% -7.62% -17.19% 20.94% -8.49% 
4. Positive Black 












5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -4.26% 21.03% -12.03% -4.26% 23.92% 19.42% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -2.74% 4.29% -12.01% 0.00% -14.42% 0.00% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 14.66% 8.70% 0.00% 1.98% -12.14% 26.42% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -7.41% -10.18% -6.45% 7.06% -19.53% -6.90% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -18.23% -17.59% 19.11% 25.38% -45.20% -20.07% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 5.41% -3.28% -37.04% -20.97% 3.39% 10.82% 
 UK 
Sterling 
     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) -20.41%      
4. Positive Black 
Swans (Seg. Returns) 
26 
(0.45%) 
     
5. Positive Black 




     
6. Difference (%) -23.84%      
7. Negative Black 
Swans (Seg. Returns) 
27 
(0.46%) 
     
8. Negative Black 




     







Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and squared returns of the daily 



























2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 78.85% -51.79% -13.53% -78.23% -41.47% 138.63% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 93.43% -23.36% 7.41% -92.43% -21.36% 109.86% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -99.49% -92.05% -72.49% 17.54% -39.26% 1.63% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -160.94% -145.53% -78.85% 0.00% -50.31% -6.67% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 37.47% 24.20% 4.04% -8.39% 124.17% 7.90% 
4. Positive Black 












5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 39.47% 27.63% -6.19% 9.10% 121.11% 32.09% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -59.85% 26.83% -68.25% 61.90% -50.39% 43.94% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -42.05% 26.57% -60.98% 71.29% -53.63% 65.81% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -25.84% -8.55% -20.43% -37.47% -92.80% 4.88% 
4. Positive Black 













5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -28.14% -10.92% -4.26% -8.27% -111.44% 4.55% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -23.36% -6.45% -41.69% -77.32% -77.32% 5.26% 
 UK 
Sterling 
     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) -65.47%      
4. Positive Black 
Swans (Seg. Returns) 
26 
(0.45%) 
     
5. Positive Black 




     
6. Difference (%) -67.37%      
7. Negative Black 
Swans (Seg. Returns) 
27 
(0.46%) 
     
8. Negative Black 




     







Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and log squared returns of the daily 






























2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 17.10% 43.18% 85.56% 43.11% 69.16% 79.73% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 22.41% 60.36% 125.71% 29.29% 78.86% 14.05% 














8. Negative Black Swans 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -24.78% 45.22% 23.43% 108.21% 73.87% 150.27% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) -90.70% 12.35% 35.57% 100.72% 73.87% 139.35% 














8. Negative Black Swans 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 125.29% 190.73% 192.84% 73.13% 37.14% 68.24% 













5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 94.47% 198.80% 156.89% 84.44% 35.77% 79.13% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 97.80% 133.27% -2.30% 247.47% 15.44% 80.19% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 134.58% 138.99% 25.14% 209.86% 22.11% 104.80% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 97.32% 238.74% 31.15% 66.15% 8.00% 92.29% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 99.85% 271.88% 46.07% 84.25% -11.42% 83.28% 














8. Negative Black Swans 














9. Difference (%) 94.72% 176.33% 11.27% 38.39% 24.25% 103.80% 
 UK 
Sterling 
     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) 47.36%      




     
5. Positive Black Swans 




     
6. Difference (%) 51.91%      




     
8. Negative Black Swans 




     








Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced 






























2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -11.52% -38.80% -37.83% -22.84% -19.59% -11.55% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -143.01% -71.93% -66.43% -120.48% -100.30% -128.82% 















8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -13.20% -23.02% -3.42% -1.66% -16.15% -12.87% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -126.94% -156.95% -57.34% -75.96% -116.12% -94.62% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 85.41% 2.09% -94.38% -45.30% -1.43% -22.81% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -57.62% -51.94% -173.55% -65.69% -43.44% -51.74% 


















8. Negative Black 











































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -40.63% -12.78% -65.66% -17.41% -46.35% -26.10% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -75.72% -66.33% -144.17% -88.32% -105.07% -71.59% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -27.35% -14.92% -47.56% -31.95% -57.59% -20.61% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -106.56% -65.55% -75.75% -61.68% -137.42% -188.84% 















8. Negative Black 


















     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) -60.48%      





     
5. Positive Black 




     
6. Difference (%) -153.23%      





     
8. Negative Black 















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced 






























2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -0.07% -58.86% -47.37% -102.54% -42.57% 13.98% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -109.93% -92.23% -77.88% -170.99% -96.43% -86.50% 















8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -78.36% -89.36% -36.03% 45.64% -69.31% -0.05% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -175.49% -193.72% -86.11% -28.19% -153.02% -67.22% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 36.25% 21.20% -12.76% -20.98% 73.60% -21.10% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -9.61% -40.61% -100.64% -49.21% 33.18% -40.62% 


















8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -57.34% 32.85% -85.54% 37.14% -75.10% -30.19% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -92.58% -22.03% -162.15% -24.60% -133.95% -74.80% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -27.35% 2.14% -79.62% -55.17% -99.79% 7.81% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -106.56% -48.11% -108.16% -85.14% -180.06% -59.74% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 361.01% 288.88% 256.43% 283.22% 321.84% 232.64% 
 UK 
Sterling 
     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) -87.23%      





     
5. Positive Black 




     
6. Difference (%) -179.26%      





     
8. Negative Black 















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced log 































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -23.11% 15.63% 31.51% -19.50% 32.02% 24.47% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) -25.19% 227.64% 242.70% 194.50% 226.80% 69.27% 















8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -36.38% -15.17% 31.43% 114.93% 15.31% 109.80% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 288.95% 201.40% 199.17% 166.37% 165.72% 145.16% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 124.60% 177.04% 90.17% -10.29% 89.51% -12.09% 















5. Positive Black 

































8. Negative Black 










































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 31.76% 112.00% -54.63% 181.84% -0.09% 71.99% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 272.91% 149.26% 288.93% 197.33% 172.18% 241.97% 















8. Negative Black 












































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 35.36% 158.56% -30.30% 46.90% -36.83% 75.75% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 201.40% 215.82% 253.83% 190.33% 230.21% 225.03% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -15.12% 109.73% -162.54% -66.43% -92.48% 21.61% 
 UK 
Sterling 
     




     
2. Total Black Swans 




     
3. Difference (%) -27.60%      





     
5. Positive Black 




     
6. Difference (%) 207.89%      









8. Negative Black 




     








Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and differenced absolute returns of 
the daily stock exchange market 
 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -9.72% -2.37% -6.95% -0.91% -11.8% -8.49% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 
-69.31% -29.27% -102% -21.03% -14% -41% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













9. Difference (%) 
34.83% 20.66% -140% 17.59% -9.53% 17.8% 
 
Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -7.91% -6.52% -17.25% 4.65% 1.44% 0.92% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 
-40.55% 0.00% -25.7% 5.26% 4.51% -5.41% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













9. Difference (%) 21.83% -13.06% -8.70% 4.17% -1.38% 7.55% 
 
Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 

















2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 
-18.75% 3.43% -2.12% -5.77% -9.91% -7.37% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -19.89% -6.60% -27.9% -39.73% -38.8% -21.5% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













9. Difference (%) 
-17.52% 14.31% 22.01% 26.57% 14.84% 5.41% 
 


















2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 
8.11% 6.90% 5.72% -3.64% -25.1% 8.22% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 0.05% -27.19% -1.80% -47.96% -42.7% -28% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













9. Difference (%) 
17.44% 32.28% 14.17% 34.23% -9.53% 35.28% 
 
Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -4.45% -16.91% 11.57% 18.23% -13.1% -8.43% 














5. Positive Black Swans 
















6. Difference (%) 
-44.47% -42.90% -7.28% 0.00% -37.9% -18.6% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 













9. Difference (%) 
31.24% 2.11% 29.78% 31.85% 6.78% 2.15% 
 
Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 










3. Difference (%) 
-1.94% -16.88% -10.9% -2.48%   











5. Positive Black Swans 










6. Difference (%) -31.37% -32.54% 1.38% -7.23%   
7. Negative Black 










8. Negative Black 

















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and squared returns of the daily 
stock exchange market 
 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -80.98% -23.43% -3.15% -12.16% -30.9% -16% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -53.52% -7.70% 0.00% -3.25% -26.2% 4.17% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -124.43% -43.18% -6.45% -22.82% -35.4% -43% 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -55.46% 26.91% -31.1% -69.88% -42.4% -29% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -37.22% 26.47% -31% -61.90% -34.8% -30% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -77.77% 27.33% -31.2% -79.08% -49.9% -27% 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -17.89% 1.13% -18.8% -29.02% -71.4% 9.24% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -21.03% -2.20% -5.99% -12.52% -50.4% 21% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -14.84% 4.65% -34.1% -49.11% -96.8% -3.9% 
 





















2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -20.48% -20.07% -30.8% -48.84% -35.7% -38% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -24.69% 10.92% -36% -23.18% -22.3% -7.8% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -16.32% -59.47% -25.5% -82.51% -51.1% -77% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -56.39% -26.44% 15.4% 5.72% -43.8% -60% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -41.36% -4.08% 25.8% 20.07% -24.5% -56% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -77.01% -55.96% 3.85% -13.35% -68% -64% 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 










3. Difference (%) -43.76% -40.93% -13.5% 14.17%   











5. Positive Black Swans 










6. Difference (%) -21.06% -33.35% -15.6% 21.06%   
7. Negative Black 










8. Negative Black 


















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and log squared returns of the daily 
stock exchange market 
 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -1.51% 42.69% 9.06% 23.55% 13.5% 60.8% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 29.16% 60.92% 12.03% 41.57% 10.37% 79.80% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -48.42% 20.37% 5.93% 3.86% 16.62% 35.87% 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 20.92% 51.09% -20.9% 0.41% -0.07% 29.8% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 39.15% 43.74% -23.4% 5.32% -1.00% 29.3% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -1.39% 58.49% -18.2% -5.44% 0.92% 30.2% 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 38.63% 23.63% 35.6% 25.27% 11.1% 24.8% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 40.53% 18.49% 46.6% 57.92% 27.6% 52.2% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 36.87% 29.17% 22.3% -8.93% -9.85% -1.66% 
 


















2. Total Black Swans 

















3. Difference (%) 50.15% 24.40% 28.4% 27.44% -38.0% 50.9% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 54.93% 66.21% 39.3% 48.13% -28.7% 80.2% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 45.81% -23.80% 18.9% -1.13% -49.2% 12.4% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) 31.93% 8.06% 140% -68.93% 39.6% 4.47% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 49.19% 34.50% 160% -62.97% 71.3% -0.57% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 8.81% -25.46% 120% -77.63% 4.29% 10.7% 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) 21.68% 28.03% 42% 28.06%   











5. Positive Black Swans 











6. Difference (%) 66.06% 30.00% 44.8% 28.33%   
7. Negative Black 










8. Negative Black 


















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between returns and range of the daily stock 
exchange market 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Czech 
Republic 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -71.89% -0.74% -42% -3.22% 35.1% -15.32% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -127% -19.78% -58% -16.9% 29.9% -47.49% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) -32.67% 14.31% -24% 8.60% 40.5% 11.11% 
 Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -14.42% -37.21% -66% -47.5% -28% -59.57% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -30.20% -41.87% -82% -52% -27% -71.23% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) -2.33% -32.66% -52% -42.9% -29% -46.67% 
 
Hungary Ireland Israel Italy Japan Luxembourg 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 10.59% -0.20% -66% -79.7% -7.6% -62.18% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 8.84% -15.75% -109% -115% -16% -112.98% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) 12.49% 12.87% -21% -47.2% -0.4% -16.74% 
 
Mexico Netherlands Norway Portugal Korea Spain 














2. Total Black Swans 































5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) -11.26% -77.49% -92% -89.1% -22% -55.95% 














8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) -18.42% -6.86% -17% -4.98% -23% 3.62% 
 Sweden Switzerland Turkey U.K. U.S.A.  












2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) -45.86% 2.24% -50% 2.44% -11%  












5. Positive Black Swans 











6. Difference (%) -41.94% -26.05% -59% 1.74% -14%  












8. Negative Black Swans 


















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced 
absolute returns of the daily stock exchange market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -72.60% -41.05% -34.7% -34.98% -27.9% -56.89% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) -236.8% -154.11% -144% -167.48% -113% -169.4% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 321.78% 393.12% 415.8% 405.97% 346.5% 245.59% 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -48.46% -1.26% -6.30% -49.94% -34.7% -15.14% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 
-136.4% -58.84% -92.9% -173.16% -120% -89.22% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 343.34% 253.84% 313.5% 352.52% 404.3% 380.61% 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -28.11% -15.68% -7.85% -34.34% -65.5% -40.29% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 
-120.1% -83.71% -98.1% -131.03% -197% -128.6% 
7. Negative Black 
















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 376.07% 363.68% 418.9% 378.33% 54.53% 352.60% 
 


















2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -45.89% 19.67% -50.6% -54.59% -70.7% -47.09% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 
-120.9% -66.03% -147% -188.82% -176% -148.3% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 313.49% 207.83% 299.4% 376.01% 257.9% 355.44% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -73.48% -52.37% -1.87% 69.19% -45.4% -36.06% 














5. Positive Black Swans 














6. Difference (%) 
-174% -129.15% -92.2% -20.19% -188% -126.9% 
7. Negative Black 













8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 313.46% 325.76% 418.9% 256.37% 371.3% 368.80% 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) -60.00% -26.40% -31.2% -40.58%   











5. Positive Black Swans 











6. Difference (%) -186.2% -112.05% -98.4% -146.95%   
7. Negative Black 










8. Negative Black 





















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced 




Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -115.21% -45.38% -19.85% -27.57% -68.51% -65.40% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 
-279.43% -154.11% 
-
129.71% -160.07% -143.79% 
-
180.30% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 321.78% 213.94% 415.83% 405.97% 116.23% 355.45% 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -66.50% 27.51% -30.76% -83.95% -70.87% -49.50% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 
-154.43% -27.15% 
-
119.86% -207.17% -156.12% 
-
122.86% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 343.34% 225.07% 382.77% 352.52% 404.25% 380.61% 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -30.21% 25.47% 3.61% -41.11% -136.81% -26.61% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 





















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 376.07% 294.97% 349.59% 378.33% 294.32% 260.97% 
 


















2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -45.89% -69.43% -83.30% -86.80% -79.73% -88.39% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 
-122.43% -163.69% 
-
168.32% -218.34% -185.34% 
-
181.74% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 382.81% 317.70% 79.70% 215.06% 270.71% 125.18% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -128.49% -44.68% -2.54% 25.66% -87.90% -69.41% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 
-228.79% -122.69% -92.82% -63.72% -226.38% 
-
159.54% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 244.15% 325.76% 407.97% 256.37% 210.37% 368.80% 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) -81.64% -61.52% -28.83% -55.69%   












5. Positive Black 



























8. Negative Black 


















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced log 
squared returns of the daily stock exchange market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -76.71% -23.49% -21.15% -17.11% -35.46% -11.22% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 34.75% 128.82% 143.53% 158.35% 129.68% 167.30% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -91.66% -54.83% -55.06% -43.31% -82.84% -43.46% 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -22.00% 50.62% -8.69% -60.74% -49.92% 7.17% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 170.41% 311.29% 277.16% 102.84% 212.77% 210.35% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 
-69.38% -23.42% -59.12% -89.37% 
-
102.01% -51.14% 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -6.84% 24.85% 23.15% -0.07% -71.35% -21.13% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 172.24% 171.67% 219.65% 219.65% 125.15% 177.03% 















8. Negative Black 





































2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -17.11% -2.65% -13.30% -41.80% -71.57% -44.80% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 189.66% 270.69% 156.72% 91.52% 138.52% 189.61% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) 
-73.62% -51.20% -53.21% -64.66% 
-
109.97% -86.45% 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 














2. Total Black Swans 














3. Difference (%) -53.49% -54.44% 101.41% -35.09% -55.48% -28.49% 















5. Positive Black 














6. Difference (%) 250.70% 299.30% 152.50% 102.39% 178.23% 150.31% 















8. Negative Black 














9. Difference (%) -96.55% -114.40% 77.30% -76.78% -80.67% -73.09% 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   











2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) -51.54% -8.43% -18.36% -50.12%   












5. Positive Black 











6. Difference (%) 97.17% 194.96% 161.01% 99.32%   












8. Negative Black 


















Summary of the innovation in extreme variance between residuals of returns and differenced range 
of the daily stock exchange market from best fit ARMA-APARCH model 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile 
Czech 
Republic 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) -104.13% -43.99% -51.29% -16.52% -5.73% -57.47% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 



















8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) 57.17% 79.56% 367.68% 167.23% 99.25% 138.42% 
 Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 
-64.16% -28.21% -97.86% -52.79% 
-
39.18% -62.27% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 



















8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) 3.85% 175.48% 237.37% 197.64% 64.91% 75.05% 
 
Hungary Ireland Israel Italy Japan Luxembourg 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 



















5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 



















8. Negative Black Swans 


















Mexico Netherlands Norway Portugal Korea Spain 














2. Total Black Swans 













3. Difference (%) 
-52.32% -79.93% -98.82% -74.29% 
-
73.64% -59.25% 














5. Positive Black Swans 













6. Difference (%) 



















8. Negative Black Swans 













9. Difference (%) 121.41% 277.27% 61.82% 217.03% 89.50% 216.46% 
 Sweden Switzerland Turkey U.K. U.S.A.  












2. Total Black Swans 











3. Difference (%) 
-52.93% -32.90% -51.94% -33.85% 
-
65.89%  












5. Positive Black Swans 











6. Difference (%) 
-134.51% -156.92% -113.5% -95.33% 
-
153.3%  












8. Negative Black Swans 















Descriptive statistics of Absolute returns – Equity Markets 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
No. of obs. 6255 7923 9493 8950 6883 5772 
Mean 0.67% 0.88% 0.64% 0.69% 0.77% 0.89% 
Standard Dev. 0.67% 1.00% 0.74% 0.78% 0.81% 0.99% 
Skewness 2.65 2.95 3.34 3.78 2.80 3.64 
Kurtosis 13.85 14.70 20.90 27.88 15.85 28.18 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 
No. of obs. 6904 5209 7665 7531 13406 7210 
Mean 0.81% 0.87% 1.06% 0.97% 0.84% 1.25% 
Standard Dev. 0.84% 1.23% 1.20% 0.99% 0.88% 1.37% 
Skewness 2.60 4.85 3.08 2.60 3.00 2.58 




 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 
No. of obs. 6622 6101 8707 7586 4797 13406 
Mean 1.06% 0.56% 0.76% 0.99% 1.10% 0.82% 
Standard Dev. 1.22% 1.61% 0.95% 1.06% 1.11% 0.93% 
Skewness 3.60 52.83 3.30 2.68 2.21 3.24 
Kurtosis 24.61 3464.34 19.55 13.08 7.94 22.32 
 Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
No. of obs. 10798 4534 7404 8709 4015 7665 
Mean 0.97% 1.04% 1.03% 0.88% 0.49% 1.00% 
Standard Dev. 1.14% 1.32% 1.12% 0.99% 0.49% 1.12% 
Skewness 2.95 7.28 2.95 3.13 2.64 3.94 
Kurtosis 15.64 133.41 15.74 16.85 14.07 37.41 
 Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden 
No. of obs. 5764 6101 5918 2383 7402 7664 
Mean 1.23% 0.79% 0.78% 0.83% 0.95% 1.00% 
Standard Dev. 1.31% 0.85% 1.21% 1.44% 0.99% 1.03% 
Skewness 2.52 2.84 5.73 17.92 2.64 2.43 
Kurtosis 11.24 15.55 69.90 473.28 12.96 9.75 
 Switzerland Turkey UK USA   
No. of obs. 7014 7142 9731 13406   
Mean 0.78% 1.80% 0.67% 0.67%   
Standard Dev. 0.84% 1.88% 0.86% 0.76%   
Skewness 3.13 2.35 4.38 4.83   
Kurtosis 17.88 8.87 42.76 73.89   
 
Appendix 34 
Descriptive statistics of Squared returns – Equity markets 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech 
No. of obs. 6057 7511 9049 8612 6572 5453 
Mean -1093% -1047% -1114.12% -1094.00% -1066% -1032% 
Standard Dev. 233% 247.73% 246.80% 235.65% 240.39% 227.49% 
Skewness -1.02 -1.09 -1.06 -1.00 -1.18 -0.83 
Kurtosis 1.49 2.37 2.38 1.98 2.60 1.05 
 Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece 
No. of obs. 6599 5017 7368 7302 12899 6795 
Mean -1053% -1075% -1016.73% -1023.85% -1047% -975.03% 
Standard Dev. 228.4% 255.3% 250.53% 239.50% 232.2% 247.98% 
Skewness -0.92 -0.64 -1.05 -1.17 -1.06 -1.12 
Kurtosis 1.45 0.97 2.32 2.41 2.03 2.42 
 Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan 
No. of obs. 6323 5669 7595 7079 4661 12678 
Mean -1012% -1148% -1061.93% -1012.90% -1001% -1061% 
Standard Dev. 244.8% 251.4% 246.78% 237.72% 236.7% 246.02% 




Kurtosis 2.11 1.60 2.53 1.91 1.84 1.87 
 Korea Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland 
No. of obs. 10165 7096 8398 3866 7354 5490 
Mean -1030% -1015% -1044.66% -1149.94% -1017% -977.11% 
Standard Dev. 246.2% 241.7% 233.65% 231.22% 232% 243.34% 
Skewness -0.85 -1.02 -0.86 -1.26 -0.90 -1.10 
Kurtosis 1.32 1.85 1.32 2.97 1.29 2.27 
 Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland 
No. of obs. 5897 4983 2267 7134 7358 6752 
Mean -1075% -1075% -1065.61% -1027.67% -1014% -1067.76% 
Standard Dev. 250.2% 269.7% 245.36% 238.62% 237.1% 235.92% 
Skewness -1.13 -0.75 -1.05 -1.09 -1.13 -1.08 
Kurtosis 2.51 0.75 2.39 2.18 2.19 2.29 
 Turkey UK USA Luxembourg   
No. of obs. 6812 8035 12892 4371   
Mean -897% -1066% -1101.53% -1021.79%   
Standard Dev. 233.9% 234.8% 239.66% 245.81%   
Skewness -0.97 -1.09 -0.98 -0.89   
Kurtosis 1.69 2.29 1.72 1.50   
 
Appendix 35 
Descriptive stats - Log Squared returns – Forex markets 
 Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 4422 5730 5468 5737 
Mean -1416.86% -1138.05% -1162.86% -1217.9% 
Standard 
Dev. 
281.30% 218.11% 276.60% 226.59% 
Skewness 0.23 -0.76 -0.63 -0.77 
Kurtosis 0.32 0.75 -0.04 0.71 
 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5666 2568 5769 5751 
Mean -1198.61% -1573.20% -1177.98% -1176.9% 
Standard 
Dev. 
225.36% 253.41% 237.64% 229.25% 
Skewness -0.69 -0.51 -1.16 -0.95 
Kurtosis 0.51 -0.07 2.03 1.07 
 Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4185 5206 4870 5312 
Mean -1194.81% -1891.61% -1155.39% -1376.3% 
Standard 
Dev. 
201.76% 246.10% 225.08% 279.09% 
Skewness -0.77 0.08 -0.69 -0.32 
Kurtosis 0.78 -0.55 0.78 -0.41 
 Indonesian 
Rupiah 
Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 




Mean -1241.64% -1268.43% -1273.31% -1180.2% 
Standard 
Dev. 
285.27% 211.88% 260.52% 234.69% 
Skewness -0.01 0.14 -0.38 -0.73 
Kurtosis 0.03 0.04 0.17 1.43 
 




No. of obs. 3917 5688 5723 4336 
Mean -1219.75% -1143.46% -1130.98% -1302.3% 
Standard 
Dev. 
248.65% 237.03% 223.45% 258.06% 
Skewness -0.47 -0.57 -0.79 -0.07 
Kurtosis 0.56 1.00 0.67 -0.07 
 South Korean 
Won 
Norwegian Krone Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty 
No. of obs. 5456 5773 4191 5481 
Mean -1233.04% -1147.73% -1467.08% -1145.2% 
Standard 
Dev. 
255.69% 233.40% 256.06% 234.72% 
Skewness -0.46 -1.08 0.09 -0.81 
Kurtosis 0.38 1.85 -0.10 0.98 
 
Russian Rouble Singapore Dollar Solomon Isl Dollar 
South African 
Rand 
No. of obs. 5027 5692 1880 5736 
Mean -1287.59% -1305.19% -1180.61% -1125.6% 
Standard 
Dev. 
305.47% 225.89% 261.18% 256.21% 
Skewness -0.29 -0.62 -0.19 -0.85 
Kurtosis 0.36 0.42 -1.02 0.82 






No. of obs. 5773 5387 5750 
Mean -1142.94% -1403.91% -1199.22% 
Standard 
Dev. 
226.36% 255.51% 226.73% 
Skewness -1.09 -0.61 -0.92 
Kurtosis 1.96 0.40 0.93 
 
Appendix 36 
Descriptive statistics for Absolute returns for forex markets 
 
 Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real Canadian Dollar 
No. of obs. 5840 5840 5711 5840 
Mean 0.20% 0.53% 0.59% 0.37% 
Standard 
Dev. 




Skewness 23.55 3.88 4.15 2.79 
Kurtosis 772.44 32.56 32.01 15.73 
 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5840 2829 5840 5840 
Mean 0.40% 0.067% 0.45% 0.44% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.42% 0.096% 0.41% 0.41% 
Skewness 2.87 7.25 1.85 1.85 
Kurtosis 16.52 111.70 6.43 6.44 
 Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4558 5840 4954 5840 
Mean 0.35% 0.01% 0.51% 0.21% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.47% 0.03% 0.67% 0.30% 
Skewness 24.77 6.75 8.02 3.15 
Kurtosis 1153.72 95.08 120.26 15.63 
 Indonesian 
Rupiah 
Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 
No. of obs. 5840 4954 5840 5840 
Mean 0.51% 0.27% 0.24% 0.48% 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.26% 0.44% 0.69% 0.76% 
Skewness 8.39 4.75 26.75 9.58 
Kurtosis 100.33 34.46 1214.38 155.65 
 




No. of obs. 5612 5840 5840 5455 
Mean 0.31% 0.59% 0.56% 0.26% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.61% 1.03% 0.56% 0.54% 
Skewness 8.36 13.23 2.70 6.88 
Kurtosis 140.70 348.39 13.82 82.43 
 Norwegian Krone Pakistan Rupee Polish Zloty Russian Rouble 
No. of obs. 5840 4743 5578 5272 
Mean 0.52% 0.13% 0.55% 0.46% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.50% 0.27% 0.58% 1.54% 
Skewness 2.52 5.80 2.62 16.38 
Kurtosis 13.23 45.97 11.47 363.11 
 





No. of obs. 5840 2587 5840 5840 
Mean 0.24% 0.41% 0.65% 0.40% 
Standard 
Dev. 
0.27% 0.65% 0.70% 0.76% 
Skewness 3.45 3.58 2.74 9.66 








UK Sterling  
No. of obs. 5840 5840 5840  
Mean 0.52% 0.16% 0.40%  
Standard 
Dev. 
0.48% 0.22% 0.37%  
Skewness 2.21 4.76 2.34  
Kurtosis 9.47 50.14 11.67  
 
Appendix 37  
Descriptive statistics for Squared Returns – Foreign exchange market 
 
Argentine Peso Australian Dollar Brazilian Real 
Canadian 
Dollar 
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5710 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.32% 0.03% 0.05% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.01 0.07 -1.14 -0.36 
Kurtosis 1197.70 299.53 252.71 196.74 
 Chilean Peso Chinese Yuan Danish Krone Euro 
No. of obs. 5839 2828 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.42 2.80 0.03 0.05 
Kurtosis 160.18 613.44 75.37 77.54 
 Fijian Dollar Hong Kong Dollar Icelandic Krona Indian Rupee 
No. of obs. 4557 5839 4953 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.11% 0.00% 0.04% 0.01% 
Skewness -0.27 3.82 -1.18 0.16 
Kurtosis 2257.31 1069.91 880.84 115.43 
 Indonesian Rupiah Kenyan Shilling Malaysian Ringgit Mexican Peso 
No. of obs. 5839 4953 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.20% 0.02% 0.24% 0.10% 
Skewness 0.17 1.71 0.00 1.06 
Kurtosis 308.10 179.78 2663.65 686.47 
 




No. of obs. 5611 5839 5839 5454 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.06% 0.25% 0.02% 0.04% 
Skewness 0.06 16.59 0.35 -0.09 
Kurtosis 1055.58 2280.85 96.52 732.93 




No. of obs. 5839 4742 5577 5271 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.56% 
Skewness -0.22 -0.53 -0.90 8.75 





South African Rand 
South Korean 
Won 
No. of obs. 5839 2586 5839 5839 
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Standard Dev. 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.10% 
Skewness 1.21 -1.01 -2.63 1.83 





UK Sterling  
No. of obs. 5839 5839 5839  
Mean 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
Standard Dev. 0.02% 0.00% 0.01%  
Skewness 0.69 -8.00 -0.02  
Kurtosis 85.57 749.39 129.25  
 
Briefly overviewing the first two moments of the distributions across the data sets 
does not indicate non-normality; however scrutinizing the third and fourth 
moments reveal significant deviations from normality. 
 
